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Dueling Perceptions:

British and Egyptian Interactions, 1882-1919

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Dueling Perceptions:

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Dueling Perceptions:

British and Egyptian Interactions, 1882-1919

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This study is an attempt to ascertain the degree to which occupied and occupier can truly understand each other. The focus is Egypt between 1882 and 1919. This work attempts to ascertain how a whole host of Egyptians of various outlooks perceived the British Empire that had recently occupied their country. It investigates the perceptions that each of these factions held of the British. Then, it looks into just how well those very same British occupiers understood the Egyptians they ruled. More specifically**,** the British perceptions of the prominent Egyptians with whom they either had to share some power or wished to exclude from power altogether.

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Introduction

When violent demonstrations broke out all over Egypt in 1919 after the deportation of the nationalist politicians involved in forming the *wafd*, the Egyptian nationalist delegation, the British were for the most part caught unaware. The British comprehension of Egyptian public opinion seemed woefully and dangerously out of date. The British had not realized just how thoroughly the *wafd* had managed to capture and hold Egyptian public opinion, behind their demands for complete Egyptian independence. The sudden and violent outpouring of Egyptian resentment against the British occupation was widespread and in some ways reminiscent of the 1882 Urabi revolution. The demonstrators came from all walks of life, including the previously quiescent peasant farmers -- a shocking development for the British, who had prided themselves on being the guardians of the poor farmers. Britain had conquered Egypt in 1882 with the consent of its Ottoman suzerain, but justified its continued occupation with claims of moral responsibility towards the downtrodden peasant. This violent peasant rejection of Britain's role in Egypt was an excellent indicator of just how badly the British were out of touch with Egyptian developments.

The demonstrations were eventually suppressed, but only after the use of military force and the shedding of blood. Indeed, in another echo of the initial invasion of 1882, the British dispatched a destroyer to the shores of Alexandria to remind the Egyptians of the fatal consequences of opposing British demands. But here again the British seemed to have misread the situation, for the populist involvement in the 1919 revolution was far greater than in that of 1882. In 1882 the defeat of Urabi's troops, and the surrender of the leadership, had ended the conflict and allowed Britain to offer conciliatory terms and attract collaborators. The circumstances were far different in 1919, for the unrest was far more widely spread, and the enemy was imbedded in and supported by the populace. Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, the newly appointed High Commissioner entrusted with suppressing the disturbances, quickly realized only a massive increase of British troop

numbers or negotiations could work to end the revolution permanently. The British government was persuaded of the wisdom of negotiating only too late. In the period of time preceding the outbreak of violence, the British government had ignored similar advice from Sir Reginald Wingate, its previous High Commissioner, and had missed a valuable opportunity to resolve their differences with the Egyptian nationalists in a peaceful manner. The outcome of those negotiations might have been uncertain, but they would have had a much greater chance of success than those after the outbreak of violence. After imprisoning the *wafd,* and after the violent mobilization of the Egyptian populace, Saad Zaghlul, the leader of the *wafd*, had neither the appetite nor the courage to oppose Egyptian popular will and arrive at an acceptable compromise with Great Britain. The initial bloody events of 1919 then, had serious long-term ramifications, for they poisoned the future Anglo-Egyptian relationship, to the detriment of both Egypt and Great Britain.

Given these extremely serious consequences, it is quite natural to wonder: How could the situation have deteriorated to such an extent without British awareness of increased dissatisfaction among the Egyptian population? What were some of the crucial changes between 1882 and 1919 that had caused such a broad swath of Egyptian society to unite in opposition to British presence? When and how did the British relationship with the Egyptian elite deteriorated to the point where they had alienated even long time collaborators? How, and when, had the network of local collaborators that Lord Cromer and his successor Sir Eldon Gorst so painstakingly built, collapse? On the other side of the equation, how had the ideology of Islamic reform and modernism evolved, and what effect did it have on Anglo-Egyptian relationships? How had Egyptian elite perceptions of the British changed, and how did that alter their attitudes towards the occupation?

In the course of answering these questions, this study will minutely reconstruct some often-overlooked facets of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship between 1882 and 1919. It will show the extent to which personalities and ideologies influenced the progression of events. It will trace how and why the adherents of reform, who had cooperated fully with Cromer, Britain's first Agent to Egypt, no longer saw their interests

aligned with those of Great Britain. In addition this study will assess the consequences of this realignment and reveal just how important interpersonal relationships were in assuring the smooth conduct of Anglo-Egyptian affairs; as well as the negative repercussions of ignoring these relationships. This is absolutely vital to understanding the gradual hardening of attitudes among the majority of the Egyptian intelligentsia towards the occupation. It also has the added advantage of revealing why Lord Alfred Milner's vision in 1920 of renewed Anglo-Egyptian collaboration was unsustainable given the changed attitudes of Egypt's most influential nationalists.

Saad Zaghlul was one such Egyptian reformer whose attitudes towards Great Britain underwent extreme change. Zaghlul was influenced by the ideology of Islamic reform and was a willing collaborator under both Cromer and Gorst. However, during Kitchener's tenure as Agent, Zaghlul's position transformed radically. A conflict of personalities and ideologies between Kitchener and Zaghlul drove the latter to become the most effective of Britain's opponents. The examination of Zaghlul's altered perceptions of Great Britain between 1912 and 1914 help us understand just how such clashes of personalities and ideologies could result in a larger intractable conflict. The same is equally true when one examines Kitchner's perceptions of the Egyptians with whom he worked. Fundamentally, this project contends that conflicts of personalities and ideologies, and the often-misinformed perceptions that British and Egyptian individuals had of each other, were undoubtedly major contributing factors behind the violent events of 1919. A better understanding of these people and their relationships is the key to a better understanding of the course of events in Egypt in 1919.

In a broad sense, this study is an attempt to ascertain the degree to which occupied and occupier can truly understand each other**.** This work attempts to determine how a whole host of Egyptians perceived the British Empire that had occupied their country since 1882, it then attempts to determine just how well those very same British occupiers understood the Egyptians over whom they ruled. More specifically**,** the British perceptions of the prominent Egyptians with whom they either had to share some power or wished to exclude from power altogether. Why this importance attributed to

perceptions? Very plainly it is because people often act or react based on what they perceive to be occurring and not what is occurring in reality. Perception drives action. This is true with regards to individuals and institutions and governments.

Egypt is ideal for this kind of case study for several reasons. First it was the first of the Arab and Muslim countries of the Middle East to be occupied by a western and Christian Power. Second, unlike India, it enjoyed a much greater degree of homogeneity when it came to religion. The vast majority of the Egyptian population, close to 90 percent, was Muslim. This made mass movements more likely, and the program of divide and conquer more difficult to apply. Yet another notable aspect of the British occupation of Egypt was the fact that in principle it was to be a temporary occupation and one that was undertaken with the agreement of the Ottoman Sultan Egypt's suzerain, and the Khedive Egypt's Viceroy. Hence the occupation was governed, at least in principle, by a set of complex agreements between the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the European Powers who held a significant portion of Egypt's public debt. In essence, the initial conquest of Egypt by 1882 was an extreme form of foreclosure on property for delinquent debt payment. This was also an invasion that crushed a nascent indigenous nationalist movement, in the form of the Urabi Revolution. Unlike many other European conquests in the East during the 19th century, Egypt had already experienced the inklings of a nationalist movement that could excite large portions of the populace in its support. For all these reasons having an accurate perception of the native population was crucial to the British occupation.

The presentation of this dissertation is relatively straightforward. Excluding the Introduction and conclusion, it is comprised of four chapters**,** each written to stand independently, but with a clear thematic link binding them. Chapter One covers the Islamists, reformers and nationalists that were influenced by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's reform ideology and who subsequently influenced Egyptian events between 1882 and 1919. The individuals introduced in Chapter One are also the subject of the second chapter as we examine their perceptions and understanding of the British Empire and the Anglo-Egyptian relationship. In an attempt to develop as comprehensive a picture of

events in Egypt between 1882 and 1919 Chapter Three presents the various British Agents who served in Egypt from 1882 to 1919. Their backgrounds and personalities are covered so as to allow the reader to understand how those shaped the Anglo-Egyptian relationship. The fourth chapter then turns towards the Islamists, reformers and nationalists, but this time by examining British perceptions and understanding of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship. The first two chapters and the second two chapters are thus intimately coupled. The first part of each pair presents a certain number of individuals and ideas for discussion, while the second gives them voice by allowing them to speak for themselves.

The first chapter introduces the Muslim reformers, modernists, and nationalists involved in Egyptian affairs in the late 19th and early 20th century. Those individuals include Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Abdallah al-Nadim, Mustafa Kamil, Rashid Rida, Saad Zaghlul and ‘Ali Abd al-Raziq. Not all will receive equal attention, and a few will not have their narrative continued in all the succeeding chapters, but all are of some importance and interest. In addition to introducing their backgrounds and personalities, this chapter presents their ideological programs or the schools of thought to which they belonged. A common trend in all these schools of thought is that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani served as their originator or progenitor. It was he who brought a new spirit of Muslim reform to Egypt. In Egypt**,** his school of thought evolved dramatically, branching out and mutating with each successive generation. The second chapter, or its couple, continues the story of these individuals by focusing on their perceptions of the British Empire.

The third and fourth chapters of this study**,** as indicated earlier, also form a close couple. Chapter Three introduces the reader to the British Agents and High Commissioners in Egypt from 1883 through 1919. It examines their lives, and more significantly, their character, with an eye to understanding how these personalities contributed to the improvement or worsening of Anglo-Egyptian relations. Chapter four then examines the correspondence sent to the British government by the Anglo-Egyptian

officials, regarding many of the individuals introduced in the first chapter. It is a look at the reformers, modernists and nationalists of Egypt through, British eyes.

Many works have remarked on the inability of the British Government to comprehend accurately what was going on in Egypt. Even knowledgeable contemporaries such as Cromer commented on this fact in his book, *Modern Egypt* (1908). George A. Lloyd, the High Commissioner in Egypt between 1925 and 1929 repeated the refrain in *Egypt Since Cromer* (1908). In addition John Darwin's work, *Britain Egypt and the Middle East* (1981) highlights some of the most serious issues that plagued the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, including the differences of view between the Milner Mission and the Agency in Cairo. Never to my knowledge, though, has there been an attempt to track and analyze the correspondence between Cairo and London; over a long period of time. That is exactly what Chapter Four endeavors to do.

This project builds upon, but also significantly adds to the existing literature on the Islamists, reformers and nationalists by paying careful attention to the external political factors that influenced them. The most notable of these external political factors was the Anglo-Egyptian administration. This careful attention to the external political factors, is what makes this work different from those that have preceded it. Noteworthy among those previous works is Hamid Enayat's *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (1982) This work deserves high praise for its thorough treatment of the various trends of Muslim political thought as well as the clarity with which it draws many of the connections between these schools of thought. His work is especially praiseworthy for the efforts he took to incorporate Shii political thought into the discourse. In order to accomplish this, though, he had to focus on internal developments, and consequently downplayed how the British occupation administration affected the reformers in Egypt. Enayat also does not fully expose the roots of many of the seemingly secular nationalists within these various schools of Muslim reform.

This project also shares relatively superficial similarities with four prominent works: Albert Hourani's *Arab Thought in the Liberal Age* (1970), Anouar Abdel-Malek, *Contemporary Arab Political Thought* (1983) and Majid Khadduri's, *Political Trends in*

the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics (1970) and Arthur Goldschmidt's *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt* (1999). The obvious similarities rest on the choice of characters for this study, most of whom have been discussed in the works just mentioned. The current work differs substantially from all four in its exclusive focus on the Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani school, which sprang up in Cairo and was expanded on by his intellectual heirs. It is also obviously quite different in scope, as it is a significant study of interaction between these figures and the British Empire, something outside the realm of all these works. Badawi's work on *The Reformers of Egypt* (1978) is another excellent work. Yet it focused exclusively on al-Afghani, Abduh, and Rida, the ideologues of the reform movement, while ignoring the political activists deeply influenced by it. While Badawi focused on the interaction of western and Islamic ideas, and ignored the political compromise that often resulted. Readers familiar with Nikki Keddi's, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism* (1968) will find certain similarities between that work and the section of this work focusing on al-Afghani. In this narrative**,** though**,** al-Afghani will be dealt with as part of a much greater whole. Rashid Rida and his perceptions of the West, have also been a subject of study by Emad Eldin Shahin. Shahin's work *Through Muslim Eyes: M. Rashid Rida and the West* (1993) focuses solely on Rida and follows his steps beyond the timeframe of this study. Its careful attention to the evolution of Rida's ideas on westernization and modernization is well done. Rida the political thinker truly comes through in this work. Shahin though studied Rida from a single perspective, relying heavily on *al-Manar* to form his narrative of events. The narrative then relies on Rida's absolute veracity when discussing his dealings with the British. This work will address this imbalance by presenting Rida's views of the British as *elucidated in al-Manar* but the British perspective of him as well. A very recent publication that also deserves mention is Charles Tripp's *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism* (2006) This valuable new contribution to the field of Islamic Studies discusses in some detail the attempts by various Muslim societies to apply the teachings of the reformers such as al-Afghani and Abduh to the economic field. It is a study of various attempts to render modern western-derived

capitalist systems more compatible with Islamic principles. Although the aims of Tripp's study are quite different from the ones envisioned for this dissertation, it reaffirms the assertion herein of al-Afghani's and Abduh's influence on the thinking of subsequent Muslim reformers and modernists.

A quick note with regarding the Arabic historiography: There are substantial studies in Arabic on many of the individuals included in this chapter, to which this work is indebted. The literature can be extremely detailed in its treatment of the individuals and of many aspects of their ideology, but it rarely looks at the way that their ideas evolved in response to political changes, which is again one of the unique features of this study. The Arabic literature is also unfortunately still incapable of impartially considering the often-intimate ties that many of those figures had with the British Administration. This is possibly due to the nationalist sentiments of many of their readers, but it nevertheless creates a lacuna in their studies difficult to ignore. Despite this, there are many works of high standard. Notable among those is Amal Fahmy's *al-Alaqat al-Masriyyah al-Uthmaniyah fi Ahd al-Ihtilal al-Britani* (2002). The value of this work on the Ottoman-Egyptian relations during the period of the British occupation is exacting in its utilization of the sources and its careful discussion of the Egyptian nationalist parties and their ties with the Ottoman Empire.

The larger usefulness and relevance of a study such as this is apparent when one considers the nature of many of today's ongoing conflicts. The lack of comprehension among diverse peoples across the globe is the same today in many respects as it was in the heyday of the British Empire. Faulty perceptions continue to lead modern nations into disastorous and unintended actions. Perceptions themselves were in turn nourished by misinformation and oftentimes prejudice. Can occupier and occupied ever truly understand each other? One must conclude that two opposing forces will always prefer to deal with their perception of reality, and not with reality itself.

Reformers, Islamists, and Nationalists: Evolution of an Ideology

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to a host of influential Islamic reformers, modernists, and Egyptian nationalists from the late 19th and early 20th century. Some of these individuals were not of Egyptian descent, but all resided and worked in Egypt; and undoubtedly had significant impact on the development of modern Egyptian political thought. Moreover, they were, no matter what their ideological leanings, concerned with the empowerment and advancement of their society. Furthermore, all these individuals were to some extent Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani's intellectual and ideological descendants. However, as al-Afghani's ideas were disseminated, individuals adapted them to best suit their own purposes. These adaptations of al-Afghani's original ideas will be carefully covered in this chapter. The result will be an essay that combines a study of individuals and their lives as well as their contributions to the growth, evolution, and permutations of an ideology.

Understanding exactly how this ideology of Muslim reform and modernization can grow, evolve and mutate will allow the reader to grasp the complex and often tortured path that a progressive idea might take. It will also help to clarify how it is that the inheritors of the same intellectual teachings and ideological beliefs can still differ vastly in the perception of the world around them. The reader will see how the same teachings that originated with al-Afghani could be adapted in the Egyptian context to allow for the existence of reform-minded collaborators, radical nationalists, and later on fundamental Islamists. This will help to explain the vast variance in outlook with regard to the British occupation of Egypt, from a whole host of individuals that claimed al-Afghani's ideas as their inspiration. Moreover, they were, no matter their ideological leanings, concerned with the empowerment and advancement of their society. All were working to accomplish this goal at the time when Egypt was under British occupation.

It is fair to say that few Muslim reform minded intellectuals have had as many pages dedicated to them as al-Afghani. As an intellectual and firebrand orator, al-Afghani had few rivals. He managed to have himself expelled from Constantinople,

Cairo, and even had his publication shut down in Paris thanks to British pressure. But, again we must look at the generation of students he left behind, and their students after them, to understand his impact.

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani

Jamal al-Din-al-Afghani was intellectually and politically active during the latter part of the 19th century. His national origins are an issue of contention. By his own account he was born at *As'ad Abad*, near Kabul, in Afghanistan. Western and Persian scholarship has tended to place his birthplace as a village near *Hamadan* in Persia, and his religious upbringing as possibly Shii.[1] Al-Afghani likely claimed Afghanistan as his place of birth when he traveled and taught in Sunni Muslim countries, since identifying himself as Shi'i would have not have allowed him entry into the world of the Sunni elite. His education is also of no help to those trying to determine his place of origin, as he received it in different parts of Persia and Afghanistan as well as India. It was in India at the age of eighteen that he was exposed to western learning and the possibilities of Muslim reform. In the late 1850's al-Afghani entered the service of Amir Dust Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan. After Dust's death he entered the service of one of his sons, Muhammad Azam, but that proved unfruitful as Azam ultimately lost out to one of his brothers in the Afghan civil war.[2] This necessitated Afghani's departure to healthier climes. No matter what his origins, his influence transcended any one geographical region and made itself known throughout the Islamic world. This is especially true of Egypt, "the country where his legacy is most strongly felt."[3] Indeed, al-Afghani has become part of Egyptian myth, as he is today often viewed "as a crucial link in establishing Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and the united Muslim defiance of western imperialism."[4]

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[1] Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London, 1933) p. 4; Nikki Keddi, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism,* (Berkeley, 1968) pp. 5-11
[2] Ibid., p. 5
[3] Rudi Matthee, "Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the Egyptian National Debate," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21, no. 2, (May, 1989) pp. 151-169
[4] Ibid., p. 153

Although the legacy and myth of al-Afghani have not been without their critics, there has never been a shortage of authors who are quick to respond to these critics and to reaffirm his status. The fierce debate in the mid 1990's between Louis Awad, a Coptic Christian literary figure and critic of al-Afghani, and Muhammad Imara, is a perfect example. At the heart of this debate were the accusations by Awad that Afghani sought to conceal his Persian, and hence heterodox Shi'i origins, and that at his very core he was a political opportunist. These claims were not completely original, as Nikki Keddi had already trod that path, but their publication in Arabic by an Egyptian author made them an issue of great contention.

Al-Afghani as an intellectual was firmly grounded in the Islamic traditions of learning. His scholarship was very much reliant on the medieval Islamic philosophers but onto this base were grafted certain modern aspects and concepts.[5] Rather than detracting from its worth this hybridization actually enhanced his scholarship, as it placed these modern concepts in a familiar setting to a Muslim reader hence making it less foreign and more easily assimilated. One cannot underestimate the value of this ability, as al-Afghani was attempting to reform Egyptian and Muslim society as a whole by introducing into it elements of western science and philosophy. Afghani saw these elements as crucial to the empowerment and advancement of Islamic society in the face of western hegemony. Their introduction, though, was hardly a simple matter of translation and publication. al-Afghani and his fellow modernists and reformers understood that the initial resistance of Muslim scholars and Muslim society to the introduction of western philosophical and scientific concepts could destroy their hopes for reform and revival. To them then fell the task of presenting this foreign material in a familiar and acceptable manner.

This is demonstrated clearly in his article "On the Types of Despotic Governments" published in the May 24, 1879 issue of the magazine *Misr,*.[6] Although

[5] L.M. Kenny, "Al-Afghani on Types of Despotic Governments," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 86, no. 1, (Jan. – Mar. 1966) pp.19-27. Translation of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's "Despotic Governments," with forward and analysis by L.M Kenny.
[6] Ibid., pp. 21-27

recognizing the superior nature of the republican style of government[7], he was forced to admit to the impossibility of its contemporaneous application. This, he argued, was due to Muslim rulers and elites having abandoned the true Islamic sciences of political philosophy.[8] By this argument al-Afghani was laying claim to political philosophy as a true Islamic science, and not an alien concept. Hence the concept of representational government was not a western import but an Islamic tradition.

Intelligent enough to realize the resistance of entrenched political interests to such concepts even when justified by Islam, he sought at the very least the implementation of an informed and "enlightened government." He stated that "wise leaders know that the foundations of the kingdom and the lives of its subjects are agriculture, industry and commerce." Yet, the "mastery of these things come about only" with the acquisition of "true beneficial science and the useful arts." Those in turn required the establishment of "well organized schools run by skillful teachers of virtuous character," who exhibited patience and compassion towards their students. Secondary to this was the "provision of agricultural tools and industrial machinery," as well as the facilitating of the means of communication and commerce.[9] All these factors, along with the application of democratic principles, and strict accounting and statistical practices to ward off waste and cultivate capital, were seen as key factors in the success of the West.[10] Although al-Afghani's understanding of the reasons behind western success was at that stage not fully developed, and was lacking truly perceptive depth, his approach was nonetheless outward-looking and sought to effect change in Muslim society as a whole. He promoted a two-pronged approach, first the "support [of] religious leaders who sought to revive Islam, and second, a tolerant attitude towards those who advocated the adoption of

[7] Note: al-Afghani would become a major proponent of constitutionalism and representative government. He used the Islamic concept of *shura* to argue that representative government was actually prescribed by Islam. He took his argument even further and argued that power and authority rested with the people. In this manner some in the religious establishment were brought over to the support of these liberal ideas. See Khadduri p. 29-30. The problems arose "once the liberals succeeded in establishing modern institutions, they ignored the role of the religious groups," looking westwards exclusively. p. 41. Hence the failure of the religious establishments support of these liberal ideals led to a backlash against them as well as a 'moral crisis,' p. 55.
[8] Ibid., p.21
[9] Ibid., p. 25
[10] Ibid., p 22, 26

European civilization."[11] Unfortunately he never formulated a coherent system that indicated how his ideas could be put into practice. Previous attempts to introduce aspects of modernity, whether by Muhammad Ali of Egypt, or the Ottoman Sultans had not proven very successful, but it must be noted that their primary concern had been changes in the army and bureaucracy, and not to society as a whole.

This modernist penchant for reliance on science and its equation with reason and rationality eventually led, according to one commentator, to the modernist's "rejection of the traditional, theological and philosophical understanding, and to the acceptance of new philosophical and theological interpretations that [were] based only on science."[12] These beliefs were of course to bring the adherents of the modernist school of thought into direct conflict with the traditionalists. To many of the traditionalists, such an approach verged on heresy or *bidah*. In any case, they were neither equipped nor willing to engage in such a radical departure in the study of theology.

Al-Afghani also railed against sectarianism, laying at its door a good deal of the blame for Muslim backwardness. Not since Nadir Shah, founder of the "short lived *Afsharid* state in Iran" during the seventeenth century, had any serious efforts been made to address the Shi'i-Sunni enmity. For al-Afghani, and to a lesser extent his students, "Islamic unity" was an article of faith.[13] The end of sectarianism was also inherent to the spirit of "[r]ationalisms, which governed the better part of the modernists reformulation of the Islamic spiritual heritage."[14] Such unity was necessary on a very basic level since it was crucial to the struggle against western domination. It was a reasoned and rational response to evolving challenges.

Al-Afghani, and to a greater extent his student Muhammad Abduh, took a very bold stance with regard to the adoption of modern sciences. Empirical science to them stood as the highest form of reason. Since rationalism and reason were the bywords of

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[11] Majid Khadduri, *Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics* (Johns Hopkins, 1970, 1972) p 57
[12] Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb* (Beirut, 1992) p. 132
[13] Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Though* (Texas, 1982) pp. 40-41
[14] Ibid., p. 42

the Islamic modernists, these principles were to be rigorously applied in the understanding of holy writ. This opened the Muslim modernists to the accusation of adopting the views of the schismatic *Mu'tazilah* of the 8th-9th centuries. The *Mu'tazilah* were "associated with the first attempts to reconcile reason and revelation in Islam." They, like the modernists were "willing to borrow non-Islamic intellectual tools in order to defend their faith."[15] However intellectually apt this association might have been, it could hardly have been welcomed, carrying as it did the prejudice of centuries and the label of heresy.

Al-Afghani's persistent calls for reform proved increasingly upsetting to the Muslim rulers and elite of Egypt. As a consequence he was expelled from Egypt in 1879. He then moved to India and eventually to Paris where in 1883, with the assistance of his former student Muhammad Abduh, he published an Arabic language weekly, *al Urwa al'Wuthqa* (The Firmest Bond). As mentioned earlier, this journal was, according to the authors, forced to shut down in 1884 after only 18 issues due to British pressure. The content of this journal will receive much closer examination in the next chapter, as we consider the authors' perception of British actions.

Al-Afghani's legacy is in some ways quite problematic. A Muslim reformer and modernist, and defender of his faith against secular and Christian aspersions, he nevertheless left little in the way of a concrete program for the practical reconciliation of Islam and modernity. As Nikki Keddi aptly pointed out: "if al-Afghani were mainly pragmatic or political, there is no reason to expect from him a well thought out reconstruction of the Islamic religion."[16] This is quite true as far as it goes, but how pragmatic al-Afghani was is a matter open to serious debate. Despite his seeming familiarity with the British Empire and with the West and the tremendous inequality of power between them and the Muslim world, al-Afghani promoted anti-British activism to the point that it was actually detrimental to his cause of reform. His rejection of collaboration and accommodation at all stages did not take into account the realities of

[15] Ibid., p. 8
[16] Keddi., p. 44

balance of power and the inequality of means. Such an uncompromising attitude is hardly in keeping with the description of him as a pragmatist. Al-Afghani might have sown the seed of reform in the Middle East, but it actually required others, of more moderate personalities, to cultivate it.

Muhammad Abduh

Just as important as the written legacy left behind by Afghani were his cadre of dedicated followers of whom Muhammad Abduh was the most prominent. In the inimitable style that has made his work such a success, the prominent Middle East scholar Albert Hourani provides the following description of Abduh:

> A photograph taken on the terrace of the House of Commons when he visited England in 1884 shows a handsome man, well built, dark of complexion, with a tranquil and almost melancholy charm that does not quite conceal the look of conviction in his eyes. In later years the gentleness increased, and those who knew him well were conscious of his kindness and intelligence and a certain spiritual beauty. He was on good terms both with Cromer and with the most eloquent of his critics, Wilfrid Blunt, and he had around him a group of devoted friends and followers who were to become prominent in the life of Egypt. But the intransigence was still there.[17]

Indeed his ability to reach accommodation with his adversaries and survive politically has often opened Abduh to accusations of being more interested in his personal position than in the cause of reform and revival.

Abduh was born in Egypt in 1849. His family was not particularly affluent, yet he was schooled in the mosque school in Tanta, north of Cairo. After his early schooling he moved to Cairo in order to continue his education at the al-Azhar University, which at the time was regarded as the premier center of Sunni Muslim learning in the world. Indeed "no school existed that could vie with it . . . by the

[17] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* (London, 1970) p. 135. This description has been often quoted. For example, Donald Reid, "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age Twenty Years Later," *International Journal for Middle East Studies*14, no. 4 (Nov., 1982) pp. 541-557.

turn of the century… a census of its foreign students justified the claim that in the realm of knowledge it was the *Ka`ba,* comparable to the pilgrimage shrine at Makka"[18] Although this census came quite a bit later than the date of Abduh's attendance as a student, Al-Azhar's reputation was one of long standing. In 1877 Abduh received his degree of '*alim* from Al-Azhar, but only after the rector at the time, Shaikh Muhammad Ali-Abbasi, intervened on his behalf with the examining committee. Abduh's status as al-Afghani's student, and his championing of change and modernization, had upset many of the conservative *ulama*, who would have gladly denied him his degree as '*alim,* without which he could not teach. Indeed, the greatest influence on Abduh as a student were not the teachers or teachings at al-Azhar, which he would later claim had done much more harm to his intellect than good, but those of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. As a result of his attachment to Afghani and his message of reform and modernization, when Khedive Tawfiq exiled al-Afghani from Egypt in 1879, Abduh also was banished to his home village. It was hoped that this would eventually silence their reform message. Fortunately for Abduh, upon the return of the liberal Prime Minister Riad Pasha from a trip abroad, he was recalled to Cairo in 1880 to assume the editorship of an official gazette called, *Al-Waqai' al-Misriyyah* (Egyptian Events).[19]

By the time of the 1882 Urabi revolution, Abduh had become deeply involved in this event. He utilized his position as the editor of the official *Al-Wakai al-Masriyyah*, and as the general censor of the local press, to promote the cause of the revolution.[20] When the revolution was crushed, Abduh was sentenced to three years in exile. After a brief stay in Beirut, he joined his

[18] Chris A. Eccel, *Egypt Islam and Social Change: Al-Azhar in Conflict and Accommodation*(Berlin, 1984) p. 295
[19]Adams, p. 46
[20] Ibid., p. 53. Note: The word Revolution is used here in the full meaning of the term eschewing the description of the events of 1882 classification, as a "Revolt." The movement marshaled a large portion of the populace not just the army and hence deserves to be described as a full-fledged revolution. As to whether or not it was a Nationalist Revolution, Perhaps, the more cautious labeling of proto-Nationalist is appropriate.

former mentor al-Afghani in Paris and helped him to publish *Al Urwa l'Wuthqa*. In 1884, after the closure of the paper, he returned to Beirut and taught at an Islamic school until his return to Egypt in 1888.

Having departed from al-Afghani's belief in the necessity of confronting the British Occupation directly, Abduh became a friend to the British Agent Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer. Soon after his return from exile the Khedive Tawfiq appointed him as a judge in the newly formed "native courts." These courts had been introduced to enforce the new non-*Shari'ah* derived code of law. Abduh then began his ascent of the ladder of officialdom under the auspices of Tawfiq and with the full approval of the British. In 1895 he was appointed to the new administrative council of Al-Azhar University and four years later he was named Grand Mufti of Egypt. He thus became responsible for the country's religious courts as well as an official advisor to the government on all issues that infringed on Islamic law. He retained his position as Grand Mufti until his death in 1905.

Abduh's aims were much like those of his mentor, even if he settled on different methods to carry them out. Abduh grew to see the British occupation of Egypt as an opportunity to advance his reform project. Reform had to be initiated, Muslim society had to be empowered, and the relative freedom of the press which the British guaranteed early on in their occupation was crucial to the broadcasting of these ideas. His task was daunting as he "was forced to present rather than withhold ideas as the question of preserving the stability of the community was no longer relevant," given what he believed to be the moral collapse of that community.[21] The challenge was tremendous, for all new ideas had to be presented in a manner that would not alienate the majority of conservative opinion. Alienation ran the risk of rendering all attempted reform ineffective. Fortunately, he was well equipped to master this task, for while not a traditionalist, he was conservative by nature. The result was that while the

[21] Charles D. Smith, " 'The Crisis of Orientation' : The Shift of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects in the 1930's" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, no. 4 (Oct., 1973) p.390

"foundation of his thought was Islamic," he perceived and preached that "the 'praiseworthy aim' of revitalizing the community demanded the inculcation of Western ideas."[22]

There were limits to this inculcation. The wholesale importation of western culture was hardly what Abduh strove for. He believed that the solution to the stagnation of Islamic society rested in Islam itself. It was not Islam, "whose truth is valid for all times," that was the cause of Muslim stagnation and decadence but rather the Muslims themselves.[23] His aim was to introduce into Muslim society the modern sciences and modern methods of scientific investigation that would in turn help the faithful better understand their religion. Mastery of these implied the acquisition of reason and rationalism. Once that occurred, Muslim society could discriminately and intelligently import western ideas that would help advance it.[24] It could also intelligently reject those aspects of modern western society that could harm the integrity of the Islamic community.

With those views in mind, Abduh opposed the adoption of western laws and institutions, despite having served as a judge on the secular courts. The needs of modernity in his view did not necessitate such an adoption. Adapting to modernity could be done within the bounds of *shari'ah*, which carried within it "boundless resources for legal innovation." It was blind orthodoxy that had "fostered the misconception that Islam by its very nature [was] incapable of coping with the growing complexity of modern life, and Muslims therefore had to have recourse to foreign laws."[25]Once they had mastered the modern scientific methods, which were in any case part of their heritage, then Muslims would be able to find in the *Shari'ah* all the answers they needed.

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[22] Ibid.,
[23] Majid Fakhry, "The Theocratic Idea of the Islamic State in Recent Controversies," *Royal Institute for International Affairs* 30, no. 4(October, 1954) 450-462. p.454
[24] Khadduri, p. 60
[25] Enayat, p. 78

This kind of approach that praised the modern western sciences and urged their adoption, along with his powerful endorsement of true Islam and his stress on its adaptability, made Abduh the darling of many on both sides of the ideological divide. Those desiring to adapt to the West found support for their position in his attitudes, but so did those who argued that Islam contained within itself the seeds of advancement. This would pose a problem since Abduh, much like al-Afghani, also failed to create a functional system that would harmonize between the two aspects of his plan for reform.[26]

Abdallah al-Nadim

A close contemporary of Abduh and a fellow revolutionary, Abdallah al-Nadim, perhaps the staunchest critic of the British Occupation, deserves mention here as well. Although not a great thinker like al-Afghani or Abduh, al-Nadim was a revolutionary through and through. He was a pioneer political satirist whose work inspired many of the younger generation of nationalists, such as Mustafa Kamil. Al-Nadim was born in 1843 to Musbah Ibn Ibrahim, a migrant laborer who had moved from the countryside to Alexandria seeking employment in the new government industries. His early education was at the local kuttab or religious school, where he acquired the basics of reading, writing and religious studies. He then attended the *Jami al-Anwar* to continue his education, but left his studies before their completion to join a band of wandering poets and performers. Tiring of life on the road, al-Nadim next moved to Cairo and joined the telegraphy school. Upon completing his coursework he worked for the railroad and afterwards at one of the royal palaces for the Khedieve Ismail's mother. He was later fired from this job for a mistake in deciphering a telegram, which made him quite resentful of the Kedieval family.[27] After a new period of wandering, he made the acquaintance of Shahin Pasha Kenj in Tanta in 1876.

[26] Ibid., pp. 64-65
[27] Nazih Hamzeh, *Abdallah al-Nadim, Sirra Attira…Wa Hayat Hafilla* (Cairo, 2000) p. 47

Kenj was one of the founders of *al-hizb al-watani.* (Nationalist Party, although distinct from the later party of the same name).

Eventually, al-Nadim returned to Cairo and became a frequent visitor to the coffee house where al-Afghani held his meetings. In al-Afghani, al-Nadim found a mentor and an inspiration. From him he learned the finer aspects of public speaking. He eventually joined *al-hizb al-watani,* on whose behalf he employed his newly acquired oratorical skills.[28] In 1879 while on a trip to Alexandria he also joined *Misr al-Fatat*, a new political organization founded by a number of officers in the Egyptian Army. Upon the accession of the Khedieve Tawfiq to the throne, Afghani was banished from Egypt and his former students harassed by the authorities. In response to this al-Nadim founded his own newspaper in the autumn of 1882, *al-Tankit wa al-Tabkit* (The Amusing and the Saddening), so as to continue his mentor's message. His talent was in writing amusing allegorical stories that sought to educate as well as entertain. They were social critiques written in a form accessible to a very wide audience.[29] They were also an attempt to impart many of the lessons of al-Afghani and the modernist reformers to those lower down the ladder of society.[30]

Al-Nadim also played a key role in the 1882 Urabi revolution. The task of gaining the support of the peasants fell to him, and in this he was quite successful. In September of 1881 when Urabi and the army demonstrated in Cairo, al-Nadim was among the leaders of the demonstrations. He also founded a new journal *Al-Taif* that became the voice of the revolution. After the failure of the revolution and Urabi's surrender, Al-Nadim fled into the countryside a wanted man. His popularity was such among the peasants that he was able to remain hidden among them for nine years.[31] In 1891 he was finally captured and

[28] Hamzeh, p. 49
[29] Ibid., p. 52
[30] The story of *Arabi Tafarnaj* (An Arab "gone western"), is a perfect example of this. It concludes with a pithy remark on the superficiality of those who forget their own origins and can only imperfectly and stupidly imitate others that they understand even less.
[31] Muhammad Ahmad Khalaf Allah, *Abdallah al-Nadim, Mouthakaratih al-Siyyassiah* (Cairo, 1956) p. 15

banished to Jaffa in Palestine. His exile though was of short duration and he returned to Egypt in early 1893 after the death of the Khedieve Tawfiq. The new Khedieve, Abass II, pardoned him on the condition that he neither write about nor get involved in politics.[32]

The restrictions on him were later relaxed and he was licensed to launch a new newspaper, *al-Ustadh* (The Teacher). He dedicated the *Ustadh* to the staunch support of the khedival authority and criticism of the British occupation and western imperialism in general. *Al-Ustadh* eventually attracted the ire of the British and their allies, and al-Nadim was once again exiled to Jaffa in June 1893, likely at the behest of the British authorities.[33] During this second period of exile in Jaffa, he began criticizing the Ottoman Sultan Abdel Hamid. This resulted in his transfer to Istanbul, where he was reunited with his old mentor, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, as compulsory "guests" of the Sultan. He died in Istanbul in 1896, leaving behind two important legacies, his writings and the influence he exercised over a rising young nationalist, Mustafa Kamil.

As a populist publicist and orator al-Nadim had outstanding skills. Had al-Nadim had the time and resources, he might even have been able to mobilize the Egyptian population in 1882, much in the same way that Zaghlul managed to do in 1919. In the final instance though, al-Nadim was a follower and not a leader. Once attached to a cause or a person, whether the Urabi revolt, or the Khedive Abbas Hilmy, he was mostly uncritical and unquestioning. His talent was in mobilizing the masses, yet he rarely decided the ends to which they were to be mobilized. In 1882 those ends were disastrous and led to the destruction of Alexandria and conquest of Egypt. In 1893 the consequences were less grievous, but he once again had to leave his homeland, and left the Khedive Abbas, his sponsor, in a weakened position.

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[32] Hamzeh, p. 82

[33] Anwar
Abdel-Malek, ed., *Contemporary Arab Political Thought* (London, 1983) p. 88

Muhammad Rashid Rida

The great challenges faced by Abduh and al-Afghani paled in comparison to the dilemmas faced by their students. In 1921 Mustafa Kamil Ataturk and the Grand National Assembly stripped the post of Caliphate of all temporal power. They followed up on this in 1924 by abolishing the post and banishing the last Ottoman Sultan from Turkey. The end of the Caliphate produced the idea of the Islamic State as a utopian alternative. This concept could accommodate the new post-Ottoman reality and the advent of the nation-states in the Muslim world. It was Muhammad Rashid Rida, Abduh's pupil and biographer, who became "in many ways the founding theoretician of the Islamic State in its modern sense."[34]

Born in the small coastal town of *al-Qalamuwn* close to Tripoli in modern day Lebanon in 1865, Rida later migrated to Cairo, although his connection to what was then known as *bilad al-Sham* remained quite firm.[35] His family claimed descent from the prophet Muhammad, through the *Husayni* branch, and they made use of the honorary title of *Sayyid*. Rida went to some pains in stressing this connection, even signing some of his works "Rashid Rida al-Husayni," possibly to give himself and his work more validity and respect.[36] His early education began at the local *kuttab* in Tripoli. He then spent a year at a government primary school, which taught both Arabic and Turkish, after which he joined the Islamic National School in Tripoli. The government refused to recognize this school as a religious institution and to exempt its students from military service, which led to its closure. He then completed his education under the private tutelage of Sheikh Husayn al-Jisr, the founder of the ill-fated National Islamic School.[37] Upon completing his education with al-Jissr, Rida attempted to make contact with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani seeking to become one

[34] Abdel-Malek., p.69
[35] Ahmad al-Sharbasy, *Rashid Rida Sahib al-Manar, A'srah wa Hayatih wa Masdir Thaqafatih,* (UAR, 1970) p.102.
[36] Ibid. pp.105-106
[37] Ibid., pp.120-122

of his pupils. Rida was disappointed in this, as he received no response and al-Afghani died before he could pursue the matter further. His next step was to seek out Muhammad Abduh, whose acquaintance he had initially made in Beirut. In order to renew the acquaintance Rida decided to move to Cairo in 1898.

Not long after his arrival he began the publication of a journal, *al-Manar,* (the Lighthouse), with the encouragement and support of Muhammad Abduh. The purpose of *al-Manar* was to publicize of the Islamic reform program along the lines advocated by Muhammad Abduh. In fact, until Abduh's death in 1905, his was the spirit who guided it. As a consequence of his ownership of *al-Manar* and his promotion of peaceful Islamic reform, Rida's fame grew. This allowed him to travel to Istanbul in 1909, immediately after the constitutional revolution, to look into the possibility of setting up a new Islamic reform school. He was also actively involved in attempting to work out some of the issues of contention between the Turks and their Arab subjects. His reputation was not just limited to the Middle East. Rida traveled to India at the invitation of Shaykh Shibli al-Ni'mani in 1912, where he meet some of the most renowned Indian *ulama* including Abd al-Haqq al-Baghdadi, the teacher of Arabic at Deoband.[38]

Rida traveled widely in the Muslim world, which undoubtedly confirmed his views on the necessity of Muslim cooperation. Prior to the First World War, Rida had supported the Ottoman Empire because of its connotations of Islamic universalism. He believed that, if properly reformed, the Ottoman Empire could play a positive role in promoting cooperation among the various Muslim nations, kingdoms, and populations. His support, though, was tempered by the failed promises of the 1908 revolution. The Young Turks (Ijtihad Party) had swept into power in 1908 pledging "to establish communal equality and safeguard human rights."[39] Unfortunately for those within the Empire who had placed their hopes in the Young Turks, what actually followed was a policy of Turkification.

[38] al-Shrbasi., pp.149-152
[39] R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World,* 2nd ed. (Syracuse,1985, 1995) p.24

Launched by the Empire in an attempt to bind its subjects to it, this policy led instead to the alienation of the Arab populations.[40] During the war itself the British kept Rida under close surveillance in Egypt, not for supporting the Ottomans, but rather for urging his fellow Arabs not to trust British promises.[41] Postwar events, especially consequences stemming from the Balfour declaration, irrevocably convinced him of the rightness of his previous warnings. By 1924, the date the Caliphate was abolished, his commentary on the event was quite detached and analytical. Islamic universalism was still a crucial component of his thinking, but by this point he had thrown his entire support behind the idea of establishing an Arab Caliphate. To that end in 1924 he published his thoughts in an "important treatise" -- the Caliphate and the Supreme Imamate (*Al-Khilafa aw al-imamah al-uzma*). These were originally a series of articles that had appeared in various issues of al-Manar between December 1922 and May 1923. This new Arab Caliphate that Rida envisioned was to preside over the reopening of the gate of *ijtihad* and become the enunciator and interpreter of Islamic dogma.[42]The Caliph thus endowed with spiritual authority could exist alongside the political framework of the modern state. The problem with such a construct was the centrality of Islamic dogma to an Islamic state. The Caliph would essentially become the ultimate arbiter of the *Shari'ah,* the sole basis of law in an Islamic state. This would endow any potential Caliph with tremendous political clout unlikely to be acceptable to any National Legislative Assembly.

As he reinterpreted Abduh's ideas, Rida became much more attached to the ideas of the possibility of internal Islamic reform. According to Rida, the attitudes that had allowed the West to excel were those of early Islam, and hence Muslims did not need to look westward at all, but to return to their own history. It was to the first generation of Islam that Rida looked, toward the holy book, and the *hadith* and traditions of the companions of the prophet. In attitude this

[40] Khadduri, p.15
[41] Emad Eldin Shahin, *Through Muslim Eyes: M. Rashid Rida and the West* (Herndon, Virginia 1993) p. 85
[42] Fakhry, p.455

made him close to the Wahhabi ideology prevalent in Najd and adopted by the house of *al-Sa'ud.* Indeed he clearly expressed his admiration of King Abdallah Ibn Abd al-Aziz al Saud in several *al-Manar* articles. This belief in the possibility of internal reform through reversion to the fundamentals of Islam without reference to the West created a serious split between him and those of Abduh's more liberal disciples. Hence from the legacy of al-Afghani and Abduh two radically different schools of thought emerged: Rida, who advocated a reform program based on an insular fundamentalism, and the more liberal of Abduh's students who remained convinced of the advantages of a reform program based on selective importation of western ideas.

Ali Abd al-Raziq

The abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1925 caused much discussion and rethinking in the Arab and wider Muslim world. Among the boldest voice to speak out on the issue was Ali Abd al-Raziq. In that same year Abd al-Raziq published a work on the Caliphate as a political institution, in which he asserted that that the office of Caliphate had no proper sanction in the *Qur'an*. Furthermore, he made strong argument for the "necessary historical separation between religion and political power."[43] Abd al-Raziq clearly stated that Muslims had fallen into a misapprehension, "namely that the caliphate is a religious role, and that he who holds power over the Muslims occupies amongst them the same position as God's Prophet." He then added that it was in "the interest of various sultans to propagate this error amongst the people, so as to use religion as a shield with which to protect their throne against rebels."[44] His arguments were thoughtful and sound, reflecting his education and experience, as a graduate of Al-Azhar and as a judge on the

[43] Anuar Abdel-Malek, ed., *Contemporary Arab Political Thought* (Paris, 1970, 1980) English translation (London, 1983) p.41
[44] Ali abd al-Raziq, *Al-Islam wa Usoul al-Hukm* 3rd ed (Cairo,., 1925) pp. 95-103. Translated and referenced in *Contemporary Arab Political Thought*

religious courts. Although familiar with western thought from having attended Oxford (his Oxford stay was interrupted the First World War before he received a degree), Abd al-Raziq based his argument on "the legal and historical antecedents of Sunni political theory." He contended that the Caliphate had "no basis either in the Quran, or the Tradition, or the consensus." The injunction to obey the *Ulu al-Amr* (Holders of Authority) did not sanction the position of Caliphate nor sanctify it, as some have contended.[45] Furthermore, Abd al-Raziq argued that religion and politics were separate even during the time of the Prophet who carried out those two functions separately. Hence religion and politics did not need to be intertwined and it was left up the wisdom of the Muslim community to choose the form of government that suited it best.

Abd al-Raziq's essay was not well received in Muslim intellectual circles. It sparked a storm of attacks that culminated in disciplinary action by a Special Court of Al-Azhar that condemned the book. Another committee, comprised of 25 prominent al-Azhar scholars, would take additional steps of revoking his diploma and removing him from the religious courts.[46] Abd al-Raziq was also made the object of attack and derision by such prominent thinkers as Rashid Rida, who savaged him in *al-Manar*. Abd al-Raziq never recovered from this controversy and spent the "rest of his life working at the Arabic Language Academy in Cairo."[47] The great tragedy of it all was that with his carefully considered and religiously based arguments, Abd al-Raziq had provided the reformers and the *ulama*, had they just seized it, with the opportunity to refute the necessity of obeying despotic power. It would have given them the freedom of choice, so prized by Afghani and Abduh, to choose a form of government that met their communities' needs. Although Abd al-Raziq would not become one of the power brokers in Egyptian politics, he demands mention for his original thinking and his daring approach to the issue of reform and modernization.

[45] Enayat, p.62
[46] Enayat., p. 64
[47] Abdel-Malek, p.41

Saad Zaghlul

Saad Zaghlul has few equals among Egyptian statesmen when it comes to reputation and fame. Zaghlul has come to be known as the father of his people and the father of his country.[48] His life and nationalist struggle have become legendary, and as such slightly distorted. Most sources claim that Saad was of *Fallah* or peasant stock. This, while strictly true, is slightly misleading. His father was the '*umda* (headman), of the village of Abyanah in the western province. He was a very successful gentlemen farmer and quite comfortably situated. Saad was born in 1859 and lost his father at the age of five. The first five years of his education were in the village *kuttab*, after which he moved on to al-Azhar.[49] There he joined Muhamad Abduh's *halaqa* and became one of his students. Through Abduh, he met Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and attended his lectures on despotism and freedom.[50]

In 1880 Saad became a junior editor in *al-Waqai al-Misriyah* of which Muhammad Abduh was chief editor. From there he moved on in 1882 to another government post, as overseer of the administrative headquarters for the province of Giza. That was the same year as the Urabi revolution, of which Zaghlul was a supporter if not a major actor. After its suppression he was imprisoned for several months, accused of being a member of a secret organization seeking to overthrow the government. He was eventually found innocent of the charge and released.[51] Suspicion had fallen upon him because of his close association with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. His old teacher had been one of the proponents and supposed leaders of the 1882 revolution.[52]

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[48] Fuad Yeghne, *Saad Zaghlul, Le Pere Du Peuple Egytien,* (Paris, 1927)
[49] Muhammad Ibrahim al-Jaziri, *Saad Zaghlul, Dhikrayat Tarikhyya Tarifah* (Dar Akhbar al-Yawm, Date not indicated) pp. 8-14
[50] Ibid., p.16
[51] al-Jaziri., p.25
[52] Muhammad Said al-Buhiry, *I'barat al-Sarq,* (Cairo, 1927) p 8. Note: al-Buhiry names the organization that Saad was supposed to have joined as *Jamiyyat al-Intiqam* and claims that this was a trumped up charge.

In 1884, partly due to his prison experience, Zaghlul entered law school. He took and passed his law exams in France, where he received his degree. His career as a lawyer was successful and quite distinguished, bringing him both wealth and recognition. In 1892 he was appointed deputy judge of the civil appellate courts. He remained a judge until he was appointed a Government minister in 1906. In his last year on the court he had become a proponent of the idea of establishing an Egyptian university along western lines. Hence in October of 1906 he was actually named vice president of the committee in charge of the university project.[53] Yet as soon as he was named minister of education, he resigned this position. That created a rift between him and Mustafa Kamil, the young nationalist fire-brand and journalist, who saw Zaghlul's withdrawal from the project as a capitulation to British desires and a blow to the nationalist movement.[54]

Zaghlul's appointment to the ministry of education came at the behest of Lord Cromer. Zaghlul was the son-in-law of Mustafa Fehmy, Cromer's long time friend and ally, and was seen as a perfectly congenial choice from the British perspective. He also had the added benefit of being initially acceptable to the nationalist camp.[55] Despite the early nationalist attack against him, Zaghlul was destined to become the leading figure of the post-First World War nationalist movement and a thorn in the side of the British administrators of Egypt. Some contemporary observers believed that the final rupture between Zaghlul and the British took place in late autumn 1914. This was reportedly due to a personal animosity between him and Kitchener and the latter's refusal to consider Zaghlul for the post of Intendant of the Egyptian Educational Mission in Paris.[56] By the time of the First World War, Zaghlul had attained a leading position among the opposition in the Legislative Assembly. Throughout the war years he solidified his position and emerged as the opposition's outright leader. Hence after the signing of the armistice, Zaghlul presented the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, with a demand for complete Egyptian independence. When Wingate replied that he did not have

[53] Abd al-Rihman al-Rafii, *Mustafa Kamil Baith al-Haraka al-Wataniyya*, (Cairo, 1939) p. 241
[54] Ibid., pp. 400-402
[55] George Lloyd, *Egypt Since Cromer* (London, 1939, 1969. NY, 1970) p. 51. For the Nationalist reaction see Rafii, pp. 399-400
[56] Lloyd George pp.181-182

the authority to respond to such a request, Zaghlul and his fellow nationalists asked for permission to travel to London in order present their case directly to the British government. This request was turned down. By March the situation was dire, and Zaghlul delivered a letter to the palace urging in strong terms that no new government should be formed. Sir Milne Cheetham, acting High Commissioner in the absence of Wingate, used this as an excuse to recommend the deportation of Zaghlul and several other nationalists. This was carried out on March 8, when Saad Zaghlul, Hamid el Bassal, Ismail Sidki, and Mohammad Mahmoud were arrested and placed on a British destroyer headed to Malta. As a result of this action the entire country went up in flames. The British responded with the application of military force, under the direction of General Buffin, but the results were not clearly advantageous nor did they end the rioting and violence.

The British government of Lloyd George then decided to dispatch General Sir Edmund Allenby effectively, if not technically, to replace Sir Reginald Wingate. After arriving in Cairo and making a study of the situation, Allenby recommend the release of the four Egyptian political prisoners. On April 7, a proclamation was issued to that effect. Zaghlul and the *wafd* (delegation) were released and allowed to proceed to the Paris Peace Conference. In Paris the *wafd* were severely disappointed by the international and especially American position that endorsed the British Protectorate over Egypt, but they did not relinquish their claims for independence. The British Government in an attempt to resolve the issue decided to dispatch Lord Alfred Millner at the head of a Royal Commission to study the situation in Egypt. The mission, which had as its main aim the preservation of Egypt as a "British satellite" for the "foreseeable future", was decried by Zaghlul and the nationalists and was boycotted.[57] In the meantime, Zaghlul remained in Paris and did not return to Egypt to negotiate directly with the Commission. Upon the Commission's return to London an Egyptian delegation was sent, with the tacit agreement of Zaghlul, to open dialogue. Ultimately, no matter the concessions made by the Commission, Zaghlul claimed he could not and would not

[57] John Darwin, *Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of War 1918-1922* (New York: 1981) p. 106

accept anything short of full independence. Without his outright support the Millner report and its recommendations had no chance of success.

Zaghlul returned to Egypt and resumed his activities as head of the opposition. He moved quickly to enhance his popular status and base. Yet he proved intractable on the issue of Egyptian independence and sovereignty and was from the British point of view an obstructionist and an agitator. Lord Allenby sought to remove this obstacle by yet again arresting Zaghlul on December 22, and deporting him on the 29th. The High Commissioner, after consultations in London, returned to Egypt and on February 28, 1922 declared the Protectorate over, but retained the status quo on issues of security, the government of the Sudan, and foreign relations until such a time as they could be resolved. Sarwat Pasha took over as Prime Minister and prepared to form a cabinet. The Sultan was now officially re-designated His Majesty the King of Egypt, a state of affairs that hardly pleased the majority of pro-Zaghlul nationalists.

On March 24, 1923, Zaghlul was again released and returned to Egypt on September 27. By this time Yehiya Pasha, who had replaced Sarwat as Premier, had pushed through a constitutional settlement and the King had signed it. Zaghlul would soon came out against the declaration of 1922 and called for revisions to the constitution. His position was made even stronger when the January 1924 elections brought his *wafd* party a clear majority of about 190 of the 240 seats in the Chamber. Zaghlul was then invited by the King to form a Government, and he promptly accepted.

Zaghlul's government though was shortly placed in an untenable position by the murder of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor General of Sudan and the Sirdar of the Egyptian army. Set upon by his political opponents for failing to provide peace and security, and unable to accept the full list of demands made by Allenby, Zaghlul was forced to resign. Ahmed Zawar Pasha then formed a new government more congenial to the King and the British. Zaghlul's political fortunes were not long eclipsed though and in the next elections the *wafd* once again won a majority of the seats in Parliament. The Zawar ministry resigned after the elections, and the King took that opportunity to constitutionally dissolve parliament. When the next elections arrived, Zaghlul, and the

wafd demonstrated their enduring popular support yet again by attaining a majority in parliament. Although as head of the parliamentary majority Zaghlul was entitled to the position of Prime Minister, British opposition to him was so intractable, that he was persuaded to step aside. Despite this, Zaghlul retained full control of the *wafd* and remained until his death on August 23, 1927, the undisputed power behind the government.

It is quite difficult to arrive at an accurate summation of Saad Zaghlul's character. His diaries draw a picture of a man who was prideful, egotistical, quick to take insult and anger, and often conceited. At the same time he was capable of generosity and was not a stranger to self-assessment and even self-recrimination. Furthermore, all, including the British, attested to his honesty, intelligence, and administrative ability. When, late in his life, he found himself in conflict with the British, Zaghlul both gloried in his hold over the multitudes, and feared being abandoned by them or exposed to their displeasure. Ultimately Zaghlul, the longtime collabor'ator and politician, was forced by circumstances to become the revolutionary leader. He was never able to bridge the gap between the two roles and because of that a golden opportunity was lost to Egypt; the opportunity for Egypt to develop stable democratic institutions with the support of the British. Zaghlul was aggressive in his demands when he believed he had the upper hand, yet he showed timidity when confronted with Allenby's unwarranted demands of Egypt after the murder of Sir Lee Stack, the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. These criticisms notwithstanding, Egypt undoubtedly owed its independence to Zaghlul's activism, and for that he earned the title of "father of his people."

Mustafa Kamil

Mustafa Kamil was, arguably, the most militant of Egypt's nationalist figures. He was born in Cairo in 1874. His father was an engineer, first for the army, and then for the state civil authorities. He received his secondary education at the *Khidyawiyah,* (khedieval School) in Cairo, from which he graduated in 1892. From the *Khidyawiyah* he elected to move on to the Khedieval law school, while simultaneously attending the

French law school.[58] Receiving his French law degree required that he sit for the exams in Paris. He went there in 1893 and took his first-year exams and returned to take his second-year exams in 1894. When the school in Paris did not allow him to take the third-year exam, on an accelerated schedule, he transferred to a more accommodating university in Toulouse. Hence in 1894, he received his degree in Law from Toulouse. Thereupon he wrote his brother a brief letter in which he explained that "I now have the law degree, I had decided to become a lawyer so as to defend the rights of the individual, but if I am blessed with good fortune, and I achieve what I hope for, I would then become the defender of the rights of the nation as a whole, in front of the entire world, because Egypt is this world's paradise and does not deserve to have its honor trampled underfoot, and we, her dear sons, become derided strangers."[59] Given these strongly expressed feelings with regard to the British occupation and his deep connection with the French intellectual world, Kamil became an ardent Anglophobe. His French connections did not create his Anglophobia but definitely enhanced it. For these connections he was mostly indebted to Madame Julliette Adams, one of the leading intellectual and political hostesses of her time.[60]

Another source of influence on Kamil's political outlook was Abdallah al-Nadim. Al-Nadim had been among the key figures in the 1882 Urabi revolution, and one of the most vehement anti-British figures in Egypt. He had eluded capture for a long period after 1882, but ultimately was found and sentenced to exile. He returned from exile in 1892, only to be kicked out of the country again, but not before Kamil met him. Kamil acquired from al-Nadim what the latter thought were the key lessons on the failure of the Urabi revolution. The most important among those was that any successful revolution had to be initiated by the people and not led by the army. The other lesson he learned was that any dissension between the Khedive and the revolutionary movement would lead to the revolution's failure, as in 1882. To that end Kamil became a strong proponent

[58] Abd al-Rihman al-Rafii, *Mustafa Kamil Baith al-Haraka al-Wataniyya*, (Cairo, 1939) p. 28
[59] Ibid. p. 35
[60] al-Rafii., pp. 51-53

of an independence movement directed by the Khedive.[61] This led to accusations that Kamil was hardly a revolutionary seeking independence, but rather the Khedive's paid man.[62] His volatility and uncompromising brand of nationalism did not always suit the Khedive though, and this resulted in periods of alienation and hostility between them.

Upon graduating from Toulouse and returning to Egypt in 1896 he eschewed the practice of law in favor of a career as a political activist and agitator. His actions in France and on his return to Egypt did not go unnoticed by the British, who supposedly retaliated against Kamil by harassing and ultimately court-martialing his brother, an officer in the Egyptian army.[63] That issue aside, Kamil had taken upon himself the role of Egypt's defender, at home and to the western world. In 1895 he had indeed spoken in front of the French parliament on the issue of Egyptian independence and in 1896 he returned for a two-month period and continued publicly denouncing the English occupation. From France he traveled to Germany and then to Austria, again speaking on behalf of Egyptian independence. He toured Europe again in 1897, and then again in 1898, carrying the same message all over the continent, from Austria, to Germany, to Hungary.

The confrontation at Fashoda between French and British army contingents, which resulted in France's de facto concession of British authority over the Nile Valley, was a terrible blow to Kamil and all the nationalists. This was later compounded by the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1899 that basically placed the Sudan outside Egyptian control. Realizing that seeking external European leverage to remove the British from Egypt was insufficient, he called for the promotion of Pan-Islamism and adherence to the Ottoman Empire among the Egyptian population.[64] To this end Kamil launched in January 1900 a newspaper, *al-Liwa al-Misriyah* (The Egyptian Standard). Stridently anti-British in tone, very populist, and even bellicose at times, *al-Liwa* achieved a large circulation and had significant impact among the educated youth of Egypt. It was through the pages of *al-Liwa* that Kamil aired his views and promoted his causes. On the

[61]Ibid., pp. 30-31
[62] George A Lloyd, *Egypt Since Cromer,* (NY, 1970) 2 volumes. 1 of 2, p. 41
[63]al-Rafii, pp. 64-66
[64] Ibid., p. 138

pages of *al-Liwa,* Kamil promoted the Ottoman pan-Islamic movement and affirmed the Sultan's claims of ultimate sovereignty over Egypt. Through its pages he attempted to defend Ottoman interests and promote anti-British sentiment, which to Kamil were very much one and the same thing. The Entente Cordial signed between France and England in 1904, which essentially granted England a French carte blanche with regards to Egypt, made this new reliance on the Ottoman Empire and Pan-Islamism even more necessary, in Kamil's view. The possible implications of admitting the sovereignty of a distant Ottoman Sultan over Egypt was a matter of much less importance than the reality of British occupation and control.

Kamil visited London in 1906, after the *Danshawi* incident,[65] to object to the sentencing and to capitalize on the large outcry in Egypt and abroad, against the brutal punishment the villagers had received. His visit was quite eventful, as he was well received by the orientalists in England and was sought after by newspapers and politicians. He was able to make an eloquent plea for his cause.[66] In Egypt itself the *Danshawi* fiasco gave huge momentum to the nationalist movement and forced the British administration onto the defensive.

Regarding internal Egyptian matters, Kamil was a great proponent of an Egyptian nationalism that purported to see no differentiation between Muslim and Christian Copt: "The Muslims and Copts are one people tied together by their nationality, customs, manners, and their sources of livelihood, and it is not possible to divide them against each other eternally."[67] But in his passion for the removal of the British and to achieve his goal of independence, he was willing to use almost any method, even declaring support for the Ottoman Caliph. [68]

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[65]Altercation between a British hunting party and the villagers of *Danshawi* had led to the injury of one British officer and his later death from exposure. The punishments meted out by the court had included hangings, floggings and imprisonment.

[66] al-Rafii, pp. 218-231

[67] Ibid., p 98, An alternate translation would have the last line reading "…and it will never be possible to divide them against each other." Given his later speeches on Lord Cromer's attempts to divide the population of Egypt, the translation in the body of the text seems more in the spirit of Kamil's message.

[68]Charles Wendell, *The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image: From its Origins to Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid*. (Berkeley,1972) p. 246

In keeping with his self-appointed role as Egypt's spokesmen to the West, he issued two other newspapers in 1906, the French language *Etendard Egyptien* and the English Language *Egyptian Standard*. Kamil wished to circumvent the European newspapers and addressed directly the Europeans, specifically those residing in Egypt. The costs of founding the paper were to be raised by forming a shareholding company and collecting 20,000 Egyptian pounds in capital.[69]

One of the last important tasks undertaken by Kamil prior to his early demise was the transformation of the national movement into an actual political party, the Nationalist Party. In December 1907 the Nationalist Party had its first general assembly. Its goal was an independent Egypt, under the nominal sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Kamil did not live long enough to see any of his efforts come to fruition. Two months after this first assembly of the Nationalist Party Mustafa Kamil passed away from an illness that had afflicted him for some time. His death was greatly mourned, especially among the younger generation of students and graduates who had been inspired by his fiery rhetoric. Many thousands of mourners were said to have participated in the public procession that carried him to his grave.[70]

There is no doubt that Kamil was a brilliant individual and a naturally gifted orator and publicist, much like al-Nadim his mentor. In the span of eight years between 1899 and 1907 he had founded three publications, two of them in foreign languages, traveled all over Europe lobbying for Egyptian independence, and founded what was at least under his leadership an effective Nationalist Party.

Brilliance though, cannot and should not be confused with wisdom. So vehement was Kamil in his calls for Egyptian independence that he spared little of his considerable energy and ability actually to prepare his countrymen to assume the responsibilities of running their country in the future. The vast inequalities present in Egypt, the corruption and ineptitude of many of Egypt's elite class, were all ignored or glossed over in his drive to oust the British from Egypt. Intermediate goals, such as the improvement of

[69] al-Raffii, p. 246 Lord Cromer in statements to the British press would claim that source of funding for these papers was the Khedive. This scenario is indeed very possible despite Rafii's dismissal of it.
[70] Ibid., p. 278

education, were often recognized as vital, but the need to pursue them prior to calling for independence was ignored. The foundations upon which a modern state could be built were not yet fully available to the Egyptians, no matter what Kamil in his impatience for independence wished to believe. Ultimately though, this harsh judgment of Kamil has to be mitigated by the fact that he died very young and hence his project was unfinished.

A last observation worth mentioning with regard to Kamil is the great prestige accorded him by the Arab and Egyptian nationalist authors. In contrast many of the English language works that allude to him do so in a belittling manner. Traits they would laud in a western nationalist, such as a grasp of certain aspects of realpolitik, become negative aspersions on his character.[71] Ultimately though, even some of his harshest critics acknowledge the "undoubted qualities of ability and leadership" he exhibited while presiding over the Nationalist Party.[72]

CONCLUSION

The individuals featured in this chapter do not by any means represent the full roster of modernists, reformers and nationalists involved in the formation of the modern Egyptian nation during the period of British occupation. They were chosen from among the rest, in some cases because of their prominence, in other cases because of their legacies, and in yet other instances because their efforts were illustrative of the ongoing struggle to reshape Muslim society Egypt itself. Another crucial reason was their interaction with the British. This interaction could have been confrontational or conciliatory, but it provides us with the opportunity to assess their views of British involvement in Egyptian political life. Finally most of these figures produced journals, corresponded prodigiously, or left detailed personal journals from which a reader can

[71] The works range from the dismissive characterization such as Storrs *Orientations*, to the negative comparison to his contemporary Lutfi al-Sayyid accorded him by Wendells, *The Evolution of the Egyptian National Image,* p. 245*,* or the description of him as a Khedieval "agent" in George Lloyd's *Egypt Since Cromer,* p. 41.
[72] George Lloyd, p. 78

derive their views. Without those source materials a study of this nature could not be undertaken.

Reformers, Islamists, and Nationalists:

Perceptions of the British Empire

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the views of the various Egypt-based reformers and nationalists introduced in the previous chapter on the actions of the British occupation and the British Empire in general. Careful consideration will be given to discussing perceived threats, dangers, and opportunities for empowerment and independence. The narrative will also cover instances when the reformers, including prominent collaborators, perceived British steps as counter to the spirit of reform and eventual self-rule. These will all be accompanied by critical commentary and analysis that will place them in their proper context.

In all cases the reformers' grievances, accusations, and complaints, will be presented in their own voices. One of the objects is to try to ascertain how they comprehended the events of their time as it involved them and the British Empire. The ultimate result will be to see the British Empire, not as it actually was but rather as the reformers and nationalists saw it. The benefit of this approach will be to allow us to view the sources from which much of the nationalist histories that inform today's populations have been derived. Additionally, since among the characters discussed in this work were certain prominent Islamic reformers whose impact went well beyond the borders of Egypt, this study will help us gain a better understanding of some of the historic grievances with the British Empire specifically and the West in general, as expressed by the adherents of Islamic reform and universalism.

To accomplish this goal several sources will be used. Among those are a host of periodicals as well as relevant political speeches, correspondence, memoirs and diaries. Many of the grievances against the West will be generalized in nature and refer to a nebulous policy, while others will be much more specific regarding actions taken against the reformers and their supporters. Others still will focus on specific figures, attributing to them certain actions, speeches, or sentiments with regard to Egypt. Yet all will serve to demonstrate the author's perceptions of the British Empire, and allow us to assess the

relative sophistication, or more importantly the accuracy, of their understanding of that empire.

Several different reformers covered in the previous chapter will appear again in the following pages. They often present dramatically different views of the British. These views will run the gamut from the demonic to the virtuous and noble. They will also vary over time, according to circumstances and the authors' political leanings and aspirations. In many cases, very complex personal, economic, and political relationships existed between Egyptian elites and the British and those will be examined in turn. It also must be noted that since in some cases we will be covering peoples' perceptions over a decade or more, we will sometimes see fluctuations and changes of heart. This is very clearly the case when dealing with Muhammad Abduh and Saad Zaghlul. The one constant throughout this chapter will be the portrayal of the British and their involvement in Egyptian affairs through Egyptian eyes, and in the Egyptians' own voices.

Prior to the examination of each publication or document, it will be introduced to the reader with a short biographical sketch when relevant. This short sketch will include the dates of publication, the identity of their founders, a reminder of their political leanings, a brief description of content, and an explanation of their closure if necessary, as reformist journals would often be shut down by the authorities. The following is the list of the journals that we will be covering; *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, al-Ustadh,* and *al-Manar.* In addition to these journals, we shall be looking closely at the political speeches, articles, and correspondence of Mustafa Kamil, as well as, the diaries and correspondence of Saad Zaghlul.

AL-URWA AL WUTHQA (THE INDISSOLUBLE BOND):

Al-Afghani's stay in Paris was marked by the most ambitious of his projects. With the aid of his pupil Muhammad Abduh, he launched a Paris-based Arabic language monthly journal, to trumpet his call for Muslim social, economic, political, and religious reform; for pan-Islamic action; and to attack European and more specifically British

imperialism.[73] The first edition of the journal appeared on March 13, 1884. The *Urwa al-Wuthqa* had a comparatively short run of 18 issues before it had to shut down. Its closure was attributed to British attempts to block its distribution throughout the Muslim nations under their influence.[74] Given the journal's content and its overt calls for the overthrow of British rule in India and Egypt, the British attitude toward it could hardly be called surprising. Pan-Islamic unity and calls for pan-Islamic action were repeatedly promoted as a means of curtailing and even breaking British hegemony over India and other parts of the Muslim world.

In an article on *al-Ta'ssub* (fanaticism), al-Afghani revealed his true feelings about European, and especially British hypocrisy as he saw it: "A man among them will reach the highest level of freedom, such as Gladstone, then you will not find a word coming out of his mouth that is not imbued with the spirit of Peter the monk [preacher of the Peasant's Crusade]. In fact, you will see his soul is a copy of [Peter's] soul."[75] Ultimately then in al-Afghani's view, British expansion in Muslim lands was nothing but a renewed crusade, a Christian holy war against Islam. The British actions in Egypt, for instance, are painted in the bloodiest and most barbaric terms possible: "The English soldiers strike at the Egyptian lands as they go and as they come, killing and despoiling."[76] The theme of crusade is picked up again when discussing General Gordon and the Sudan expedition, especially in the assessment of the English motives for establishing contact with King John of Ethiopia:

> The soldiers of the English government having failed on the shores of the Red Sea, and the [English government] having failed in preparing new soldiers to drive into the middle of the Sudan has turned to the Ethiopian King to ask his help against the Muslims of Sudan….The information that

[73] It is not my intent to write a "Political Biography" of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, that task has already been accomplished by Nikki Keddie, my interest is to derive from *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* his perceptions of the British Empire; its strengths and weaknesses, and the reasons for its actions and concerns.
[74] Jamal al-Din al-Afghani & Muhammad Abduh, *Al-Urwa al-Wuthqa, wa alThawra al-Tahrririyya al-Kubra,* with Foreword and introduction of the bound edition, by Abd al-Baqi Surour. (Cairo, 1957) p. 36 Note: Close reading of the journal indicates that at least early on, articles where being translated and carried by Indian newspapers, both hostile and friendly. p. 114
[75] Ibid., p. 47
[76] Ibid., p. 31

> has come out this week confirms that England is determined to harm the Muslims of Sudan, because they are Muslim, and not just to end the revolution, or to spread civilization…There is no other name for this but religious war, that reminds one of…the Crusades, and feeds the fires of religious fanaticism…"[77]

In the British, al-Afghani saw deadly enemies to Islam and Muslims everywhere:

> The English government is a staunch enemy of Muslims because of its absorption of Muslim kingdoms…for it takes pleasure in tormenting the people of religion (Muslims). [The English government] seems to take pleasure in debasing [Muslims] and eradicating their property…Gladstone's…many speeches during the Russo-Turkish war, and the articles [written by] his like, gave the clearest statement to the enmity residing in the hearts of the English towards Muslims.[78]

For the likes of al-Afghani, Britain's rule over so much of what had previously been *dar al-Islam,* or Muslim lands, was intolerable. British rule over India and the occupation of Egypt, with the attendant decline of Muslim prominence and prestige, were clear evidence in his mind of Britain's enmity towards Islam.

In an evocative article titled "*al-Wahm*" (illusion or myth), al-Afghani described the British and their empire in these terms:

> [A European observer], judges [Britain's] strength in the far-flung reaches [of its empire] and its ability to defend them akin to its abilities to defend the British Isles. He does not observe, however, that the English body [strength] has been stretched lengthwise and sideways to the extent that any disturbance could tear its extremities apart, and their strength would be dissipated until they had none left (literally: no position of power) …All this but for the veil of illusion."[79]

He continued to remind the Egyptian people that their own divisions that had allowed the British to occupy Egypt and remarks:

> The people of Egypt act as if they are ignorant of the reasons that have allowed the British to occupy their lands. It is as if they believe that the

[77] Ibid., p. 236
[78] Ibid., p. 334
[79] Ibid., p. 138

> people had been united in their resistance to the English, and that they had all been defeated and suppressed by the English. It is as if the Egyptians have forgotten how divided they were and that the English were only able to enter the country with Egyptian help. That is the incredible illusion.

Al-Afghani perceived a great difference between the appearance of power and the reality of it. He was also infuriated by the self-defeatism that led Egyptians not to realize their own potential strength. Britain had occupied Egypt owing to Egyptian foolishness and divisions and it could be driven out by Egyptian unity and wise action:

> Those very same people that two years ago were the very reason for the success of the English troops and their occupation of the Nile valley; without whom they could not have set a foot in it, now believe that those same troops could suppress the entire population and subjugate it to the will of the British government…. Don't they realize that if the English troops were occupied in the Sudan and even a slight disturbance occurred in the eastern district, and the Bahria, and Fayum, the English would panic, and their will would collapse, and they would leave the country to its people."[80]

In lines such as these, al-Afghani and Abduh called for Muslim unity, as a means to defeat the British and drive them from Muslim lands. In al-Afghani's view if the Muslims of India, Egypt and the Sudan, could rid themselves of the illusion of British invincibility and act in concert, they would then be able to defeat the British and tear the extremities of the Empire apart.

Upon the occasion of the Mahdist uprising in Sudan, the journal published an article *Zilzal al-Ingliz fi al-Sudan* (The English Earthquake in Sudan) in which he elaborates on the previous theme:

> The enemy marched upon you under a banner of affection (mahaba), then he turned his back upon it and showed you his dark side (Dhar al-majn). He took in his oppressive hands your public affairs, military, monetary, administrative and judicial, and nothing was left to you except being denied the ability to serve your country…and this when he has not yet

[80] Ibid., p. 140

> destroyed all local strength…so what if he establishes himself…and rids himself of all opposition.

The Indian experience must have been uppermost in al-Afghani's mind here, for once they had established themselves in India the British had indeed persevered. In the Mahdi uprising al-Afghani saw a golden opportunity for a successful Egyptian revolt against the British occupation. In an attempt to inflame his target audience, he mercilessly reminded the Egyptians of all they had lost and all they had yet to lose:

> You have seen that he has corrupted your affairs, caused you discomfort. [He has] denied your men service, impoverished thousands of families, and given of your country to your enemies. [He has] damaged your interests in agriculture, trade, industry, and closed the door of gain in your face. [He] has sought to intervene in your religious affairs (like the awqaf). He has [also] determined to destroy your defenses and remove your strength by firing your soldiers, and this is only the beginning. So what will the end bring.

This ominous warning was quickly followed by a rousing call to arms:

> You have the ability now to strike at your enemy and he is incapable of striking back, but in time the situation will be reversed, and you will become incapable of fighting him and in his hand he will carry the big stick (Assa al-Jabrout) with which to subjugate you.[81]

Time, al-Afghani stressed was one of the things that Egyptians could least afford to lose. With time the British would only grow stronger and their ability to dominate Egypt would increase.

As to claims that the British had improved and reformed the Egyptian infrastructure, al-Afghani's response was simple and straightforward:

> It would be correct for an Egyptian to believe that what has happened to his country over the last 20 months or so (since occupation) is a prelude to its reform and the ordering of its affairs. Indeed, it could occur to someone that this is in preparation for some industrial project in Egypt…that with

[81] Ibid., pp. 149-150

> time would transform it into a garden of paradise. But as for the people (of Egypt) they are not the objects of consideration, for should they perish, then other nations will take their place.[82]

For al-Afghani, all that Britain did or would do in Egypt was designed only to increase British wealth and good fortune. That was the message he so desperately wished to impart to all Egyptians.

Al-Afghani continued to harp on the Egyptians because he strongly believed that only by finding willing local collaborators could Britain remain in Egypt. He saw them as the mainstay of British imperialism. In an article titled *al-Sharaf* (Honor), he commented:

> Certain princes in the Muslim lands have been given titles of honor from countries such as England, for their services in fighting to conquer their very won lands. The English were then able to march in behind them and seize those lands, while fellow Muslims are striving mightily to find ways to expel them. What comparison is there between Uthman Pasha al-Ghazy's medals [honorable deeds], and those on the chests of those deceived [princes]?"[83]

This position is strongly in keeping with the emphasis placed by modern historians on the crucial role played by collaborators in aiding British rule.[84]

India with its multitude of Muslims was an area of great interest to the journal, and the articles painted a picture of India as a land in which the British hold could be broken, should the Muslims but unite and take advantage of the struggles of the great powers. In the various articles on the subject al-Afghani's great passion for Islamic unity, no matter the sect, emerges very clearly. Having been in the service of the governments of both Shii Persia and Sunni Afghanistan, he urged the two neighbors to

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[82] Ibid., pp. 164-165
[83] Ibid., pp. 99-100
[84] See for example, Ronald Robinson, "Non-European Foundation for European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration' in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, eds. *Studies in the Theory of Imperialism* (1972), pp. 117-42

set aside their sectarian differences in the face of the much greater threat of British imperialism:

> Do you remain oblivious to the fact that every Muslim in India looks towards you eagerly, awaiting your coming should you but unite with your Afghan brothers…This is the time for brotherhood and agreement, for the enemy has surrounded your lands from the east and from the west…he but waits an opportunity to assault your borders. Should you let this opportunity pass you by, you might not have one like it again, for the English are in a deep bind over the Egyptian issue because of their military weakness, and they are involved in arguments with many nations who oppose their goals.

The object of his Muslim unity then was not merely defensive, but a will to regain the lands lost to Muslim rule. His articles seemed to have had at least some impact in India, for it appears that certain newspapers were reported by al-Afghani to have falsified his words, in translation, in an attempt to mislead their readers. He also generated some adherents, whom he was quick to thank for their proper translation of his articles "to the benefit of their countrymen."[85]

Al-Afghani was not shy about looking towards any possible source of aid against British imperialism, even seeing possibilities in Russian ambitions with regard to India:

> During this new epoch in politics, [Russia's possible attack on India] should the countries of Iran with the principality of Afghanistan come to an agreement, then they would have great fortune and profit, for even should anger against the British in the hearts of the Indians aid the Russians, there are still obstacles in their path that only an alliance with the Afghans and the Iranians would clear…and Russia having received the aid of the Persians and Afghanis in opening the doors of India cannot but share with them the spoils and benefits otherwise they would be an insurmountable obstacle to its goals.[86]

In these lines we see the cold calculating pragmatism, and the understanding of realpolitik, that have led many of al-Afghani's critics to label him unethical and

[85] *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*, p. 114
[86] Ibid., p. 125

opportunistic. It is not my goal to refute or confirm these claims or confirm them, but to highlight the level of hatred and distrust with which al-Afghani regarded the English, whom he perceived as the greatest threat to the Muslim Umma.

One of the fascinating facets of *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* was its coverage of events far removed from the Muslim lands, but which were understood to reflect on the British empire, and thus were of importance to India, Egypt and the Muslim Umma. A prime example of this was the attention given to Ireland's independence struggle and the implications for Egypt:

> Everyday the British present logical evidence and rhetorical arguments that they only went to Egypt to bring peace and justice to it. But every time they prepare their arguments to convince the doubtful of their 'famous' case, the Irish contradicts them…for no period of time passes that they [the Irish] do not carry out an operation to break the hold of the English government in Ireland. They place dynamite to destroy buildings and bridges and disrupt the railways, and they assassinate the government employees. Having grown sick of [the English government's] tyranny, they seek all means to get rid of its authority, and they remain firm in their quest.[87]

Here we see a sophisticated awareness of the scope and problems of the British Empire. This interest was not merely sensationalistic, but was in keeping with his perception of the English power as stretched too thin, and susceptible to pressure at the extremities.

The inner workings of Britain's political system and its political parties were also a source of interest to *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*. The judgment leveled by the journal on the Liberal Party's imperial politics and those of the Conservative Party leaves one in little doubt that al-Afghani saw little practical difference between the two. The following is a small selection of the analysis that appeared in the journal:

> The opinion makers in England fall into two groups. One group urges the government to proclaim its sovereignty over the Egyptian lands and to take over all its administration, in other words to join it to its empire… and this is the group of the business and financial interests …and it is

[87] Ibid., p. 187

> supported in its views by various newspapers, the most famous being *The Times*.

Translated articles from *The Times* were a common feature in *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* and provided al-Afghani chances for endless commentary:

> As for the other group [of opinion makers] in the English nation, among whom are the interior minister and Mr. Gladstone, they exhibit, or so it is remarked, honesty and declare in their speeches that the English government cannot take over the running of Egypt and that it cannot join it to its empire …This is what they pronounce on their podiums…but this same group have meanwhile worked to secure their footing in Egypt, and really oppose the first group only in the way they wag their tongues."[88]

Al-Afghani seemingly gave little credence to Gladstone's promises of imminent withdrawal from Egypt.

Despite his general hostility toward the English, al-Afghani was certainly not blind to the merits of those Englishmen he considered friendly toward Egypt and Muslims. A prime example of this was Wilfred Blunt, described in the journal as a man "who has become famous for his love for Muslims and his defense of Egypt." Mr. Blunt's recommendations regarding Egypt seem to have met with Afghani's whole-hearted approval. A letter of Blunt's to *The Times* regarding the "Egyptian Matter" was translated in the journal with minimal commentary and carried the following recommendations:

> The English government must come to an agreement with the international community to make the Egyptian nation independent in its administration, and to make the international community the guarantor of this independence without exception, and the privileges accorded to foreigners must be amended. Any issue over which there is disagreement should be resolved with the agreement of the European nations who can resolve the issue as they please. There should be no foreign officers in the army, and the Suez Canal should be considered a common way, in which all countries should have a partnership, and under international supervision.

[88] Ibid., pp. 240-241

> The country's administration must be in the hands of a government elected by the people.[89]

An independent and strong Egypt with a representative government, supported by an Egyptian Army indigenously officered, was exactly al-Afghani's aim. If that could succeed in Egypt, then the rest of the Muslim world would have a model to follow and the dream of reform and empowerment could be fulfilled.

Al-Afghani was quite convinced that the British were determined to ban his journal from all their areas of influence. He remarked in an article *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa wa Jaraid al-Ingliz* (The Indissoluble Bond and the English Newspapers):

> We determined to establish this journal of ours, and certain French editors learned of this, so they wrote about it before it was ever published, without explaining its origins, or revealing the truth of its intent. When the editors of the important English newspapers came upon these stories, they were seized by passions… and they warned their government of the effects this journal could have on England's politics and its influence in the Eastern lands, and they urged the government to take all steps to stop it from getting it to India and Egypt…

The British, nevertheless, according to al-Afghani, were not satisfied to ban the circulation in areas under their direct rule but had taken even additional measures:

> …They have gone to the extreme of recommending that pressure be put on the Ottoman Empire to ban it as well. All this from them and the first issue had not yet been published, and before a single one of them had known its political leanings. All this [was done] when this journal was not established to rouse passions, or to promote strife, but rather to defend the rights of all Easterners in general, and Muslims specifically…to what is in their best interest, and has taken a moderate approach and a straight and just path….Let the English government know that it cannot stop us from spreading our ideas in the East whether through this journal or by other methods if it came to that, for the proponents of right are many.[90]

[89] Ibid., p. 237
[90] Ibid., p. 230

Clearly, the feelings of animosity al-Afghani held for the British were reciprocated in full. This animosity came to a head when the Egyptian ministers finally banned the journal at the behest of the British and imposed a five to twenty-five Egyptian pound penalty on anyone caught with it. This action engendered the following facetious comment from the journal's editors: "This is indeed a stiff fine; maybe it is necessitated by the impoverishment of the Egyptian treasury due to the blessings of English actions in Egypt."[91]

The cessation of *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* was abrupt, and no special final edition was published in which to warn its subscribers and readers. The impression is given throughout that British efforts to disrupt its operation were relentless, a theory accepted by the majority of the Arabic language literature on the subject and in the historical introduction to the bound volume of the journal.

ABDALLAH AL-NADIM'S AL-USTADH (THE TEACHER)

Abdallah al-Nadim's years as a fugitive in the Egyptian countryside and later exile in Jafa had not reduced his zeal for Egyptian independence but had redirected it. Al-Nadim strongly believed that the failure of the Urabi Revolution was a direct result of palace opposition. Hence, for any independence movement to succeed it must have the backing of the palace and must operate under the direction of the Khedive. With this newfound conviction al-Nadim launched the weekly *al-Ustadh* on August 24, 1892. In the introduction to the first issue al-Nadim described the content and the purpose of the journal thus:

> We do not restrict ourselves to a single subject but publish what is good to publish and what is pleasant to hear…as long as it insults no religion or dishonors anyone and does not carry what incites and does not deal with contemporary politics, in that it does not speak of the administration, or of the affairs of the ministries, or of their employees…and as for politics in general we will discuss only its intellectual aspects, for the study of history, manners, traditions, the organization of the state and are all the

[91] Ibid., p. 286

> branches of political studies which is independent of the politics of administration.[92]

In short, al-Nadim promised to discuss political ideas only in theory, and to refrain from referring to contemporaneous administrative practices. This in its own way was no less a form of political commentary than the direct naming of names, for it set a bar against which the reader is left to judge current events.

The articles and stories in *al-Ustadh* were directed to the literate audience in general, regardless of their social position. It carried articles on literature and science, while at the same time carrying a series of satirical pieces in the '*amyah,* the common Egyptian dialect. These were in the form of a running dialogue between several characters that addressed topics ranging from the introduction of drinking establishments in Egypt and their effect on family life, to the destruction of local trades by the influx of foreign goods, to the benefits of female education. The topics of these stories concentrated mostly on the ills introduced into Egypt by the Europeans and the British occupation, but sought solutions not in reactionary actions but in Egyptian self-improvement and self-awareness.

Al-Nadim's concerns were mostly localized and internal. Unlike al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, the coeditors of *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa,* al-Nadim concentrated on internal Egyptian empowerment. This was in keeping with his support of the Khedive, but also with his precarious position under the eye of the palace on one hand and of the British administration and its allies on the other. Al-Nadim initially remained cautious in his articles and refrained from naming names. He was also careful to not directly indict the British occupation, but preferred to speak of the Europeans in general, even when his own experience was predominantly with the British. His writing could best be described as political satire. What on first glance appear to be laudatory statements often turn out to be facetious comments shared with a knowing audience.

In the manner that he perceived the British Empire, al-Nadim was quite similar to al-Afghani. He regarded European and British expansion in general as motivated equally

[92] *al-Ustādh***,** Editor: Abd Allah al-Nadim al-Idrisi, Cairo 1892-1893, 2 vol., vol 1, pp. 2-3

by greed and religious intolerance. Although he did not the use of the word "crusade," there is little doubt that he perceived it as such:

> 'If you were in our position you would have done as we did.' These are words repeated by Europe to Easterners every time it is driven to do something by the exigencies of imperial colonization (al-Isti'mar al milki) or religious expansion. It has judiciously balanced between the powers of religion and state, for it made the first a winsome ambassador and the second a whip wielding rider…[93]

According to al-Nadim Easterners could understand European behavior towards them by realizing that Europeans did not regard them as fellow human beings:

> The actions of Europe have astonished us. It has not allowed an easterner to own even an inch in its lands, yet it throws us out of our dwelling places and takes up residence without any contractual conditions or cause. It must be excused though, for it has found no one to oppose it and no one to fight it. It does not acknowledge that we share a common humanity, but it declares, that if you were in our position, you would have done as we did.[94]

When it came to European claims of expanding in the East in order to spread stability and modernity al-Nadim, again much like Afghani, was clearly derisive:

> No European country enters an Eastern country in the name of conquest, but does so in the name of reform and the spreading of modern civilization. It claims when it first enters that it will not attempt to alter religion or tradition, then turns around and gradually begins changing both….[For example] England entered Egypt with an invitation from its people and the excuse of supporting the honored position of the Khedive (read sarcasm writ large), then [they added] the excuse of establishing order, and a new stable government, similar to those in Europe

In the end the English had stolen the country from its quiescent populace, and all due to that population's apathy:

[93] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 506
[94] Ibid., p. 514

> It is like the story of the thief that entered someone's house and asked them to load for him all they had in furniture and valuables, and they complied without objections. Had a policeman walked in through the door and seen them voluntarily loading their property for the thief, would he presume this was a thief, no, rather that he was the master of the house and they his servants [95]

According to al-Nadim the tragedies being visited upon Egypt were very clearly due to the Egyptian inability to unite behind their king and defend his position and his honor:

> Did they say to the Egyptian we shall spend millions on engineering projects without regard as to how it is used, and do not dare to question these amounts for which you shall become slaves, indebted to Rothschild and his likes. Or are they the ones that doled out the contracts, and expanded the scope of the treaties until they have drawn a noose around every Egyptian endeavor. [96]

Grievous as that was to al-Nadim, it paled in comparison to what he believed the Egyptians had allowed to happen to their education system:

> … Or are they the ones that decreased the number of Egyptian students in their schools, and increased the use of foreigners in them, and moved towards killing their language by giving rewards to those who excelled in English, so that a student may forget the language of the Quran and hence forget religion, which stands as an obstacle in Europe's way, as they say in their assemblies and elite clubs. No by God…Why do we feel pain at their [the British] actions, while our own leaders have dedicated themselves to sitting in their castles and riding their carriages for pleasure, and our wise men remain silent…[97]

[95] Ibid., p. 515
[96] Ibid., p. 516
[97] Ibid., p. 518

The way forward in al-Nadim's view was again to rally around the Khedive: "Stop talking of this and of that oh Egyptians, for the countries of the world have judged us as full of speech and no action."[98]

The British Empire then was presented as an opportunistic entity that would take advantage of weaknesses where it found them: "For if every Englishmen sees you mired in this passivity, while he dedicates himself to his work night and day, he would say 'if you were as we are, you would have done the same."[99] And returning to his earlier advice to his countrymen he urged them to support their Khedive in whom they should trust their hopes, for he loved all his subjects no matter their religion, and would raise the patriots and appoint them to administer it:

> He but needs men to carry out his wishes who have been awakened by the shock of Europe so that they would turn away from their prideful stances and surround their prince and bind themselves to him loyally so he may say to the men of England, here are the men who you want to support my constitutional (nidhamia) government, so put the running of it in their hands and test them to see how they carry out their jobs.[100]

Al-Nadim understood the need for Egyptians to acquire Western knowledge, but not at the price of abandoning their country and their prince. Much as al-Afghani had preached, al-Nadim was calling upon Egyptians, no matter their religious creed or background, to unite in the face of British domination.

Ultimately, his concerns with internal Egyptian empowerment created a clash with those he saw as collaborators. This newly prominent group, he believed, were weakening the Khedieve and the nation for the sake of their European masters. Prominent among these were the migrants from Syria, mostly Christian, who had gained prominence in the government and were favored by the British occupation (mostly for their facility with languages). On those al-Nadim passed a scathing indictment:

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[98] Ibid., p. 519
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid., pp. 520-521

> I am your brother so why have you denied me? What are Egypt and the lands of the Sham, but twins from the same father? what harm comes to one comes to the other, so when the sons of both disagree, and the Syrians move away from the Egyptians, even as they dwell in Egypt, would it not have been better for us to spend all our knowledge and mental capacity in the effort to reform our country and spread the spirit of learning and nationalism; or for a twenty pound salary a man among us will sell his brother, his country, and even beyond that his race and his religion. For seductive words we spend our lives in the service of the foreigner, to aid him over our brothers so he may have vengeance upon those who have committed no sin, and assault those who have assaulted no one.[101]

The British occupation was undoubtedly a tyrannical oppressor, but one that relied upon locally placed collaborators. It was though the division of brother against brother that the British Empire ruled, and according to al-Nadim, "if we stay on this path of enmity and opposition, then the foreigner will take us as a tool to carry out his commands."[102]

As to the issue of religion, al-Nadim reminded all the dwellers of Egypt that their fathers had lived together as neighbors and brothers, prospered together, and never let anyone come between them: "If it is said that the commonality of religion bound them, then we would say that the honor of independent nationalism is preferable to the degradation of co-religionists." No matter the supposed bonds of a common religion a person could not rely on the promises of an alien invader, for "the foreigner will entice a man among us until he has achieved his ends and then sell him off once he has gained all he wanted."[103]

Al-Nadim, regardless of his true feelings, was often cautious in his assessment of the British occupation and its administrators. That was certainly the case when the issue of choosing a new Prime Minister came up in January 1893. After the removal of Mustafa Fahmi for reasons of ill health, so al-Nadim claims in *al-Ustadh*, the khedive was presented with a list of replacements approved beforehand by Cromer. The Khedive saw this as an attempt to interfere in his prerogative and took exception to it. As a result he appointed Mustafa Riad Pasha to the position of Prime Minister. The fascinating

[101] Ibid., p. 531
[102] Ibid., p. 531
[103] Ibid., p. 532

aspect in all of this was al-Nadim's description of Cromer's behavior during this altercation:

> Let us not forget what does credit to Lord Cromer in this matter, he had been difficult, and he had made the matter hard, and he had pushed his government to accede to his opinion, and he sent out frequent messages regarding this matter, and he had gotten angry, and he did what no Consul before him had done, but when he saw the firmness of the Khedive's mind and his insistence on preserving his rights, and his refusal of all foreign interference in the concerns of his country, he gave up his objections and agreed to the [appointment of Riad Pasha as Chief Inspector], and we shall not forget him for this, nor shall we be stingy in our praise.[104]

It is imperative to remember that above all else al-Nadim was concerned with empowering the Khedive, in whom he had put all his hopes and all his faith for a strong and independent Egypt. Upon those occasions when the British were accommodating to the Khedive he could be generous in his praise, just as he could be scathing in his denunciation, when the Khedive's will was thwarted. In the very same article in which he expressed his thanks to Lord Cromer for his actions, al-Nadim urged his fellow countrymen to treat all foreigners in Egypt with courtesy and kindness; for he says: "

> ..They did not take an inch of land from us through war, nor did they enter our land by force, but through treaties between our rightful government and theirs … so any action harmful to them is an affront to that same government and contrary to its works.[105]

Ever present in al-Nadim's mind were the consequences of the 1882 Urabi revolution, which he describes as "disastrous for the country, and ending in what the Egyptian did not wish for," mainly the British occupation[106] Again he urged his countrymen to remain calm and thoughtful and above all else to trust the Khedive and leave the politics to him and his government. He also spoke out against those who "enter gatherings, and call

[104] Ibid., p. 543
[105] Ibid., p. 545
[106] Ibid., p. 546

themselves Egyptians, then curse England and belittle its deeds, and move people's minds against her …" and labels them enemies of Egypt, its people and King. His representation of the British occupation changed in accordance with the needs and requirements of Khedival politics.

In March 1893, when the Khedive was coming out the worse off in his contest with Cromer over government appointments, the tone of the articles had changed, as did the portrayal of the British Empire. The portrayal grew negative and the assessment of its accomplishments full of sarcasm:

> Was not the entry of England into India for the purpose of installing an ordered government and the creation of a civilized society, and it claims it to this day even, as it has placed around the throat of every Indian a noose with which to lead him wherever it pleases...[107]

As for those Egyptians who might be deceived that the English would treat non-Muslims with any respect or consider them as equals: "The sight of the Brahmas shows [otherwise] for everyone that evil fate has placed under the tyranny of the English [will suffer], since they consider none but the English as human (equals)."[108] As to the maintenance of British political maneuvers and intent in the East:

> The English excel at removing weapons form the hands [of the indigenes] and reducing their wealth, and removing their sons from the significant projects and jobs, and this requires it to use tyranny under the guise of constitution." This has been allowed to happen because the Easterners had been blind: "England's politics of reducing peoples (nations) had been hidden from many Easterners, but it has been revealed by its capriciousness and its oath breaking.[109]

There is little doubt that this change in the portrayal of the British was related directly to the political tribulations of the Khedive, for although the immediate political developments were not spelled out they were implied: "They call the Egyptians visits to

[107] Ibid., p. 696
[108] Ibid., p. 696
[109] Ibid., p. 697

their king religious radicalism, and they ascribe lies to the Islamist journal that they fabricate, and they falsely attribute to them speech never said by any Egyptian…"[110] The conclusion of this article was a sarcastic thanks to England for all it had taught the Egyptians of good behavior and manners, of recognizing the good from the bad, and of differentiating between the foreign and national authority. It also contained an acerbic assurance that after eleven years of occupation the lessons had been learnt and the Egyptians were now qualified to take care of their own affairs.[111]

In a smartly written appraisal of certain British statements regarding public servants in Egypt, al-Nadim pointed to one of the inherent problems in the nature of the British occupation, and the source of Egyptian hope for eventually sovereignty.

> They [the English] are under the impression that the [government] workers fall into two groups, those friendly to the English, and those friendly to the government, or the Khedive…but that would mean that there is opposition between the goals of the National Government, and the English. But the English deny this in front of Europe, and claim it is only an advisor to the Egyptian government on matters of reform.

Britain's advisory role was moreover open to the judgment and interference of the European powers. The Consul General was constantly overstepping the limits of British influence as set by the 1882 agreement between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Egyptian nationalists long pinned their hopes of limiting these British infringements of national sovereignty on the terms of the Anglo-Ottoman agreement and the influence of its other European signatories. This, as we shall see, was, a powerful and consistent theme in the words of Mustafa Kamil, who managed to rouse serious apprehension and concern in British circles.

The following description of the British Empire also is worthy of translation and exposition for its remarks on the relation between British business and British imperialism:

[110] Ibid., pp. 697-698
[111] Ibid., pp. 698-699

> The English are the British Nation owners of great lands and large colonies and massive wealth which has become famous for its rich individuals and their fair business dealings which begin in the Eastern kingdoms with loans and the purchase of property, and end with forced intervention and occupation (taghalub), with the excuse of spreading civilization, ending barbarism and the spreading of European learning among the Easterners. With this hidden political agenda it entered many Indian kingdoms, and imperially controls much of the coast of Asia and Africa and has colonized Islands in the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean, and its political agenda spread until it entered Egypt…(May 23, 1893)[112]

Having entered Egypt nominally to support the Khedive and to create a modern ordered government, al-Nadim claimed that they initially enjoyed the support of the Egyptians. In the last analysis, however, having fallen prey to the lies of outsiders (the same Syrians he had attacked previously) whom they had favored over the Egyptian, the British had fostered Egyptian hatred: "If England would calculate the affection of the Egyptians before those rented ones (Ujara) had opened their journals, and their rejection of it after they opened it, it would notice that they had lost greatly and that those rented ones count against her rather than for her."[113]

Whether for his continued attacks on the Levantines and other foreign elements that were promoted for service by the British in the Egyptian government, or for his occasional attacks on the British themselves, it became expedient for the Khedive to banish al-Nadim once again. Thus, on June 13, 1893 *al-Ustadh* published its last issue. The decision to banish him seems to have been a sudden one, for al-Nadim himself had vehemently denied in previous issues that he was to be banished. Indeed he had blamed those very same "hired ones" for having circulated these baseless rumors. The only indication that something was seriously amiss came in a "Thanks and Salutation" letter to his subscribers written in the last issue. This letter actually went well beyond just expressing his thanks and carried an explanation as to whom, and what, he believed were behind his newest banishment:

[112] Ibid., pp. 933-934
[113] Ibid., pp. 935-936

> It did not please certain western persons to see the awakening of the Easterner and his willingness to compete with Europeans and emulate their free deeds and words, and they saw this as harmful to their personal plans. Knowing that *al-Ustadh* was among the leading journals advising ways of reform and success, they incited some English journals in Egypt and in England, like the Gazette, and Progres, and *The Times*, and the Daily News, and the *Muqatam*, against *al-Ustadh* in an eruption of enmity…

The *Muqatam* was the only one among these papers published in Arabic. It was owned and edited by two brothers of Syrian descent with very close ties to the British Agency. In fact whether it received a financial subsidy from the British Government was the subject of several unanswered inquiries in the House of Commons.

> …They hurled false and baseless accusation of religious intolerance against it, and they assaulted it with accusations that it hated the deeds of all Europeans, and that it denigrated those who emulated them (the Europeans) seeking to incite peoples against them…It is well known that people differ in their customs…and warning an Easterner that he has customs that he should preserve, does not mean that it is defaming Europeans and inciting people to hatred of their deeds. But the corrupter will lie to achieve his ends, so they falsely said that the editor (of *al-Ustadh*) was an incendiary revolutionary, despite the fact that he was dedicated to calmn and composure and called…and never incited anyone, other than those vengeful journals (that is). Let people know that their antagonism is for personal ends.

All that remained was to thank those who had come to his defense:

> …. Most of the Arabic journals in Egypt, especially *al-Muayyid*, *al-Ahram*, and *al-Watan*, and some of the French journals in Egypt and Europe… defended *al-Ustadh*, and revealed the evil intent of those [vengeful] journals, for which they deserve thanks and praise. [114]

He would then continue in his thanks naming the Khedive Abbas and Prime Minister Mustafa Riyad as well as the consuls of France and Russia for defending *al-Ustadh.* In a

[114] Ibid., pp. 1030-1032

sense al-Nadim's downfall was indicative of the fate of any small player caught up in the games of the great powers. The journal was a worrisome irritant to the British, and hence a source of delight to their competitors. The end result was the termination of *al-Ustadh* and the renewed banishment of Abdallah al-Nadim from Egypt.

AL-LIWA (THE STANDARD)

It was not long after the banishment of al-Nadim that one of the men he had inspired, Mustafa Kamil, launched his own journal in 1900. A*l-Liwa* agitated for Egyptian nationalism, independence, and the departure of all foreign troops from Egypt. Kamil was a fiery orator who excelled in his chosen career, attracting many admirers and adherents. His political speeches constantly featured in the journal when it was established and helped expand his audience and his influence. Even speeches and interviews given to European audiences were often translated and transmitted in *al-Liwa*. Kamil was also a prolific letter writer who corresponded tirelessly in the attempt to promote the Egyptian nationalist cause. These speeches, interviews, and letters are an excellent source for attempting to understand Kamil's views of the British and their Empire. Many of these fortunately were collected and published by his great admirer and biographer, Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, in 1939.[115] An even more comprehensive collection, *Awraq Mustafa Kamil*, was compiled and edited by Yuakym Rizq Murcus under the auspices of the Center for Modern Egyptian History and Documents.[116] This collection encompassed a great many if not all of the known letters, speeches, and articles of Mustafa Kamil.

Early on in his career Mustafa Kamil rested his hope of achieving Egyptian sovereignty on the French and, to a lesser degree, other European nations. It was in the competition and fears existing between rival European nations that he believed Egypt's salvation rested. If the European nations were made to see the threat that a Great Britain

[115] Abd al-Rihman al Rafii, *Mustafa Kamil Baith al-Watania,* (Cairo, 1939)
[116] Murcus Yuakim Rizq ed., *Awraq Mustafa Kamil: al-Khutub* (Cairo, 1984)

in possession of Egypt was to their own ambitions then they would apply pressure on it to withdraw. In a letter published on September 15, 1896, the 14th anniversary of the English occupation of Egypt, in the French newspaper *La Clair* he wrote:

> Fourteen years have passed and a people that call themselves the world's civilizers have oppressed Egypt! When a person reflects--- the English have spent all this time destroying Egypt's prosperity (binyan), battling Europe and European civilization on the shores of the Nile, reducing the influence of France and its dignity, and oppressing the Egyptians, all this while the countries of Europe have done nothing about the occupation, --- he would think that Europe had weakened and that it had no more presence today. The 14th of September is not only a mourning memorial for Egypt… but also a memorial of shame and embarrassment for European politics and European civilization in general, and France's specifically."[117]

Written when Kamil was twenty-three years of age, it was typical of his brash and aggressive style. It clearly revealed his aims and aspirations, and his constant attempts to push Europe and France especially to help oust Britain from Egypt.

What becomes starkly apparent from the analysis of Kamil's speeches, articles, and letters, is the great weight and trust he was putting in the power of international agreements and promises. He was not naïvely assuming that the agreements alone were enough to move Britain, but it had to be pressured, cajoled, and even shamed into respecting them. That goal could only be accomplished by addressing European public opinion and the British people actively and directly, for apathy in this as in all else, meant failure. Kamil believed strongly that only by challenging the British occupation and by actively promoting independence could anything be achieved. The greatest enemies to the nationalist and the greatest allies to the British occupation were apathy and inactivity. Challenging the British was the only way to get their respect, however grudgingly. The following excerpt from a speech delivered to a crowd in Alexandria demonstrates his assessment of British attitudes:

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[117] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

> Do not think, brothers, that your work on behalf of our country will result in belittling and contempt from the English, no and then again no, for the Englishmen who has contempt for an Egyptian who loves his country and defends it honestly and loyally would be showing contempt for himself and his own kind, because he and his countrymen are among the first of Nations in working to advance their nation: And, they are not content that it be happy internally only, but they try their utmost to expand [Britain's] colonies and extracting the good from them for its (Britain's) benefit and for no other" (Jan 1896).[118]

Kamil was arguing that jealous nationalism was no stranger to the British, but rather the absence of it, and the absence of active challenge was what made them believe that a nation could be colonized. He continued this promotion of activism by explaining to his audience:

> Will the sons of England agree to have their honor used as a lowly tool, to possess a free land and the enslavement of a free nation (umma)? Would the British nation (umma), which is jealous for its position and its respect, let it be said that it has no honor or respect of its publicly given word and honest agreements? I do not believe so, and I believe all of you (his audience) agree with me on this.[119]

In a sense Kamil was seeking to address Europe as an equal, as a product of modern civilization, and to deny Europeans the chance to reduce him to something less than they were. It must be recalled that both al-Afghani and al-Nadim, who stood as inspirations to Kamil, had bitterly remarked that the Europeans and especially the English, could do what they did because they had reduced the Muslims to being less than them, and not quite fellow humans. Accomplishing this goal required the Egyptians to address Europe and England directly and not through intermediaries, however well intentioned. Egyptians had to make Europe as a whole aware that the time for guidance had passed:

> Advising the English nation as to what Egyptians expect of her, and what would do her honor, cannot happen unless there are Egyptians residing

[118] Ibid., p., 474
[119] Ibid., p., 438

> and speaking out throughout Europe, of the truth of Egyptian affairs, and of Egypt's hopes and desires, so that they may increase her supporters, and that Egypt will have champions among the European nations who will aid her when she asks the English nation to force its government to withdraw from Egypt.[120]

It is interesting to note the distinction that Kamil drew between the "English" nation and the "English" government. He had made a very useful distinction that his predecessors had failed to make. The British government occupied Egypt, and the British nation was the one that needed to be awakened to the dishonor that their government brought upon it. Hence he could openly criticize the British government or its actions, yet praise what he saw admirable in the English nation, and more importantly address it directly. This attitude was made even more abundantly clear when he says

> Should we say these things to the English nation and make it understand that we do not hate the English but hate the occupier since he occupies us, even had he been the closest person to us, because we are a civilized nation who wish to rule ourselves.[121]

This theme was picked up again in a speech presented in French to a gathering of European residents in Alexandria on April 13, 1896. Here, Kamil elaborated on a favorite theme of al-Nadim's: "Is our struggle against the English nation? No, our struggle is not against her, but against a group of individuals who work to perpetuate the occupation indefinitely, for personal reasons…"[122] Kamil believed his struggle to be with a very specific imperial faction, and that made him even more eager to speak to the English nation directly.

Kamil also firmly believed that the British occupation withheld proper education from Egyptians and impeded their efforts to establish a proper system of education as part of a studied imperial policy to foil Egyptian independence:

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[120] Ibid., p. 439
[121] Ibid., pp. 439-440
[122] Ibid., p. 444

> Nation advance and progress only with education and in the presence of great educated men, who are full of wisdom who can lead us and guide to what is good and elevating for the nation, so what have the occupiers done to that end? Can they say that they have elevated the nation and produced men capable of dealing with its functions and guiding it.[123]

Having posed the question as he did, he condemned the British no matter the answer. Had they not, as he claimed, created such a class of men, then they had obviously failed in their task to guide Egypt. Had they succeeded, they would then be doubly damned since that would mean their guidance was no longer necessary and they were in breach of promise and agreement by continuing the occupation.

This issue of higher education was of paramount importance to Mustafa Kamil and even drove a wedge between him and Saad Zaghlul, the man who some years after Kamil's death became the very symbol of Egyptian nationalism. When Lord Cromer appointed him Minister of Education, Zaghlul abandoned Kamil's pet project of an Egyptian university, drawing his ire and condemnation. This condemnation became even more scathing when Zaghlul delivered a laudatory farewell speech, on the occasion of Cromer's final departure from Egypt.[124] The appointment of Zaghlul and his abandonment of the University project confirmed Kamil in his opinion that Cromer sought to stifle Egyptian national goals by curtailing advanced education:

> People have now understood and perceived clearer than before, why Lord Cromer chose for the Ministry of Public Education, the son in law of the Prime Minister (Mustafa Fahmy Pasha) who is loyal to [Cromer's] ideas, and a servant to his policies. They have also understood why the English newspapers, and those biased in favor of the English, have thrown sand in our eyes, saying that this new minister is of the nationalist party. [In reality] his circumstances and his actions indicate his strong bias towards the Government… Those who used to respect the minister as a lawyer, are extremely sorrowful at his present (circumstances), and fear dreadfully for his future, and overwhelmingly prefer his past, for as a minister he is now standing on the edge a frightening and huge precipice.[125]

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[123] Ibid., p. 182
[124] Ibid., pp. 441-442. Article first written in *Etendard Egyptien* then translated and printed in the Arabic sister publication *al-Liwa* in March, 1907.
[125] Ibid., pp. 402-403

Kamil believed strongly that the British were out to undermine the nationalist movement. In this case they were seeking to confuse public opinion, or to placate it, by claiming to have appointed an Egyptian nationalist to this position that the nationalists had attached so much weight to, when in reality Zaghlul was their own man.

On April 13, 1896, in a speech given in French to a mostly European audience, Mustafa Kamil accused the occupation and its minions of using fair and foul means to hinder his efforts on behalf of Egyptian sovereignty. In this speech he outright accused the pro-British government of targeting his brother, Ali Fahmy Pasha, an officer in the Egyptian army, in order to pressure him to remain silent. Ali Fahmy had been subjected to a court-martial on charges of desertion prior to the Sudan campaign, a charge denied by Fahmy and Mustafa. Kamil saw this as a form of political persecution that he refused to bow to:

> Those who sought to defend the English occupation believed that they had stopped me forever. They believe (bi sathja) that the recent persecution (Ijhaf) of one of my brothers weakens my strength, reduces my will, and will decrease my struggle for the happiness of my country. They have misjudged…nothing will stop me but death—from describing the tragedies of Egypt and its pains, and calling everywhere for its sacred rights, and demanding its freedom and independence.[126]

The degree of British involvement with Ali Fahmy's court-martial is difficult to determine, but the story reveals much of the anxieties felt by those who opposed the British. Most of the government jobs to which many of the Egyptian middle class aspired to were in reality controlled by the British and not the Egyptians. Through these means the occupation was able to reward those it deemed loyal with appointments, while excluding or firing from jobs those they judged troublesome. Opposing the British then could very well mean the loss of one's livelihood.

With regard to the Sudan campaign, Kamil's opposition was clear and unequivocal. His opposition did not stem from any doubt that the Sudan belonged to

[126] Ibid., p. 443

Egypt, but rather out of the belief that the Sudan campaign was a contrived and fabricated crisis created by the British to continue their occupation of Egypt. In the same April 13 speech Kamil remarked:

> The presence of the English at the head of our army is reason enough for its failure…. Their presence at the head of the army creates a deep chasm between us and the Sudanese, that will put off for a long time the reconciliation of those very same people who had once been the Khedive's subjects.[127]

The Dongola campaign was designed in Kamil's view with the evil intent of claiming that Egypt was insecure and hence the occupation remained necessary. To support his views he cited the fifth clause of the Anglo-Ottoman treaty of 1887, which allowed the British to postpone their withdrawal from Egypt if it coincided with a threat to its security. From this clause he deduced: "The issue of the Sudan was calculated to create disturbances and to find new threats. It is simply part of an English policy, that fabricated [those threats] in the first place." He insisted that "if England were truly and honestly concerned with returning the Sudan to Egypt, then it would depart from Egypt that alone would assure the return of Sudan to Egypt."[128] As to the repeated British allusions to religious prejudice and intolerance, Kamil again dismissed those as nothing but attempts by the British to frighten Europe into acquiescing in support the British occupation.[129] The reality was that Egypt's progress had been hindered by Britain for its own interests. Britain had also curtailed and reserved for its own profit the opportunities for business and trade in Egypt, that should have been available to all European nations. Kamil concluded his speech by proclaiming:

> Once we are rid of this administrative system set up by Great Britain for its own profit…then on that day the progress of Egypt will be great. Once

[127] Ibid., p. 446
[128] Ibid., p. 447
[129] Ibid., pp. 447-9

> our trade is rid of the ills that the English occupation causes, then golden horizons will be opened for you and us.[130]

Ever aware of the less than philanthropic nature of European interests in Egypt, Kamil reminded his European audience of the opportunities for profit from which the English occupation was excluding them. The same could be said of Egyptian industries that according to Kamil could revive to the benefit of Egypt and its foreign residents once rid of the British occupation. Whether by appealing to Europe's conscience, Britain's pride and self-esteem, or simply the collective greed of international merchantmen, Kamil sought to promote the cause of British withdrawal and Egyptian sovereignty.

With the passage of time Kamil's tone became even more acerbic and his characterization of the British and Europeans in general significantly harsher. In a speech given in 1902 to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of Muhammad Ali's rule over Egypt, there was no more questioning of Britain's bad faith, but stark statements of its perfidy:

> …Western politics is based on breaking promises and treaties, and British civilization demands the sovereignty of nations through these means, and the British politician claim they did not present these promises and treaties except for the benefit of the simpleminded, and that the intelligent and wise do not believe in political promises…so the Egyptian has found out that England has conquered his country to put him in chains of humiliation and bondage and not to place on his head the crown of freedom and independence.[131]

The ultimate disappointment, though, occurred in 1904 with the signing of the Entente Cordial between France and Great Britain. The manner in which France had acceded to the British position in Egypt had a tremendous impact on Kamil, who had rested much of his hope for Egyptian independence on the French support of British withdrawal. This, however, did not end his agitation for independence, a goal he remained faithful to despite what appears to be a change of course on his part away from independence.

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[130] Ibid., p. 450
[131] Ibid., p. 463

Unable to rely on French assistance to oust the British from Egypt, Kamil attempted to strengthen the nationalist hand by heavily promoting Pan-Islamism and Ottoman claims of suzerainty over Egypt. The Entente Cordial had for all intents and purposes granted England carte blanche in Egypt. Temporarily isolated, Kamil saw the Ottoman Empire and Pan-Islamism as a likely new sponsor for his cause. The possible implication of admitting the sovereignty of an Ottoman Sultan over Egypt was a matter of much less importance than the reality of British occupation and control. That he remained primarily a committed nationalist is certain and can be shown by his promotion of Parliamentary and Constitutional reforms in 1907. The British actually attempted to capitalize on his support for these reforms to drive a wedge between him and the Sultan.

The British did not have to worry about Kamil for much longer, as his health progressively deteriorated. This speech given in Alexandria on October 22, 1907 was among the last he delivered prior to his death and is an evocative masterpiece from a purely literary standpoint:

> The English politicians thought that if they agreed with France over the issue of Egypt they could close the page on this dangerous issue, and all voices would be silenced and all hope would die…But they made a big mistake…They made a mistake because the isolation that we find ourselves in now has breathed into us a new spirit that has guided us to the truth that no people can rise without, and no nation can have life without…and that is that nations do not rise except on their own, and do not achieve their independence except by their own efforts…[132]

On this point Kamil accepted no compromise. There could be but one goal that any true nationalist could aim for and that was total independence. Those who stood against this firm stance, or even advised compromise with the British, could only be described as enemies of nationalism:

> Sirs, none of you is ignorant of the fact that the nationalist movement has bothered those lovers of imperialism among the English, so they fought it in *Danshawi* and were disappointed. [They fought it] by increasing the

[132] al-Rafii, p. 469

> number of occupying troops and failed. [They fought it] by accusing (Egyptians) of religious intolerance and failed, making the world laugh long and hard, and they are now fighting us with traitors and deceivers…and they will fail…[133]

Egypt had to rely on the strength and the unity of its own sons and daughters to gain its independence; there could be no acquiescence in their fight for independence. Kamil urged Egyptians to be like the Irish and the Poles, who had shocked the entire world as even the least among them clung tenaciously to his nationality.[134] He was scathing in his contempt for those he considered traitors and he could not believe that the English did not regard these tools with any less contempt:

> Anyone who believes that the English have any love for traitors is making a huge mistake, yes they use them for there own ends, but they revile them to the utmost, because a people that bring up their sons to believe that owning lands and those upon them, is a right of his kind, counts treason as the greatest of crimes.

Once again Kamil returned to the theme that had occupied him since his youth: the need to stand up to Europe and England specifically, and to force them to acknowledge Egyptians as equals. Those who did not work to that end were to be despised and condemned because "to be lax (to be forgiving) over the issue of nationalism is to murder it, and to put an end to it…"[135]

This attitude put Kamil in direct conflict with the school of thought championed by Muhammad Abduh. Collaboration could not be condoned nor forgiven, even should those collaborating truly have a nationalist vision. He remarked, that those who believed that Great Britain would allow the reform efforts to reach a point when they could energize Islamic society and challenge its hegemony were truly deluded fools:

[133] Ibid., p. 475
[134] Ibid., p. 477
[135] Ibid., p. 477

> I confess that it never occurred to me even once that I would be capable of defeating the English policy with this kind of exceptional [political] talent. Despite all my undoubted enmity for the English I do not see them having been suddenly turned into small children that such a laughable ploy would succeed.[136]

To Kamil any reliance on British good intentions was beyond naïve, and simply foolhardy, for only "the simpleminded can believe that the English, despite wishing to remain in Egypt, are willing to give its people a [true] constitutional government."[137]

AL-MANAR (THE LIGHT HOUSE)

Nowhere can we more clearly see the divisions within Egypt and the resulting differences in perception of the British occupation, than when contrasting Mustafa Kamil's and Rashid Rida's opinions. Rida had become the first among Muhammad Abduh's disciples. Despite his earlier association with the clearly anti-British al-Afghani and *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*, Adbduh had arrived at an accommodation with the British occupation and established good relations with Cromer. These good relations go someway in explaining his pupil's perceptions of the British. Rida's portrayals were tempered by his mentor's influence and his assessment of Britain's attitude to what he saw as true reform.

The organ through which Rashid Rida publicized his opinions was a weekly publication by the name of *al-Manar*. This was launched in March of 1898 with the encouragement and help of Muhammad Adbuh. *Al-Manar* attempted to elaborate on and publicize Islamic reforms along the lines advocated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Abduh. In effect though it was the post-exile conciliatory spirit of Muhammad Abduh that infused it rather than the more bellicose and rebellious spirit of al-Afghani.

Rashid Rida was an avowed Islamic reformer and a believer in the Islamic Umma. Because of his attachment to the concept of true reform, he regarded the Ottoman

[136]Yuakin Murcus Rizk ed., *Awraq Mustafa Kamil: al-Khutub*, , Cairo, 1984. p. 313
[137] Ibid.

attempts at creating and promoting a pan-Islamic identity with great suspicion. Due to his suspicion of the Ottoman Sultan's enmity to true reform, Rida took what can only be described as a non-confrontational stance towards the British occupation of Egypt prior to 1906, despite believing that the British harbored ill will towards Egyptians, Muslims, and Easterners in general.

Rida in fact often remarked critically on Mustafa Kamil's articles and speeches denouncing his brand of nationalism as thoughtless and reckless. He also attacked Kamil for his strong French leanings as well as for his ties to the Khedive and the celebration his frequent celebration Muhammad Ali's line. The very concept of nationalism as we shall come to see was anathema to Rida. This goes some way in explaining his support for the British despite his strong Islamist leanings.

Rida regarded the ideas of nationalism as a western stratagem introduced into the East in order to weaken the Muslim peoples and then to assimilate Muslim lands:

> The Franks know for certain that the strongest bond among Muslim is based on their religion…the Franks have greedy ambitions in the homes and lands of Islam so they have directed their attention to spreading those failed ideas among the notables of the Muslim religion…so that they would abandon this sacred bond…for they know, as we know, as do all the wise, that Muslims know no nationality but their religion…they have helped them rebel against the religious bonds…that cannot be replaced with those national bonds that they foolishly and stupidly exaggerate and inflate in importance and respect, for they are like those who demolish their house without having another habitat so that they have to live outside exposed to the elements..[138]

The house of which Rida spoke was the Muslim *Umma* as represented by the Ottoman Empire with the Sultan, who had donned the mantle of Caliph, at its head. Despite his disillusionment and distrust of the despotic sultans, the empire itself was a project that Rida thought well worth preserving. Nationalism was among the most dangerous of threats to the Ottoman Empire, and to the bonds that united the Umma. To Rida, power rested not in the creation of modern states, but rather in the reaffirmation of the bonds of

[138] Al-Manar, March 12, 1900, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 11-12

Islamic fellowship and the adherence to the Caliphate, albeit a dramatically reformed Caliphate.

When remarking on the Boer war Rida warned his fellow Egyptians in the strongest terms:

> We say truly that although bitter to the tastes of Egyptians who suffer under the weight of the English presence, that it is to the benefit of the Ottoman Empire for the English nations to triumph after its setbacks, because its repeated humiliation would cause a change in Europe and an imbalance of power. This would give the advantage to Russia, the natural enemy of the [Ottoman] Empire, which would not be satisfied unless it wiped the [Ottoman Empire's] name off the map.[139]

Rida's real goal was not the simple preservation of the status quo. Rather he sought nothing less than the complete reform of the Empire and an introduction of some form of representative government and the end of despotic rule. This should hardly be surprising given that Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was the idol of his youth, and Muhammad Abduh the mentor of his adulthood. We can see this clearly when he took the seemingly contradictory step of supporting the Anglo-Egyptian government in the Taba territorial dispute, against the Ottoman Empire:

> All wise Muslims prefer the British government over all other countries, and if they perceived that any of their lands were to come under a foreign Sultan, and they had a choice in the matter, they would choose Great Britain over any other.

Had he stopped there, it could have been argued that his preference for Great Britain was for one European occupier over another, but his next statement reveals that not to be the case.

> The reformers among them [Muslims] believe that it is not possible to carry out any reform work that would resurrect Islam and benefit Muslims in any Muslim lands except in Egypt and India. Furthermore there is no

[139] Al-Manar, March 12, 1900, vol. 3, part 1, p. 46

> freedom for Muslims to preach their Lord's dictated book and the teachings of his chosen prophet except in those two lands.[140]

This concluding statement is of paramount importance for it reveals the reasons at the very heart of his early support for Great Britain. The relative freedom of speech guaranteed early on by the British was crucial to the hoped-for spread of the reform movement. Rida had traveled to Egypt to a great extent because of his conviction that reform efforts could not be freely carried out under direct Ottoman rule, and had he had any doubts those were quickly dispelled when the first issue of *al-Manar* was banned and the copies confiscated by the Ottoman authorities in Syria. Rida was arbitrarily accused of having defamed the Sultan by the Ottoman authorities and only British protection allowed him to continue his work. As for the Egyptian Khedieval family, he expressed nothing short of derision and contempt for them, for they were in his view the worst example of despotic rule, without even the excuse of religious precedent to give them legitimacy or respect:

> …It is a mark of our departure from proper tradition in this age and these strange days that we hold celebrations in the houses of God almighty, memorializing princes and sultans and the tyrants among rulers

With regard to the accomplishments of Muhammad Ali and his descendants, he was yet more scathing as he facetiously comments:

> To the credit of Muhammad Ali are listed three major accomplishments. Creating a government in Egypt that was a prelude to the entry of foreigners and its eventual conquest as well as warring with the Ottoman Empire and exposing its weakness to the wilderness (for all to see).

To that end a Pan-Islamic movement promoted by the Sultan and initially supported by the Khedive could not but arouse suspicion on the part of Rida. Indeed he shared the Sultan's goal of a strong *Umma* and a powerful Islamic universality, yet it was to be a

[140] Al-Manar, April 25, 1906,vol. 9, part 3. p. 232

reformed Umma with representative government and a constitutional Caliphate. The return to Ottoman or Khedival despotism would have meant the end of the dream of reform, and hence the stagnation of Islamic society and its continued relegation to second class status.

This attitude of tolerance for the British occupation was limited though, and gradually eroded as the occupation persisted and reform was stifled. The death of Abduh in 1905 was also to have an impact, for without Abduh's moderating influence, Rida became more impatient with the pace of reform, and much more critical of the British. The end of the First World War found him heavily involved in anti-imperial agitation both in Syria and in Egypt. Rida wrote a brief review of Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1922 for an episode of *al-Manar*. It is important not so much for its historical content, but for its revisionist nature. The British featured as the villains of the narrative, even from the very beginning of their occupation.

THE DIARIES OF SAAD ZAGHLUL

The primary sources for the analysis of Zaghlul are his recently published nine volume memoirs. This is an impressive collection that spans the period between 1901 and 1920. The entries in these diaries are relatively consistent, especially given the long time period that they cover. Yet, the level of detail he provided varied wildly from the extremely detailed and introspective entries to the vague and uninformative. The amount of material though is more than sufficient to develop a very strong impression of Saad Zaghlul, the man and politician. These diaries exonerate him of many of the failings that British and Egyptian critics have leveled against him, but in their honesty can also condemn him. Zaghlul was no stranger to criticism and was well aware that history could prove a harsh judge. To that end he noted in his journals, "Woe to me should any read these journals after I am gone."

While Rashid Rida for all intents and purposes became the intellectual heir to Muhammad Abduh, it was another of his protégés, Saad Zaghlul who attempted to carry out his political vision. The previous chapter dealt with the history of Zaghlul's

involvement with the British and his evolution to become what some have labeled "the father of his country." What we will be doing here is gradually following his evolving perceptions of the British and their policies in Egypt. This, as we shall see, is very closely tied to his perception of the state of the Egyptian nation and the Egyptian people. This sort of approach at times seemed to belittle the achievements of his own people and created serious rifts between him and the Nationalist Party. This rift was further aggravated by a personal animosity between him and Mustafa Kamil. This has become a serious issue in the historiography between Zaghlul's detractors and defenders. The allegations generally leveled at him, notably by the author Abd al-Khaliq Muhammad, were that he collaborated with the occupation to weaken indigenous Egyptian education reform movements and that he was complicit in the British campaign of intimidation and prosecution against the Nationalist Party and its partisans. In attempting to refute any wrongdoing, or pettiness, on the part of Zaghlul in his dealings with the Nationalist Party while a government minister, Abd al-Atheem Ramadan, the noted Zaghlul scholar and editor of his memoirs, has attempted to demonstrate that Zaghlul's actions, no matter what the appearances, were always judicious and in keeping with the letter of the law. His arguments are for the most part convincing and appear to be supported by the evidence he presents. What remains in doubt was how much Zaghlul's personal animosity towards the nationalist leading figures such as Mustafa Kamil and his successor Muhammad Farid drove him if not explicitly to facilitate, then to refrain from impeding their harassment by the government, through his ministries.

Zaghlul's diaries indicate that he was well aware of the accusations leveled against him by the Nationalist Party, just as he was aware that the British had not wanted an independently minded or assertive minister of education when they appointed him. In January and February of 1907 Zaghlul had his first confrontation with Dunlop the supervisor of education, over the promised raises for teachers. It was Zaghlul's belief that only by properly compensating the teachers could you hope to have them carry out their jobs or as he succinctly pointed out: "We must improve the situation of the employees, so that we might tempt them to work for us, and open the door of hope in

front of them."[141] Zaghlul was pointing out only as an Egyptian could the growing resentment of his countrymen over low wages and austerity measures, which could only lead to their further alienation and support of the Nationalist Party. When this reasoning failed to sway Dunlop, Zaghlul retorted:

> Do not think that I was appointed here to sign everything placed before me, I am a man with opinions and a will, and any person who thinks otherwise is wrong. If Lord Cromer appointed me to this job thinking otherwise, then he has made a great mistake. I will have a care for nothing when it comes to what is just, and if justice is to be denied, then I will return to the practice of law…[142]

If the memoirs are to be believed, Zaghlul was clearly suspicious of British motives in appointing him minister of education and did not believe them to be beyond underhanded action. In the end the argument was resolved to his satisfaction. However, that would not be his last confrontation with Dunlop or Cromer, as he would clash with them again when he continued trying to exert his authority and to introduce changes long sought by the Egyptian reformers.

Despite this incident Zaghlul was grateful to Cromer for his appointment and regarded his efforts in Egypt with some gratitude. This is made quite clear when one reads Zaghlul's diary entries on Cromer: "I am not thinking of myself but of my country and its good, for we shall lose with your departure something that cannot be compensated."[143] This comment was made despite the fact that Cromer's last report on the state of Egypt was hardly complimentary to the Egyptians and upset even the very moderate among them.[144] Zaghlul demonstrated his genuine appreciation of Cromer when he attended his farewell party and publicly praised him, knowing full well that he was opposing the will of his countrymen and injuring their sensibilities.[145]

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[141] Abd Al-Atheem Ramadan, ed. *Saad Zaghlul's Diaries,* 9 vol. (Cairo: 1987 -) vol. I p. 218
[142] Ibid., pp. 218-9
[143] Ibid., p.231
[144] Ibid., p.232
[145] Ibid., p.241

The departure of Cromer and the arrival of Eldon Gorst to replace him as British Agent did not make Zaghlul's position any easier. On 10 January, 1908 he wrote:

> On the one hand, I feel that the English are not pleased because …. I oppose their desires, since I follow principles that might not match their goals.
> On the other, his highness (the Khedive) has no confidence in me, for I am a friend of Muhammad Abduh, whom he hated….[146]

Zaghlul's was in fact in an untenable position. He was deeply suspicious of the Khedive and the radical nationalists led by Mustafa Kamil, yet frustrated and disillusioned with the British administration, which he had gradually come to see as a hindrance to reform and independence, rather than a partner. The following extract from his journal is particularly revealing of this increased frustration:

> The conversation switched to the topic of the English administration and the fact that it choose to appoint only those with feeble minds, (for it fears those who are intelligent), and thus [by its actions] weakens the forces of independence.[147]

Those in the English administration, who claimed that the Egyptians were not ready or capable to take over governance independently, had actively worked to make it so. It was indeed their own policies that had kept those of intelligence and ability from truly participating in the administering of their own countries affairs.

To exacerbate matters, Zaghlul and many of his colleagues believed that the English administration in Egypt was not fully competent:

> We then spoke of the English and their inability (weakness) to administer [the country] and how they would issue orders to the (moudereen) regional administrators and later deny any personal responsibility for any [negative] consequences that occurred [from the execution of those orders].

[146] Ibid., pp. 342-343
[147] Ibid., pp. 356-357

It seems that even among the reformers of the Muhammad Abduh school, who believed in collaboration towards independence, the departure of Lord Cromer in 1907 had allowed them to fully express their nationalist sentiments. Without Lord Cromer at the helm they were now much more willing to voice their criticism of the English administration. Even more significant was the nature of the criticism, and the accusations of incompetence leveled against the English. What we see emerging is a picture of an alien administration that was incapable or unwilling (or both) to communicate with the Egyptian populace. This was starkly demonstrated upon the death of Mustafa Kamil when students, despite orders form their headmasters, flooded the streets to participate in the burial procession. These incidents occurred predominantly in schools with English headmasters, as the Egyptian students refused to heed their admonitions.[148]

Although Zaghlul's remarks upon the character and accomplishments of Mustafa Kamil were mostly demeaning, and despite the fact that he was genuinely surprised and resentful of the level of popular support Kamil's radical nationalist sentiments engendered, he was quick to take advantage of the situation. He recognized this as a golden opportunity to advance his own more gradualist nationalist goals. Given the inability of the English headmasters to control their students Zaghlul proposed increasing the number of Egyptian administrators in public schools. The Egyptians nationalists, radical and moderate, had long believed that the control of their schools and education system was the first step towards true independence. As he cleverly commented to Dunlop, there was no need for the English to feel slighted by this move, for it was not "due to their lack of qualifications" but rather in keeping with the government's stated goal "of training nationalists, and making them understand that the government wants to turn their affairs over to them whenever possible."[149] As can be surmised from his earlier statements, Zaghlul no longer believed that the English administration had any intention of preparing the nationalists for self rule. Nevertheless, he was perfectly willing to utilize any method at his disposal to wrest whatever concession the he could from them.

[148] Ibid., p. 404
[149] Ibid., p. 406

Despite the few successes he managed to achieve, Zaghlul grew increasingly pessimistic over the cause of educational reform, the reform from which he believed true independence would spring. In a conversation with a colleague in the ministry, Mustafa Pasha, he would note:

> We are in agreement that the awakening of learning will slumber in this period, for as long as both authorities (The Khedive and the British) are agreed on extinguishing it, they will likely sooner or later succeed in their efforts, to the great detriment of the nation. [150]

As Gorst's policy of reconciliation with Abbas Hilmy advanced, the trust of Zaghlul and the reformers in the goodwill of the British further dissipated. As he would acidly commented at one point, the British in Egypt seemed to lose no opportunity to foster divisions among the Egyptian elite.

> It occurs to me that he [Gorst] feels that the newspapers are opposing me, and that I am upset with them, and he then wished to expose me to the criticism of the nation, so that I may be weak in his hands [as in easily run]. [151]

It was becoming increasingly clear that Britain's policy in Egypt was not predicated on reform and eventual independence, but rather on the maintenance of the status quo. This again brings to mind Mustpha Kamil's admonitions to the collaborator reformers that Britain would allow reform only so far, but never to a point when it could challenge British hegemony.

Zaghlul returned to the theme of fostering divisions and creating tensions among Egyptians on many more occasions, yet never more significantly then upon the appointment of a Christian Copt, Boutrus Ghali, as Prime Minister (Rais al-Nuthar): "Boutrus is qualified, and I like him, but I fear this will not sit well with Muslims, and this is an underhanded policy on the governments (Gorst's) part that has no honest

[150] Ibid., p. 477-478
[151] Ibid., p. 474

intent."[152] Zaghlul came to believe that it was the intent of the British to alienate the Khedive from his people by this appointment for, "the newspapers loyal to the occupation hint that the appointment of Boutrus was the Khedive's decision, and make [themselves] blameless in it." He believed that this was intended to weaken the Khedive to such a great extent that he would have to place all his reliance on the British if he wished to maintain his throne.[153] Although a harsh critic of the Khedive, Zaghlul greatly feared the concentration of even more power in the hands of the British.

This deteriorating situation made Zaghlul consider resigning many times. The first mention occurred in January of 1910. Nevertheless he remained in the government until 31 March, 1912 (wazir al-Haqaniyya). The turning point for Zaghlul was the appointment of Lord Kitchener to replace Gorst in 1911. Despite his suspicions of Gorst's intentions towards Egypt, Zaghlul had managed to build an acceptable working relationship with him, and due to his need for the income from his job, he had remained in the government.[154] Not long after the appointment of Kitchener, however, Zaghlul found himself in an untenable situation. Both Kitchener and the Khedive had agreed upon the appointment of one Husayn Muharam to the ministry of war (wakil Nitharat al-harbiya). Zaghlul refused to condone this appointment for he believed Muharam was a crook.[155]Since both Kitchener and the Khedive were insistent upon this appointment, and he was adamantly opposed, there remained nothing for him to do but resign. Days prior to his resignation he had a conversation with Kitchener in which he recorded expressly being told: "The English government helps those who are loyal." Zaghlul responded: "I am (loyal), and if there is a fault with me it is my excessive honesty. You might say I am dumb and harsh, but dishonest, never."[156] His position deteriorated even more when he refused to resign without cause, but insisted on writing an official letter of resignation in which he indicates that he resigned over a disagreement with the Khedive. This greatly embarrassed and angered both the Khedive and Kitchener. The first set his minions to

[152] *Saad Zaghlul's Diaries*, vol. II (Cairo:1988) p. 739
[153] Ibid., p. 760
[154] Ibid., pp. 1029-30
[155] *Saad Zaghlul's Diaries*, vol. IV (Cairo: 1991) pp. 95-97
[156] Ibid., p. 107

attack Zaghlul's integrity in the Press, and the second denied him his pension, hence additionally exacerbating his financial situation.[157]Their dissatisfaction with Zaghlul lingered and he found himself unable to find another job with the government even after approaching Kitchener in an attempt to smooth things over. Part of the problem as he saw it, was his hesitation to abase himself before either of these two men. In a very honest entry in his diaries he noted:

> I have studied the [possibility of placating] either the Khedive or Kitchener, and I have foreseen that attaching myself to either would have its evils; though the evil from the latter I judge greater. The Khedive is primarily concerned with enriching himself, and is not concerned should others benefit or get hurt. In the long run his actions might not affect the greater public good. He seeks personal gain in all things, but he gains but little by these means, and hence he causes little damage. Kitchener, though, works to subjugate the entire nation by passing laws that destroy its rights and denigrates its hopes. For that purpose I lean towards befriending the former over the latter.[158]

Kitchener in Zaghlul's view was very much the despot, and unlike the Khedive a very potent one. His power was all but absolute and "Said (the then Prime Minister), and all his colleagues [in the ministry] were in Kitchener's hands, much like chess pieces, and they [the English] could find no one more obedient to their will."[159] Despite all the ill thoughts he harbored towards Kitchener, financial constraints drove him to approach the Agent and ask him to consider him for a post in the government. He even went so far as to admit to Kitchener that he had made mistakes in the past, although as the dialogue unfurled Kitchener interrupted him, and thus we are left wondering what he meant exactly by "mistakes.'[160]Was his mistake in retiring early, or was it in not acceding immediately to Kitchener's will? This entry, and the manner in which it is interpreted, complicates our picture of Zaghlul considerably. Reconciling the image of Zaghlul as a principled nationalist with an apology rendered to a "despot" casts some doubt as to the

[157] Ibid., p. 120.
[158] Ibid., p. 204
[159] Ibid., p. 205
[160] Ibid., pp. 233-34

quality of his character. All of this, however, depends on the readers' interpretation of the circumstances and the intent of the apology. From the context, and the manner in which the whole incident was reported in the diary, it seems that Zaghlul was driven by his need for a job to approach Kitchener, so he left his apology intentionally vague. His hope might have been to appease Kitchener with an apology while not categorically abandoning the grounds for his earlier opposition and resignation. Ultimately though this led nowhere and by the end of October 1913, barely three weeks after "the apology," he was convinced that no good would come from the British, at least while Kitchener remained Consul-General.[161] Despite what he thought were now great odds against him he decided to run for a seat in the Legislative Assembly, and to do so independently, seeking neither British nor the Khedive's support.[162]

Circumstances worked to Zaghlul's advantage and he appeared to be in a position to win in both the Cairo districts for which he nominated himself. This drove both Kitchener and the Khedive to send envoys to him, each attempting to draw him to their side. He remarked sarcastically to Mustafa Pasha, Kitchener's Envoy: "I praise God for this situation I now find myself in, for both the parties that had agreed to drive me out of the government, are now seeking my friendship…. I assure you I will not be the Khedive's man, nor the occupation's, but the man of truth.."[163]Zaghlul decided to rely on neither power, and much as the British feared, it seemed he also arrived at some understanding with the Nationalist Party, now led by Mustafa Kamil's brother Ali Bey Fahmy Kamil. At this crucial juncture Zaghlul did not give the full details in his journal. He does though mention that Ali Bey's younger brother, Sabri, visited him, and solicited a donation for the Mustafa Kamil school. Saad mentioned that for the first time ever he contributed to the school and agreed to meet with Ali Bey.[164]The significance of this event cannot be overestimated. Given the level of dislike he had harbored for Mustafa Kamil and his Nationalist Party, this apparent reconciliation indicates an entirely new phase in Zaghlul's political life. Kitchener in turn seemed to have been quite perturbed

[161] Ibid., p. 266
[162] Ibid., p. 310
[163] Ibid., p. 317
[164] Ibid., pp. 316, 332. Note: This meeting occurred on November 25, 1913.

that Zaghlul might become a member of the opposition, loyal to the Khedive or some other anti-British faction. Zaghlul received another indirect message from Kitchener this time through Muhammad Ahmed, who reported to him more of the Commissioner's concerns. Zaghlul's response was much the same as on the previous occasion: "I have no ties with the Khedive…but I am not the occupation's man either, I am the man of the people."[165]

In the end Zaghlul won both the districts he ran in, Sayyida and Boulaq. Although he could only accept the seat from one of these districts this was a significant show of popular strength. For the first time, he served his country as an elected, rather than appointed official. Another indirect message arrived from Kitchener this time via Rushdi, who reported that Kitchener feared Zaghlul would take over leadership of the Nationalist Party, and if that occurred, he (Kitchener) would have to deport him from Egypt.[166] This was the first time that Zaghlul was threatened with exile.

In his first meeting with Kitchener after the election, he reported being told that the Agent desired the Legislative Assembly to function properly for it was his creation. Kitchener added that he had gone against the wishes of his countrymen, and the opinions of such notables as Cromer and Gorst when creating the Assembly, for they had thought it too great a concession to the Egyptians. Zaghlul responded that this was a strange thing indeed that "they think this a great matter, while we count it as nothing."[167]

Kitchener had developed a strong distrust of Zaghlul and continued to oppose his appointment to ministry positions even after his own departure to join the war cabinet at the commencement of the First World War. Indeed despite McMahon's apparent acquiescence to Sultan Husayn's desire to have Zaghlul placed in the ministry of *Awqaf,* word reached Zaghlul that Kitchener, had vetoed that appointment from London.[168] Zaghlul commented on this occasion that he was " proud to have the enmity of a man

[165] Ibid., p. 338
[166] Ibid., p. 352
[167] Ibid., p. 358
[168] Ibid., p. 137

such as Kitchener…"[169]His relationship with McMahon during the war seemed to have been quite a bit friendlier, since he described him as a man of intelligence and a friend.[170]

The war years were difficult for Zaghlul, as the Legislative Assembly was suspended and he feared becoming redundant and forgotten. Then in August 1915 the government began a series of arrests and to persecutions of all those who had opposed it, especially members of the Nationalist Party. This situation and the seeming arbitrary arrests truly upset Zaghlul and created a rift between him and sultan Husayn. Yet the blame in his opinion lay squarely at the feet of the English who "made Egypt a protectorate and did not give the nation a voice in the decision. Then they expected the nation to applaud them! And they are angered whenever they see anything different!" [171] Once again he was caught between what he perceived as a despotic sultan and a self-deluded dictatorial occupation.

The departure of McMahon and his replacement by Sir Reginald Wingate made little overall impact on Zaghlul. He did observe though that Wingate appeared at his reception in full military uniform and that the attendance was so great as to make him suspect that few had seen its like before. Wingate himself was gracious and charming, especially as he knew many of those who came to receive him. This hardly reassured Zaghlul who noted: "What I fear most for my country are these people and this sort of friendliness (al-inass)."[172]It was what hid behind the smiles and the uncertainties facing Egypt after the war that worried him deeply. A dialogue he reported having with Wingate expressed these concerns: "At first you were occupiers, then you became protectors, and I do not what you will become next?" Wingate sought to end this line of questioning by reiterating that Britain was "Egypt's friend." Zaghlul's rejoinder was both a statement of fact and an expression of frustration, "you are friends by force, and not by choice."[173] These feeling were exacerbated by Zaghlul's observation that the government seemed determined to deny the Egyptians any say in the conduct of their

[169] Ibid., p. 138
[170] Ibid., p. 144
[171] Ibid., pp. 195-196
[172] *Saad Zaghlul's Diaries*, vol. VI (Cairo: 1993) p. 165
[173] *Saad Zaghlul's Diaries*, vol. VIII, (Cairo 1996) p 34

affairs. The committees established to determine cotton prices, and to administer the purchase of provisions, had had no Egyptians on them, despite dealing with matters vital to Egyptian livelihoods. To make matters worse these committee members were imported directly from England, visited Egypt but briefly, and failed to consult with any Egyptians.

These concerns for what was to come next were very much behind the decision by Zaghlul and some of his fellow Egyptian notables to consider forming a delegation, which they hoped could present Egypt's demands for independence to the British government directly. Those were the origins of the *wafd,* the Egyptian delegation sent to Paris, and what would later become the first Egyptian political party to control parliament. These early discussions were carried out in November of 1918, and for the remainder of that year Zaghlul and his allies busied themselves collecting signatures of support on a referendum authorizing the *wafd* to negotiate on behalf of the Egyptian people. The British military authority could hardly ignore these actions. Threats were issued to all the notables to refrain from signing the referendum, and orders were sent to the different regional administrators to seize those letters that had already been signed.[174]

In fact Zaghlul writes that the Egyptian ministers had informed him in mid January 1919 that Wingate personally saw no reason to deny the *wafd's* request to attend the Paris Peace Conference. Wingate had assured the ministers that when he himself arrived in Paris, he would recommend to his government that the *wafd* be granted permission to attend.[175] Zaghlul and his colleagues, however, were under no illusion as to their position with regard to the military authority. They were fully aware that they were liable to be arrested at any time under the martial law provisions. On 6 March, 1919 they were summoned to the Savoy Hotel and categorically ordered by General Watson, commander of the British troops in Egypt, to desist from their actions or face stiff penalties.[176] Two days later Zaghlul and his colleagues were arrested and transported to a military prison in Malta by the end of March. The news that reached

[174] *Saad Zaghlul's Diaries*, vol. VII (Cairo: 1996), p. 179
[175] Ibid., pp. 272-273
[176] *Saad Zaghlul's Diaries*, vol. IX (Cairo: 1998) p. 55

them in Malta of the popular demonstrations in Egypt gave them heart and hope. Though greatly displeased by any barbaric acts of violence, which he deemed counterproductive, Zaghlul commented:

> The imperialist party had thought that Egypt could be swallowed (taken) simply by banishing some of its sons, but they were mistaken in their belief. The country demands its independence from one end to the other, and holds nothing but hatred for those who wish to consume her.[177]

Zaghluls's release from Malta did not soften his attitude toward the British but rather sharpened his determination to gain his country's independence. The quotatation above marks the end of this narration, for no matter what future compromises he was forced to make this remained his enduring perception of the relationship between the British Empire and Egypt.

The initial appointment of Zaghlul to the government by Cromer had been an attempt to appease more moderate nationalist sentiment. Zaghlul was seen as a person who possessed sufficient nationalist credentials to appease those nationalists, yet at the same time bent toward collaboration with the British administration. As a matter of fact, Cromer saw Zaghlul at the time of his appointment as a possible antidote to Mustafa Kamil's brand of radical nationalism. This gamble seemed to have worked well while Mustafa Kamil remained alive and the standard barer of the nationalist cause, but upon his death he left a vacuum that Muhammad Farid his successor as leader of the Nationalist Party simply could not fill. Saad Zaghlul after his alienation from the government, gradually filled this void, and became in British parlance the "radical nationalist."

CONCLUSION

Even among many of those Egyptians who collaborated with the British, the desire for Egypt's independence was never abandoned. They might have believed in a

[177] Ibid., p. 73

gradual progression towards that goal, but many still thought they would see marked advancement towards it in their own lifetime. This was hardly in keeping with what the British had envisioned: indefinite British tutelage. It is hardly surprising then that with time even the most accommodating and collaborative nationalists began to lose patience with the pace of political reform. Egyptian attitudes toward British occupation had progressively hardened and the 1919 revolution was thus undoubtedly an eruption long in the making.

Consul-Generals, Agents, and High Commissioners:

A Special Breed

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the most prominent of the British administrators with whom rested the real power for the governance of Egypt from the period shortly after the occupation in 1882 through 1922. This will be done through short biographical essays that will review various published biographies covering the lives of these individuals. The essays will not break significant new ground, but rather attempt to make these figures known to those readers whose background is not in English imperial history. This is absolutely necessary, as the next chapter will be dedicated to revealing these administrator's perceptions of the reformers and nationalists active in Egypt during this period.[178] The assumption here is that the reader can best understand how these characters formed their perceptions by better understanding their life and background. That assumption in turn rests on the belief that our background helps inform our perceptions, just as our perceptions govern our actions. But, for the purpose of this project it is not sufficient to provide a descriptive biography of each administrator. It is necessary to demonstrate exactly how the personal traits and experiences of each of these individuals affected the development of events in Egypt.

The order of presentation will be chronological and relatively straightforward. It begins with Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, since it was during his tenure as Consul-General and Agent that any real consideration of a prompt British withdrawal from Egypt disappeared and the Anglo-Egyptian government took root. After Cromer both his successors to the post of Agent, Eldon Gorst and Horatio Herbert Kitchener will be presented in some detail. Henry McMahon and Reginald Wingate the first two High Commissioners, will then follow. This study concludes with Field Marshall Edmund

[178] The term "Egyptian" nationalists and reformers is not used here, as some prominent Islamic reformers were of non-Egyptian origins, although they resided in Egypt and were at the heart of the Egyptian reform and nationalist movement.

Henry Hynman, Viscount Allenby on whose watch the Egyptian *wafd* would rise to prominence through its demands for Egyptian independence.

EVELYN BARING, LORD CROMER

Evelyn Baring was born in June 1841 in Norfolk, not far from the town of Cromer. The Barings were originally merchants of German descent and had migrated to England in 1717.[179] In 1762 his grandfather founded a banking house, Baring Bros & Co., which became very successful and made the family quite wealthy. Evelyn was the sixth child, born to his father from his second wife. He was his father's eleventh child. At the time of his birth his father was already quite advanced in age and died when Evelyn was only seven. His mother, who was 30 years younger than her husband, expected her children to be independent from a very early age, and provided very little in the way of nurturing guidance.[180] His earliest schooling was at home, then in a small school near Norwich that was apparently not of the highest quality. From there he moved on to a preparatory school for the Royal Military College at Woolwich, and then on to Woolwich at the age of fourteen.[181] At the age of seventeen he received his commission to the Royal Artillery and was stationed in Corfu. This education in general seems hardly to have been on a par with what was expected of most upper class gentlemen. Indeed it was sorely lacking, since "he had left Woolwich with no knowledge of the classics, with little more than a nodding acquaintance with French and German, and with a smattering only of mathematics."[182]

In 1861 Baring journeyed back to England, going part of the way through European Turkey. What he found "wherever the Turk was supreme," in the way of "squalor, desolation and the absence of almost every trace of civilization," made him question seriously the wisdom of supporting the Turkish Empire.[183]These early

[179] Roger Owen, *Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul*(Oxford, 2004) p.3
[180] The Marquees of Zaetland, *Lord Cromer: Being the Authorized Life of Evelyn Baring the First Earl of Cromer*, (London, 1932) p. 21
[181] Ibid., pp. 24-25
[182] Ibid., p, 29
[183] Owen., p. 25

impressions seem to have stayed with him as he grew older and likely influenced his attitude towards the Turks and Turko-Egyptian elite in Egypt.

In 1862 he was granted a position on the staff of Sir Henry Storks, Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. In Corfu he met and formed a mutual attachment with the lady who became his future wife. This chance meeting changed the course of his life, as he was then driven by an ambition to succeed so as to make marriage possible.[184] He and Ethel Errington had to wait almost fourteen years before they were in a position to get married. This thought did not preclude his continued relationship with a mistress in Corfu, with whom he had a child in 1863.[185]

Politically Baring was at that time a liberal and a leftist. Hence, when England decided to cede Corfu to Greece in 1864, he was very much in support of this decision. This, though, left Sir Henry Storks as well as Baring temporarily without employment. He took this opportunity to travel to the United States, which was at the time still in the grips of its Civil War. He visited the union frontline and observed some of the fighting first hand. From there he traveled to Canada before returning to work, now in Malta, where Storks had been appointed Governor and Commander in Chief. In Malta, Baring had his first taste of indigenous opposition to British rule, and this greatly moderated his liberal and leftist leanings. He claimed that, "a few agitators who strutted on this miniature political stage represented very imperfectly the views and true interests of the mass of the population."[186] He long lived by those words. Much of his later relations with the Egyptian nationalists were always colored by his belief, no matter what the reality, that they did not represent the mass of the population. When Storks was asked to head a commission to Jamaica to investigate violent disturbances that had occurred on the island, Baring accompanied him. After the completion of that mission he received an appointment to the Staff College.

In 1869 he graduated from the staff college, and was assigned to the Topographical and Statistical Department of the War Office. He became involved in the

[184] Zeetland., p. 33-34
[185] Owen p. 32
[186] Zeetland., pp. 40-41

cause for reform of the British army until 1872. That year Lord Northbrook, former Undersecretary of State for War, and Baring's relative, accepted a position as Viceroy to India. Baring took leave of the army in order to become Lord Northbrook's private secretary.[187] After four years in India, he returned to London and finally, thanks to his improved financial circumstances, married Ethel Errington. Not long afterwards the thirty-six year old Baring, on the strength of his performance in India was offered a post on the Egyptian Commission for the Public Debt.[188] Now a major, he resigned his commission and moved to Egypt with his new bride. He almost immediately clashed with the Khedive Ismail over the setting up of a commission of inquiry into the state of Egyptian finances. His refusal to condone Ismail's behavior, a man whom Baring regarded as evil, led him to resign his post and return to England in 1879.[189] Soon after Baring's departure, Ismail was deposed by his suzerain the Ottoman Sultan and replaced by his son Tawfiq. Salisbury then offered Cromer the post of Controller-General in Egypt with the princely salary of 4000 pounds per year.[190] By May of 1880 Baring felt that the controllers had accomplished enough for him to be able to move on, and he accepted an offer from the new Indian Viceroy, the Marquees of Ripon, to act as the finance member on his council. His colleagues in Egypt lamented heavily his loss.[191]

His job in India was initially complicated by his inability to get along with Lord Ripon over the issue of a new taxation law. These initial difficulties gave way though to what became a firm friendship and good working relationship. Due to the Suez Canal's importance for British rule in India, when Britain decided to send troops to crush the Urabi revolt, the British government demanded that troops be sent from India at Indian expense. Both Ripon and Baring objected strenuously, fearing the Government of India would then incur a budget deficit.[192] In February of 1883 Ripon and Baring were blindsided by a huge outcry raised by the Anglo-Egyptian community, over a change in

[187] Ibid.,pp. 49-51
[188] Ibid., p. 56
[189] Owen, p. 114
[190] Owen, pp. 115-116
[191] Ibid., pp. 138-140
[192] Ibid., p. 166

the law allowing Indian magistrates the right to try Europeans in their courts. Ripon refused to back down, and Baring commented as a result that "[t]he Ilbert affair has raised Ripon 100% in my estimation…He is firm and determined not to yield."[193] This unyielding attitude to approaching opposition was evidenced throughout Baring's Egypt career. It allowed him to accomplish much, but it was also one of the root causes behind a great deal of the future Egyptian bitterness towards the British.

Shortly thereafter, in May of 1893, Cromer was offered the post of Consul General in Egypt. The newly minted Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in Cairo in September of that same year. His initial mandate was to straighten out Egyptian affairs so as to allow for the withdrawal of British troops. These British promises of early withdrawal eventually became a running joke. By 1891 "all the important administrations [were] subject to British influence…"[194]

Just as Baring, now made Lord Cromer, thought all was settled to his satisfaction the Khedive Tawfiq, a weak and complacent man, died unexpectedly. This brought his young 17-year-old son Abbas Hilmy II to the throne. The relationship between these two men remained antagonistic throughout Cromer's tenure in Egypt. As aptly noted in Roger Owen's biography of Cromer, "any assertion of Egyptian independence was seen immediately as an effort to undermine [Cromer's] own authority."[195] Cromer effectively weathered all challenges to his authority and forced Abbas to accede to his authority. This remained the case through 1907 and the end of Cromer's tenure in Egypt. He departed only reluctantly and left behind him an Egypt that had changed dramatically under his guidance.

Cromer materially improved the existence of many of the Egyptian population and presided over a great expansion of the Egyptian economy. His practice of strict economies finally brought the Egyptian budget under control and even produced a surplus by the 1890's. He, also, did much to alleviate social injustice in Egypt by stamping down on slavery and ending the corvee labor, among other things. His

[193] Ibid., p. 174
[194] Ibid., p. 240
[195] Ibid., p. 265

abolishment of the system of forced labor was of incalculable worth to the poorest of Egypt's land-working peasants. He, also, opposed greater British and Egyptian involvement in the Sudan, since he saw such an involvement as an intolerable burden on Egypt's budget. Another major development under Cromer's watch was the introduction and maintenance of press freedoms in Egypt. These freedoms were maintained even after the growth of the anti-British nationalist publications. This liberal attitude towards the press was preserved only at his insistence, for it was rapidly reversed under his successors. If for nothing other than his championship of the freedom of the press, Cromer should have earned a bit more than unequivocal demonization by the nationalist press.

What Cromer failed in, however, was realizing the extent to which times and the people had changed. His acknowledgment of such change when it came was often grudging as he aimed to preserve the status quo. An entire generation had come to age during his tenure. This generation, especially those from the professional classes, had learned and absorbed many of the principles of European liberalism. Cromer's despotic benevolence was anathema to them, as was his dismissal of their demands for greater participation in Egyptian governance. A new class of nationalists, many of whom were educated in Europe, had emerged. For them, the strident nationalism of the likes of Mustafa Kamil meant much more than Cromer's accomplishments and his continued admonishments for patience. Egypt and its people had imperfectly and unevenly advanced, but they had advanced, something that Cromer acknowledged only partially. This was certainly to the detriment of Britain's future relationship with Egypt and sowed seeds of future unrest.

SIR ELDON GORST

For decades, Eldon Gorst had been Cromer's right hand man in Egypt. He was personally chosen by Cromer to succeed him upon his retirement in 1907, as His Majesty's Agent and Consul-General in Egypt. Gorst's appointment came at the end of a

period that has been described as the heyday of British rule in Egypt.[196]In reality, along with inheriting a position that was invested with great prestige and power by his predecessor, Gorst inherited the festering resentments of the Egyptian intelligentsia. To compound matters, the *Danshawi* incident of 1906 and its aftermath had sorely damaged Britain's image and standing among the peasant, *Fallaheen,* class. As a result of an altercation between a British hunting party and some Egyptian farmers, a British officer was struck on the head and subsequently died from sunstroke. The punishments meted out to the farmers were so severe and shocking that much of the goodwill among the peasants towards the British administration evaporated. The complaints of the Egyptian nationalists against British rule now had greater resonance than ever before. Only with great self-delusion could the British now call their opponents and detractors in Egypt a minority. It was against this background of growing nationalist opposition that Gorst took over the administration of Egypt.

Eldon Gorst, it could be said, was born into the Colonial Office. At the time of his birth in 1861 his father, John Eldon Gorst, a provincial gentleman from Lancashire, was serving a stint as colonial official among the Maoris of New Zealand. Tragically, he began his life much as he ended it in the midst of strife between an indigenous population and the British Empire. In 1863 this was the Maori rebellion against the increasing encroachment of white settlers. In 1911 the year of his death in office, it was in the midst of increasing Egyptian nationalist resentment and agitation against the British occupation. On the earlier occasion young Eldon Gorst and his family barely survived the turbulence.

Upon returning to England John Gorst was called to the bar in 1865 and became a successful barrister.[197]In 1866 he re-entered public life, this time as the Tory Member of Parliament from Cambridge. His career within the Tory Party was extremely stormy filled with equal successes and failures.

Eldon began his education at local day schools, first in Kensington then in Worthing, then back to the private Kensington Grammar School. His early childhood was marred by a "pelvic abscess [that] was misdiagnosed as some sort of spinal

[196] Peter Mellini, *Sir Eldon Gorst: The Overshadowed Proconsul* (California, 1977). Int. xxiii .
[197] Ibid., p. 2

trouble."[198] After various very painful and ineffective treatments he was fitted with an iron shield to protect his back. To make matters worse from a young boy's perspective, in 1875 at the age of fourteen he began attending Eton while still wearing the shield. He was also very openly intelligent and ambitious which did not endear him to his upper class peers. He remained somewhat isolated from his classmates throughout the time he was at Eton and those years "contributed to a sense of emotional distance that did not lessen as he grew older."[199]

From Eton he went up to Cambridge. He later noted that nothing he had learned in Cambridge would be of any practical use to him in his career, other than the practice of self-discipline and concentration.[200] After considering the home civil service, and mastering both German and French for those exams, and after contemplating the study of law, he moved away from both these possible career paths towards conservative politics. Briefly, he took a position as honorary secretary for National Union of Conservative Associations, but was not too pleased with the volatility of political life.[201] At this point he began preparing for the Diplomatic Service examinations. In the meantime, he took the position of secretary to Lord Randolph Churchill the new secretary of state for India, a very valuable learning experience. In 1885 he took and passed his exams, earning a first. Subsequently he was attached as an unpaid honorary clerk to the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office pending overseas appointment. Gorst favored being appointed to the Consulate General in Egypt, induced by what he judged to be the good living conditions, adequate future compensation, and room for advancement.[202] He got his wish in the autumn of 1886 and was posted to Cairo.

The most pressing issue facing Egypt at that time was staving off bankruptcy, and a position working on Egyptian finance was an excellent venue for advancement. For a person with as much ambition as Gorst the challenge of helping right Egyptian finances was a golden opportunity. Hard work and dedication quickly brought him to the notice of

[198] Ibid., p. 3
[199] Ibid., p. 6
[200] Ibid., p. 7 (from Gorst's private notes 1:19-20)
[201] Ibid., p. 11
[202] Ibid., p. 14 (notes 2:2-3)

Baring who mentored and encouraged him. He also took the time to begin learning Arabic and in this, by western accounts, he became well versed. By 1890 his work on Egyptian finances had brought him recognition in both the public and the political arenas.

Always seeking further opportunities, Gorst, with the encouragement of Cromer, began submitting articles on Egypt to *The Times*. By special arrangement his identity was kept secret by the newspaper, but he and other specially chosen correspondents worked to control the flow of information from Egypt to England. Cromer sought to control all aspects of Egyptian affairs and Gorst became a valuable asset in this effort. This led Cromer to push for the appointment of Gorst as Financial Advisor to replace Milner, and he was ultimately successful in getting him appointed as under secretary of finance and controller of direct taxes.[203] Now in control of the Egyptian government's revenue collection, Gorst quickly repaid Cromer's trust by increasing British control and choking off all dissent. British control of Egypt was all but ironclad.

Gorst, though, differed slightly in style from Cromer in that he was willing to invest some time and effort in smoothing over relations with the Khedive and pashas of Egypt. He by no means intended any lessening of British control over Egypt, but rather thought to use intelligently the Egyptians themselves as tools to further that control. As he noted in 1893:

> My own view is that we ought to decline to incur the responsibility of recommending to the Khedive this or that minister. I should leave the choice to him absolutely, at the same time warning him that he would be held more or less responsible for the selections, and that the only thing we must insist on would be that the man chosen would work cordially with us. If we took up this line, the Khedive I fancy would be pleased at the idea of appointing his own ministers, and at the same time his influence would be on the side of making them go along with us:- and as there is no doubt that if Effendim [Abbass] wishes it, any minister will get along with us.[204]

[203] Ibid., pp. 39, 47

[204] Ibid., p.46. (notes 2:36) The long quote was introduced as it concisely demonstrates Gorst's later governing philosophy.

This more subtle form of control was markedly different from both Cromer's and Kitchener's bullying methods. Unfortunately, when Gorst finally had the chance to implement it, he was not afforded the time to see it carried out fully. Just as detrimental to that kind of plan was the almost insurmountable amount of bitterness towards the British that had accrued under Cromer's iron handed policy.

The next step for Gorst came when Cromer moved to take control of the Egyptian interior ministry. To his great advantage, Gorst coupled his burning ambition for success with a patient approach. In 1894 he had supported the endorsement of Nubar pasha for the post of Prime Minister, and when Cromer was ready to effect changes to the interior ministry he was well prepared. Utilizing his knowledge and familiarity with Nubar, he designed a reform plan for the Ministry of Interior agreeable to Cromer and the newly appointed Egyptian Prime Minister. This landed him later in that same year the post of advisor to the interior ministry.[205]

Now effectively in charge of the interior ministry Gorst initiated a series of changes, most notably the reform of the Egyptian police force. This was removed from under the supervision of the army and made independent. It was then subject to supervision by a new "English Inspectorate" at the ministry. Gorst hoped to reform the Egyptian police and raise their standards by introducing an English Inspectorate. The Inspectorate also provided oversight to counteract any potential abuse in the new force.[206] This, among other reforms, gained him a significant degree of public attention in Egypt, England and Europe in general. His reputation as a competent and able administrator was significantly enhanced.[207]

It is important to note that Gorst's greatest difficulties were with his fellow Englishmen. Gorst had been labeled an outsider even back in Eton and was never able to shed that characterization. Even his outward appearance would differ from his fellow Englishmen as he took to wearing a Stambouli coat and *Tarboush,* symbols of Eastern

[205] Ibid., p. 48
[206] Ibid., p. 49
[207] Ibid., p. 52

and Ottoman officialdom.[208]His difficult relationship with many of his fellow English officials proved quite detrimental to the execution of his later policies when appointed Consul-General. In the interim, though, he gained a powerful enemy in the person of Kitchener whom he described, accurately, as both duplicitous and false.[209] To make matters worse, his relationship with Cromer soured, leaving him in an awful position.

Once again, though, Gorst's patience and competence paid off. Restored to Cromer's good graces, he was appointed financial advisor in 1898, a huge step forward. The appointment came along with some advice from Cromer, who indicated that it was time he settled down and also improved his image among other Anglo-Egyptian officials. His new prospects allowed him to fulfill the first requirement by marrying a well-dowered young lady by the name of Evelyn Rudd. This marriage by all accounts was not a great success. Gorst also attempted to repair his relationship with his fellow officials, but it seems his success in that arena was also limited.

When circumstances opened the way for Anglo-French reconciliation in 1904 Gorst played a prominent role in the negotiations over Egypt. The Foreign Office was impressed enough to offer him a post as an assistant under secretary. Gorst seized upon this golden opportunity and eagerly accepted this position. By now recognized as one of England's leading experts on Egypt he was well on his way to prominence. In 1907 Cromer's seemingly unending tenure in Egypt finally came to an end, and Gorst returned to Egypt, having been handpicked and promoted by Cromer to succeed him as Consul-General.

The situation in Egypt upon Gorst's return was extremely unstable. The *Danshawi* incident and its aftermath had soured relations with much of the Egyptian populace. The Nationalist party had gained prominence and popular support rendering it a force to be reckoned with. In addition to that Gorst commented that as Cromer's position and his health had worsened his oversight had slackened. Hence, he found Egypt in a state of "administrative anarchy."[210] This he moved quickly to repair and

[208] Ibid., pp. 52, 53, 55
[209] Ibid., p. 56
[210] Ibid., p. 143

reform. Armed with what appeared to be a British government mandate to liberalize the Egyptian political scene, and driven by his personal belief in the superiority of a more subtle approach Gorst set to work. His first step was to improve relations with the Khedive Abbas Hilmy II, a former friend. This quickly paid dividends, as Abbass distanced himself from the Nationalist Party and began earnestly working with Gorst. He then encouraged the appointment of Butrus Ghali a Copt to the post of Prime Minister and the reappointment of Saad Zaghlul to the ministry of education. Both appointments were intended to provide him with competent and collaborative administrators, who could at the same time weaken the Nationalist Party.

Gorst's liberal experiment was hardly radical, as he resisted all calls for the creation of a constitutional government for Egypt, and much like Cromer, had absolutely no use for the nationalists. Ultimately three factors derailed this experiment. The first was the opposition of the Anglo-Egyptian officials to his reforms, and this has been greatly undervalued as a cause. The second was the assassination of Butrus Ghali, which made compromise with Egyptian nationalist all but impossible. The third was of course his own early death, which ruined any chances that the prior two causes could be rectified. Toward the end Gorst grew extremely disillusioned with Egyptian officials in general.[211]He thought them men of little vision or understanding of self-sacrifice. It seemed that much like his mentor, Cromer, Gorst regarded Egyptians as capable and praiseworthy only as long as they carried out British instructions.

Gorst's character, his skills, and his experience presented England with probably its best opportunity to avoid the violent post-war transition. Even had he lived, there would have been no guarantee of success since, many of the problems he needed to tackle seemed intractable; but with Kitchener as his successor there was no chance. It must be stressed that Gorst's intent was never really to loosen British control over Egypt, much less prepare Egypt for independence in the near future. In that he did not differ from Cromer. What he did realize, however, and what Cromer steadily downplyed was that nationalism had arrived in Egypt and was there to stay. To that end he went about

[211] Ibid., p. 236

finding ways to deal with the Egyptian nationalists, whether by co-opting them, weakening them or controlling them. Under Gorst the method of ruling Egypt and the Egyptians was to change but certainly not the allocation of power. It was a great testament to Gorst's personal ability that he was indeed genuinely mourned by at least a number of prominent Egyptians, and that Abbas Hilmy II rushed to England to visit his "dear friend" on his deathbed.

HORATIO HERBERT KITCHENER

Kitchener was born in 1850 in County Kerry, Ireland, where his father had, at a very advantageous price, purchased an estate bankrupted by the potato famine. In Ireland the Kitcheners were part of an alien colonizing elite whose presence was made possible by the British dominance over Ireland. The Kitcheners were originally farmers from Hampshire and East Anglia, but Horatio's grandfather had gained wealth in the tea trade and raised his branch of the family to gentility. His father, a career army officer, had recently retired since, military life had proved too rigorous on his wife's health.

His father was a martinet, but a loving if undemonstrative parent. He was a "disappointed and frustrated man," having failed to reach any great rank in the army.[212] He would assuage this disappointment somewhat with his son's great success, a success he attempted to help along. For all his disappointment at being denied an army career he was a very successful estate manager, and improved the income and value of his Irish estate. His new affluence did not alter many of his strongly held notions though, and one of those was a dislike for schools. As a result his children were home schooled. This resulted in some awkward gaps in their education and social skills, gaps they had to face when their mother's health necessitated a move to Montreux in Switzerland. Despite the change of climate she passed away shortly after the move. His father remarried within two years and departed for New Zealand with his new wife, leaving the children behind at school in Montreux. Whereas in Ireland the children had been an elite of sorts, in their new environment they were regarded as backward and provincial. Kitchener worked

[212] Philip Magnus, *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist* (New York, 1959) p. 4

extremely hard at school as he attempted to address all his deficiencies, and acquired decent command of French and some German. Socially, though, he remain on the fringes. All Horatio's efforts yielded dividends though as he passed the entrance exams and got accepted to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich in 1868 and graduated in 1870.

Upon graduation he joined his father, who was separated from his wife, in Brittany. This was during the Franco-Prussian war and as an ambitious but as yet non-commissioned young soldier he attached himself to an ambulance unit of the French Second Army. He thus gained his first invaluable experience in real battle. His action, though, caused him some trouble as his commanders in England later took him to task severely for thoughtlessly jeopardizing England's neutrality in the conflict. His daring though was equally, if unofficially, praised by those very same commanders. In any case this episode did not affect his commission and he was posted to the School of Military Engineering at Chatham. He remained there until 1873, when he was assigned as ADC to Brigadier General George Greaves on a mission to observe Austrian army maneuvers. During this stint he improved his German in order to read the German military engineering manuals.

After all this excitement returning to England to serve at Aldershot was not to Kitchener's liking and he managed to get seconded to special service in Palestine. He joined a mission funded by the Palestine Exploration Fund that sought to map Palestine in an attempt to provide scientific evidence to support the biblical narrative. This mission suited both his religious and professional inclinations. The result was a map of Palestine for which he received considerable acclaim. Based on his success in Palestine he was dispatched to survey Cyprus, newly acquired by Great Britain from the Ottoman Empire. It was during his posting in Cyprus that the Urabi revolt broke out in Egypt.

Despite his best efforts, and the advantage of some knowledge of Arabic acquired while in Palestine, Kitchener could not secure employment with the British forces dispatched to Egypt. Determined to see action, he took a spectacular risk. With a carelessness that would typify his early career, he took a week's sick leave and

unbeknownst to his superiors joined the Mediterranean fleet. On arrival he even persuaded the commander of the fleet to allow him to undertake a reconnaissance mission. When his request for extended leave was denied, as he suspected it would be, Kitchener was conveniently absent. He reappeared only after the last scheduled ship to Cyprus had departed. His act of insubordination allowed him to remain and witness the bombardment of Alexandria, but he was refused permission to go ashore with the troops.

Kitchener eventually managed to smooth things over with his superior in Cyprus and completed the survey work, but he was determined to return to Egypt where he believed he would find the best opportunity for advancement. He received his desired appointment in 1883 and was made a major in the Egyptian army and promoted to Captain in the British Army. He was given the task of training a new cavalry unit for the New Egyptian Army. He excelled at his task despite lack of formal cavalry training but, not surprisingly, "ruthless and uncontrolled ambition made Kitchener unpopular in Cairo."[213]

The disaster that struck Britain in the Sudan as a result of the Mahdi uprising presented Kitchener with yet another opportunity. Dispatched to the Sudan to carry out surveys of the roads and communications he managed to distinguish himself and enhance his military reputation. He volunteered to continue working in the Sudan reconnoitering and reporting to Gordon on the disposition of the tribes of Suakin, Dangloa and Khartoum. Gordon, who had been sent to evacuate Khartoum, was a hero in the eyes of Kitchnener and a man he sought to emulate. Although they had never personally met they communicated regularly and Kitchener made enough of an impression on Gordon for him to write: "If Kitchener would take the place [Sudan] he would be the best man to put in as Governor-General."[214]

When a relief mission was finally dispatched to the Sudan, under Lord Wolsely, with whom Kitchener had clashed in his early days in Cyprus, he was assigned as the intelligence officer to that expedition. The expedition failed in its task of relieving Gordon but Kitchener gained additional praise and prestige, including that of his

[213] Ibid., p. 37
[214] Ibid., p. 49

commander Lord Wolsely. Now a confidante of Lord Wolsely they bitterly complained to each other over what they saw as Gladstone's betrayal of Gordon in delaying to send aid. More important to Kitchener than his commander's praise though was the last letter written to him by Gordon that stated: "If you would take up the post of Governor General …it would be well for the people, and you have no difficulty you can't master."[215] This belief in their own self-worth and the righteousness of their actions marked both these men. Useful as this might be in times of crisis, when combined with a rigidity of perception, it made such men incapable of dealing peacefully with determined political opposition.

Now something of a popular hero in England, Kitchener in 1886 was made in 1886 Governor General of the Eastern Sudan and the Red Sea Littoral and given the rank of Colonel. The Governor Generalship was no more than a glorified title, since the British only retained a small foothold in the Sudan. This placement though gave Kitchener the opportunity to continue to confront the enemy, much to the discomfort of the politicians in Egypt and England who wished no further entanglements in the Sudan. During one such confrontation Kitchener was seriously injured, adding yet another chapter to his growing legend. In 1888 he had gained enough stature that he was made Adjutant General of the Egyptian Army. Despite this wave of acclaim, steadier heads such as Cromer remained cautious about him: "Kitchener possesses many good qualities but he is headstrong and wanting in Judgment," additionally he followed a policy that would win him "the maximum amount of glory."[216]In that respect Kitchener associated his own desires with what was correct action. This assessment by Cromer did not harm Kitchener's prospects and he was made Sirdar of the Egyptian Army in 1892. Having incurred widespread resentment for his rapid rise, he was determined to succeed and dealt ruthlessly with anyone who opposed him or failed to meet his expectations.[217]

As Sirdar of the Egyptian Army he oversaw between 1896 and 1899 the re-conquest of the Sudan. This was completed at the battle of Omduran. For this victory

[215] Ibid., p. 63
[216] Ibid., p. 75
[217] Ibid., p. 81

and the conquest he was granted a peerage and the Governor-Generalship of the Sudan. His governing style was personal and autocratic, and although quite ambitious on paper his accomplishments in the postwar period were relatively few. It was left to Reginald Wingate, his second in command, who succeeded him as Governor-General, to arrange for the proper administration and improvement of the Sudan.

Kitchener left the Sudan in 1900 to go to South Africa where war had broken out with the Boers. He acted as Chief of Staff to Lord Roberts the Commander in Chief of British forces in South Africa. It was Kitchener who devised the strategy to destroy Boer resistance and end the war. His promotion of extremely harsh measures to end the conflict stood in stark contrast to his willingness to deliver very reasonable terms to the defeated enemy. That surrender finally came about in 1902. Implacable and vicious to his enemies, Kitchener was apparently gracious and magnanimous in victory, at least to his European opponents.

At the beginning of the South Africa campaign Kitchener had consented, pending the end of the conflict, to take up the position of Commander in Chief of the Indian Army with an eye towards its reorganization. This task was effectively completed in 1910 and he next pinned his hopes on being named Indian Viceroy. Having failed in that endeavor, he focused his energies on succeeding the now gravely ill Sir Eldon Gorst as Consul-General in Egypt. In 1911, days before the death of Gorst, he was named the new Consul-General.

Kitchener will likely remain best known during his tenure as Consul-General of Egypt for passing the five-*fedan* law, an attempt to limit small farmer bankruptcies. This applied to all farmers whose landholding measured five *fedans* (a unit of land measurement) or less. He also reformed the legislative assembly, with an eye not to increasing Egyptian effective participation in government, but rather weakening all opposition to him. Generally the three years that he remained in Egypt were relatively calm, other than supposed assassination plots by the radical nationalists. This though was a calmness induced not by any talent on Kitchener's part, but rather by the absence of any true nationalist figure after the death of Mustafa Kamil capable of marshalling broad

support. The Nationalist Party founded by Kamil was divided, weak and incapable of adequately carrying on the fight. In addition Gorst's policy and his friendship with the Khedive created a division between the Khedive Abbas and the nationalists. This division could not be healed quickly and the element of trust was now absent. This lack of nationalist leadership was a blessing for Kitchener, but one he would not bequeath undisturbed to his successors.

Kitchener immediately reversed Gorst's policy of neutrality with regard to Egyptian internal affairs and supposedly the "change was immediately and immensely welcome[d]. People of all ranks and classes felt that they had once more direct access to supreme authority."[218] Ronald Storrs, the author of these lines, was Kitchener's secretary and hence not the most impartial of judges. This policy essentially called for the direct intervention in disputes between the various Egyptian elites and the Khedive. This change of policy was very likely motivated not by genuine concern for the Egyptian individual (never Kitchener's strong suit), but was due to his desire to aggrandize himself. It might be even more accurate to say that he was motivated by the need constantly to compete and to win. In this case, competing against his old nemesis the khedive Abbas Hilmy II made winning even more desirable, especially as it had the added benefit of farther weakening the nationalist movement. Kitchener, regardless of Storrs' laudatory claim, was no king Solomon. Much more importantly though, Kitchener's autocratic attitude, obsession with control, and the inability to deal with any form of dissent, completely alienated many Egyptians, including Saad Zaghlul. Kitchener was quite narrow-minded when it came to achieving whatever goals he set for himself. He did not hesitate to run roughshod over any opposition, even if it had merit. Edward Cecil a one-time ADC to Kitchener, and a prominent Anglo-Egyptian official in his own right, remarked that should anyone wreck Kitchener's plans, then he "would even [go] (whatever others might think) very far to remove such an obstacle."[219]An assessment of Kitchener's character made when Cecil had first worked with him paints a very unfaltering picture of the man: "He used to have little consideration for anyone, and

[218] Ronald Storrs, *Orientations,* (London, 1937), p.127
[219] Lord Edward Cecil, *The Leisure of an Egyptian Official,* (London, 1921, 1984) p. 176

was *cassant* [curt] and rude. He was inclined to bully his own entourage, as some men are rude to their wives."[220] Cecil later modified his view of Kitchener, excusing his earlier behavior as "deformed" by the stress of the military campaign, but the earlier assessment cannot be dismissed. If this was the treatment he subjected his fellow soldiers and Britons to, then one can only imagine his treatment of the Egyptians, especially the elite of whom he had a tremendously low opinion. In holding this attitude towards the Egyptian elite Kitchener was not necessarily unique, but where others were subtler, his bullying nature caused great damage to Anglo-Egyptian relations. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his treatment of Saad Zaghlul. Kitchener managed to accomplish what all the anti-British Egyptian nationalists had failed to; he drove Zaghlul out of the government, and into the opposition. The British had great opportunity to rue this event in 1919, when Zaghlul successfully rallied his countrymen to the cause of independence.

SIR HENRY MCMAHON

Whatever Henry McMahon's natural abilities and previous accomplishments, his appointment to the position of Egypt's Consul-General was very puzzling. McMahon had spent his entire career in India and was relatively unfamiliar with Egypt and had no knowledge of the Arabic language. That such an ill-equipped person was appointed as Egypt's Consul-General, or what was now styled High Commissioner after the declaration of the British protectorate over Egypt, cannot help but elicit some puzzlement.

His early education was at Haileybury from which he proceeded to a crammer, Wren, in preparation for taking the India Civil Service exam. Upon failing the ICS exam McMahon entered Sandhurst in 1881. After Sandhurst he was appointed to the Kings Liverpool Regiment, which was then serving in India. He spent very little time as an active soldier before joining the Indian Political Department in 1890. McMahon remained in this department until he was unexpectedly appointed High Commissioner of Egypt. Early on he gained a solid reputation for his work as a specialist demarcator,

[220] Ibid., p. 177

having helped establish the borders between British India, China and Tibet. He was responsible for drawing the borders between British India and Afghanistan as well as Afghanistan's borders with Persia. Between 1905 and 1911 he was appointed the Agent to the Governor General of Baluchistan. From 1911 until his transfer to Egypt he held the post of Foreign Secretary to Lord Hardinge the Viceroy of India.[221]Overall his record in the Department indicated that he was a man of some ability and accomplishment but it was hardly a record that would make him an immediate prospect for Egypt's new High Commissioner.

The impetus behind the appointment of McMahon came from Kitchener, who had known him from India. Kitchener upon becoming Secretary of State for War had attempted to continue running Egypt by proxy, and indeed to exact additional pay for his efforts. Six months into the war though this situation could not continue and Kitchener settled on McMahon as a temporary replacement. His appointment was indeed officially seen as temporary, as indicated by the following internal Foreign office minute:

> The reason why Sir H. McMahon is drawing only 6460 pounds instead of 7600 pound is that Lord Kitchener on becoming S of S for War made it clear that this was only a temporary arrangement and that he remained *de jure* Agent and Consul General and would draw the same salary as if he were on leave.[222]

If regarded cynically it could be assumed that Kitchener sought to find a temporary replacement for himself whose chances of brilliant success were unlikely. Hence, he chose McMahon, a person who would have little chance to replace him permanently. Whatever his motives were, the long wait before finding a replacement, was extremely detrimental to McMahon's chances of success. Egypt had already been declared a protectorate well before his arrival and was being governed under martial law. It had taken on the aspect of an armed camp and operational staging ground, where the military

[221] C.W.R. Long, *British Pro-Consuls in Egypt, 1914-1929: The Challenge of Nationalism* (London, NY, 2005) p. 9
[222]Ibid., p. 10., FO/371/2352/181179

authority in reality superseded all other. McMahon's authority for all intents and purposes had been fragmented.

To make matters worse, other more qualified claimants to the post, such as Graham and Wingate had been passed over, leaving them quite bitter. Both these men would actively denigrate McMahon. In Egypt itself Lord Edward Cecil, the Financial Advisor became McMahon's chief advisor, and in effect became the most powerful official in Egypt.[223]This was certainly not to McMahon's advantage and gave him a reputation for weakness.

McMahon was also unable apparently to form any kind of congenial relationship with Sultan Husayn Kamil whom he treated with utter neglect. The Sultan being quite friendly to the British and a favorite of Cromer's was extremely displeased with this treatment and the lack of any considerable dialogue with the High Commissioner over the future of his country. As for his relations with Egyptians in general McMahon was quite fortunate in that during his time in Egypt, the Egyptian nationalist movement was relatively dormant.

McMahon's dismissal when it came was quite abrupt, almost to the point of being discourteous, leading many to remark that he had been treated disgracefully. Overall his tenure was too short and his authority too contested for him to leave any lasting imprint on the Egyptian psyche. What is of tremendous importance though, with regard to McMahon's tenure was his inability to control internecine feuding and jockeying for position among the Anglo-Egyptian officials. This, compounded by the military authorities intrusion into the Commissioner's previously exclusive realm of authority, left McMahon's successor in an extremely unenviable position.

SIR FRANCIS REGINALD WINGATE

Born into a family with no wealth, influence, or connections Reginald Wingate had to climb his own way to the top. He attended the Royal Military Academy, Woolwhich, and was then assigned to an artillery battalion first in India and then in

[223] Ibid., pp. 16, 18

Aden. By 1883 he was attached to the Egyptian army as an infantry officer and would from then on receive regular distinctions. He served on the staff for several of the Sirdars in various military administrative capacities until finally being appointed Egyptian Army Director of Intelligence in 1887. In 1889, while still Director of Intelligence he handled the civil administration of the Egypt-Sudan frontier district, at the behest to the Adjutant-General.[224]He was involved in the 1896 Dangola Campaign and the Battle of Omdurman in 1898. He also accompanied Kitchener to Fashoda after Omdurman, and it was at his urging that Kitchener raised the Egyptian rather than the British flag in face of the French expedition.[225] This was a brilliant diplomatic gesture that possibly helped avoid a fight with French troops who would have been likely barred by their pride from withdrawing in the face of a blatant British advance.[226] The following year he had the distinction of winning the final battle of the Sudan wars, as it was his flying column that cut off and surrounded the Khalifa, putting an end to the war.[227]For this he was awarded the title of Pasha by the Khedive and promoted to Adjutant general of the Egyptian army. He returned to the Sudan that same year to succeed Kitchener as Governor-General and Sirdar. His first major challenge was in the form of a mutiny by several of his Sudanese battalions. These battalions, which were officered by Egyptians, were still smarting from Kitchener's austere economics and pay cuts. Troubled also by rumors that they would be shipped to South Africa to fight the Boers, they seized munitions from the armory and mutinied. After publicly cashiering some of the Egyptian officers he demonstrated leniency to the rank and file. He "approved a compromise whereby the windows of the armoury would be left open one night and under the cover of darkness, almost all the ammunition was returned."[228] Wingate showed both firmness and intelligence in dealing with the issue. As a result of this mutiny Wingate delivered a somewhat damning indictment of Kitchener's leadership, for in his opinion it was attributable to "much

[224] Ibid., p. 33
[225] M.W. Daly, "Omdurman and Fashoda, 1898: Edited and Annotated Letters of F.R. Wingate" *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 10, No. 1 (1983) p. 2
[226] Ibid
[227] Long., p., 34
[228] M.W. Daly, "The Egyptian Army Mutiny at Omdurman January-February 1900," *Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 8, No. 1. (1981) pp. 3-12.

mismanagement of officers for sometime past," and that it was "injudicious treatment to a great extent which gave rise to this trouble."[229] In 1913 he attained the rank of General, and in 1916 the post of General Officer Commanding in the Hijaz. Wingate was from the outbreak of the First World War an active promoter of the program of Arab Revolt and of al Sharif Husayn.

As dissatisfaction grew with McMahon's handling of Egypt, the British government made contact with Wingate about the possibility of becoming High Commissioner. Wingate had actually been one of the prime causes of this dissatisfaction with McMahon, having continuously slighted him to London and the Foreign Office. Regardless of his political maneuverings, Wingate had to his credit administered Sudan well, and had had a lot of experience in Egypt. He was in fact the antidote to McMahon. To that end Grey offered him the job of High Commissioner to Egypt.

In accepting this new posting Wingate was faced with numerous challenges. The administration of Egypt was vastly larger and more complex than that he had headed in Sudan. It was also, as previously noted, extremely dysfunctional and filled with competing factions. The civil administration was also still subjugated to the needs of the military, which was now under the command of General Allenby. Wingate could do little regarding the military needs but he moved quickly to try and control his administration. In this he was not particularly effective. He had been very conscious prior to his arrival that the Financial Advisor, Edward Cecil, was a threat to his authority. Although Cecil left Egypt, his rivalry with Wingate would have serious consequences for the latter. In direct contrast to Wingate, Cecil came from a noble and very well connected family. His uncle was the new Foreign Secretary in the Balfour government, and his brother Lord Robert Cecil, was Parliamentary Under Secretary to Balfour himself.[230] Wingate now had enemies and detractors in high places.

To exacerbate matters the British government had reneged on its promise not to make demands of Egypt, and was requiring financial assistance as well as men for the labor corps. These developments, especially the forced labor corvee, created an

[229] Ibid. p.9. FO/78/5086 Wingate to Cromer , Feb 5, 1900. encl. In Cromer to Salisbury Feb 18, 1900
[230] Long., p. 41

atmosphere of resentment among all classes of Egyptians. This resentment was to be harnessed brilliantly by the new nationalist leadership. The situation also emboldened the nationalists to believe that their contribution to the British war effort must be rewarded by the grant of major political concessions. No longer was political enfranchisement simply a demand but a right earned. Yet Wingate was only partially aware of all these changes.

As for Sultan Husayn Kamil, the war situation did not allow Wingate the opportunity to take advantage of their friendship to improve the political situation in Egypt. He could give Sultan Kamil no concessions or promises with which to strengthen his position vis-a-vis the Egyptian nationalists. Any opportunity to rectify the situation was lost permanently when Kamil died in 1917 and was succeeded despite Wingate's objections, by his brother Ahmad Fuad. With sultan Fuad, Wingate had abysmal relations. For his part Sultan Fuad resented the tight noose of British control and formed common cause with the nationalists.

Sultan Fuad immediately attempted to introduce changes to the cabinet by nominating to it Saad Zaghlul and Abd al Aziz Fahmy. Wingate initially recommended to the British government the desirability of approving Zaghlul's appointment as he thought it best not to alienate him. By December of 1917 Wingate had retracted his support for this appointment, having gradually become seriously concerned with the potential post-war nationalist demands. To the Sultan and Prime Minister Ruchdi's requested changes the British government sent a categorical refusal. This sort of response was exceedingly unfortunate, and could not have been better designed if the government's intent was to push the Sultan and the nationalists closer together in opposition to the British. Second thoughts about Zaghlul's appointment and the manner in which the situation was handled came far too late. Wingate could then only anticipate with dread the post war actions of the Egyptian nationalists now headed by Saad Zaghlul.

When Zaghlul finally approached Wingate to inform him of the Egyptian intent to form a delegation to travel to London in order to present their case for independence, he responded quite moderately. Although unable to give Zaghlul an official answer he recommended to the British government that the proposed deputation, the *wafd,* be

allowed to carry out its plan. He also made repeated requests, in vain, for the government to send him an outline of guidance about Egypt after the war. No policy, though, seems to have existed and the government refused to allow the nationalist deputation permission to travel despite Wingate's repeated recommendations to the contrary.

Wingate was given no clear instructions, and his advice and assessment of the situation were repeatedly ignored. Nevertheless, the British government blamed him for failing to control Egyptian nationalist sentiment. He was most especially faulted for having received Zaghlul and the deputation in the first place. This according to London had encouraged the nationalists in their ambition. Blind, uncertain, and seemingly obtuse, the government in London chose to blame Wingate for the rising tide of nationalism, deluded in its belief that all that was required was a strong man to place the nationalist genie back in the bottle. To that end when Wingate traveled to attend the Paris Peace Conference the British government took the opportunity to send General Allenby, now titled Supreme Commander in Chief and High Commissioner, to Egypt. In Allenby London thought they had found their strong man.

In the end nothing hurt Wingate and, through him that chances of finding some non-violent compromise to the situation in Egypt, more than his inability to command respect and confidence in London. His naked ambition, combined with his undisguised lack of social refinement, indicative of his humble origins, destroyed his chances to form the necessary network of political support in London. Without this network of supporters, and beset by wellborn and well-placed enemies such as the Cecils, Wingate was all but crippled. This is not to say that Wingate could have averted the outbreak of violence in the best of circumstances, for he also had failed to accurately assess the full extent and scope of Egyptian nationalist feelings. It must be acknowledged however that if Wingate fell somewhat short of the mark in his assessment of the situation, he was much closer to understanding the reality than the fantastical notions held by those in London.

FIELD MARSHALL EDMUND HENRY HYNMAN, VISCOUNT ALLENBY

Regarded as a failure with the 3rd Army on the Western Front Allenby was dispatched in 1917 to the Levant and placed in command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. In the Levant he recorded great advances against the Ottoman Turks, culminating in the capture of Syria and Palestine. In 1919 as dissatisfaction with Wingate was mounting in London, Allenby was chosen by the government to restore order in Egypt. Allenby prior to this had been the Military Administrator of Palestine. This post was hardly an easy one, as the administrator was faced by Arab anger at the Balfour plan and Zionist agitation for its rapid implementation.[231] This military administrative experience, however, was hardly sufficient to prepare him for what was to come. He was designated Special High Commissioner to Egypt and in him were vested all the military and civil powers. Allenby, who possessed absolutely no civil administrative experience, was thus given all the tools for success. This was in sharp contrast to Wingate, who while having possessed both military and civil experience had never been granted such powers. By March 25, 1919, the date of Allenby's arrival in Cairo, General Bulfin, his deputy commander, had managed by ruthless and forceful measures to restore a semblance of order to most parts of Egypt. The situation was hardly ideal, though, and the country was relatively ungovernable. The British Army's repressive measures could at best be deemed a temporary solution. Of this situation General Bulfin was well aware as he communicated to London the urgency of opening communications with the nationalists.[232] Allenby, absolutely convinced of his ability to cow the Egyptians and to control the situation in Egypt, consented to listen to nationalist demands. He also recommended to London that Zaghlul and his fellow prisoners be released and allowed to proceed to Europe. London was horrified at this suggestion, which echoed Wingate's earlier recommendations, believing that the Egyptians would take advantage of this appearance of "softness." In reality, despite all the second-guessing and potential

[231] John T McTague Jr., "The British Military Administration in Palestine 1917-1920," *Journal of Palestine Studies,* Vol. 7 No. 3 (Spring, 1978) pp. 55-56.
[232]Long., p. 107

perceptions of his actions, Allenby took the only option open to him. Barring the enforcement of military rule in the face of a hostile Egyptian population, and without any effective local collaborators, there was no choice other than dialogue with the nationalists.

Having given Allenby great authority and freedom of action, London was compelled to accept his recommendations, however unpalatable.[233] Zaghlul and his delegation were thus released from Malta and allowed the freedom to travel to France. The release, however, was greeted by many Britons, especially those residing in Egypt as an act of weakness and a concession to Egyptian violent intimidation. This faction believed that the Egyptians had to be taught a lesson and that general Bulfin had shown the way, by calming Egypt through the use of force. Yet this faction ignored Bulfin's own injunctions of the impracticability of expecting to hold a hostile Egypt without a massive influx of British troops. In any case, with Zaghlul out the country and the violence having abated, Allenby might have falsely believed that the popular support for the nationalists was not as strong as previously reported. He thus urged the quick dispatch of the Milner mission, without success, so as to take advantage of Zaghlul's absence.

When the Milner mission finally arrived in Egypt, it met with negligible success. Boycotted by the majority of Egyptians and hostilely received by the nationalists, it accomplished very little. Later negotiations with Zaghlul and the *wafd* that had been invited to Britain for that purpose also met with failure. In its final report the Milner Mission recommended that the Protectorate be abolished and that a negotiated treaty govern future relations between Egypt and Great Britain. Allenby was in agreement of the Milner reports' conclusions but like London had no intention of negotiating such a treaty with Zaghlul and the *wafd.* He hoped instead to negotiate with a more pliant Egyptian government and colluded with the King Fuad to weaken the *wafd*, a course of action regarded with great apprehension by Lord Milner.[234] Sultan Fuad then appointed and an old British collaborator Adly Pasha Yakan as the new Egyptian Prime Minister.

[233] Ibid.
[234] Darwin, pp. 104, 106

Adly had little time to consolidate his position for Saad Zaghlul returned to Egypt in March of 1920, now more obdurate than ever. Quickly denouncing Adly as a traitor Zaghlul effectively rallied his countrymen against the new Prime Minister.

In July it was decided to dispatch an Egyptian delegation headed by Adly to London, and containing members of the *wafd.* Allenby accompanied this delegation and remained with it for three fruitless months. It was his belief however that the British should immediately proclaim Egyptian independence and iron out the details later, a point of view rejected by his government. Ultimately Allenby's time was wasted and the treaty negotiations failed over issues concerning the Sudan, the placement of a British garrison, and the control of Egypt's foreign affairs. Adly, no matter how accommodating, could not, in the face of his countrymen's opposition, agree to what would amount to only partial independence and the continued presence of alien troops on Egyptian soil. Adly's return to Egypt empty-handed led to his resignation and left the country once again without a government. Allenby meanwhile continued to press his opinion that the Protectorate should be unilaterally abolished and independence granted Egypt without a treaty. Now also impatient with Zaghlul he ordered him to desist from all political activity. Upon Zaghlul's refusal, Allenby had him deported in December 1922. The Egyptian reaction was predictable and violence broke out nationwide. To this Allenby reacted with large numbers of troops in the streets. Finally Allenby won his point and unilaterally declared Egypt's independence. The sultan Fuad was now restyled king Fuad and Sarwat Pasha formed a transitional government. A commission was set up to create a constitution for Egypt. In March a neutral government was formed headed by Yahya Ibrahim Pasha. In that same month Zaghlul was unconditionally released and returned to Egypt in September.

The first elections for the new Parliament took place in January of 1924. The *wafd* won 179 of 211 seats. Zaghlul was as a result elected Prime Minister. Negotiations though between Zaghlul and the British remained deadlocked. On 19 November 1924 the murder of Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Egyptian Army shattered that deadlock. Allenby blamed Zaghlul directly for the murder and subsequently backed by British

troops delivered the Prime Minister with a list of ultimatums. The terms as drafted by Allenby went far beyond what the British Government had intended and certain clauses were clearly a form of petty vengeance. Zaghlul, badly shaken by what had happened agreed to the majority of the demands. This was not sufficient for Allenby, who threatened direct force should all his conditions not be met. Zaghlul incapable of taking that final step, resigned. Ahamad Ziwar Pasha succeeded Zaghlul and acceded to all Allenby's conditions, an act of political suicide that rendered all pro-British elements in Egypt unpalatable to their own people. London moderated the terms of the ultimatum in an attempt to rectify some of the damage that Allenby's actions had caused, but this proved too little too late. The next election, despite all its opponents' efforts brought the *Wafd* Party another majority in parliament, if a slim one. Allenby requested the prorogation of Parliament, a request that delighted King Fouad. With Allenby firmly behind him the King dissolved parliament and prepared to rule autocratically. Although instrumental in bringing about this monarchist coup, Allenby would not remain in Egypt long enough to see its outcome. He left the country on June 14, 1925 having received the news of his removal in April through a Reuters news report rather than a personal communication.

It has been remarked by Allenby's detractors that he was dispatched to Egypt to use his muscles, and instead he decided to use his brain. This, they claim, was greatly to the detriment of the British position in Egypt. In reality, Allenby demonstrated a degree of understanding of the situation in 1919 that far surpassed that of his superiors. It must be noted that General Bulfin, Allenby's deputy commander, was in perfect agreement with his superior. Bulfin had applied force in order to stabilize the initial situation, but he understood that long-term stability could only be brought about by negotiation. Allenby had in fact done as well as could have been expected in that situation. The moderation (or what those who had dispatched him saw as weakness) that characterized Allenby's early period as High Commissioner did not however outlive the murder of Sir Lee Stack. The death of Stack, Allenby's friend, elicited an understandable and very human reaction. Allenby immediately assigned the blame to Zaghlul. He then sought redress by forcing

Zaghlul and his fellow nationalists to sign an agreement unpalatable to them, by the threat of violence to their persons. His handling of Zaghlul and the Egyptian nationalists subsequent to the murder, although seen as decisive and firm by some, notably many of the British in Egypt, was not that salutary for long-term Anglo-Egyptian relations. Although, when the matter is considered impartially, it could also be argued that Zaghlul's fearful acquiescence to Allenby's demands, only reinforced the belief held by some that force could solve intractable issues. If Allenby's reactions to Stack's murder were understandable at the time, his support of King Fuad's naked power grab cannot be so easily excused. With Allenby's tacit approval, the king dissolved parliament, and basically restored personal rule. These actions severely damaged Egyptian democratic development and reflect quite badly on Allenby's legacy in Egypt. In the final analysis, circumstances seemed to control the men rather than the other way around.

CONCLUSION

The interactions among a small number of individuals often dramatically affect the manner in which events unfold. The intent here was to demonstrate just how much the British Agents and High Commissioners, who for all intents and purposes ruled Egypt, affected the course of Anglo-Egyptian relations. This was in part an exposition of their character traits, their strengths and weaknesses, especially in the area of personal interactions. This was done on the premise that these personal interactions were critical in the fostering of peace with the natives, or alternately creating the potential for great strife. Kitchener's clash with Zaghlul was a prime example. Personal interactions were also highly important within the British Administration in Egypt and the Foreign Office in General. Here, Wingate's tale is a perfect example of what happened to those who could not fit in and earned the enmity of too many of their colleagues. All these interactions shaped, to a degree, the sometimes-illogical progression of the Anglo-Egyptian relationship.

Anglo-Egyptian and British Administrations:

Perceptions and Reactions

The decisions made by the British government in London were based on several factors. The personal prejudices and opinions of the various officials in London were certainly a matter of consideration, but these were usually given substance by the reports submitted from the Agency in Cairo. The reports, letters and comments from the Consul-General and a host of other Anglo-Egyptian officials helped inform the decision makers on the courses of action available to them. During Cromer's tenure as Consul-General and Agent this was a relatively straightforward affair, as he was held in enough high esteem so as to dominate all other voices. Cromer was the primary source of information on Egypt. Among his successors in that post, only Gorst and Kitchener retained some of that aura of authority. That authoritative voice was lost during the Agencies of McMahon, Wingate and Allenby, and the voices reaching London multiplied. As a result, decision makers sought those views that best pleased their own conceits and prejudices, with disastrous results. Policymaking became reactive, shortsighted, and in many cases based on faulty information. Towards the end of Wingate's tenure in 1918, this became most egregious and costly. The High Commissioner, as the Agent's of the protectorate were termed, no longer stood as the authority of record on Egypt but rather as an authority. The intent of this chapter is to examine carefully the information that was relayed to London concerning the various factions, figures, and events in Egypt, and to attempt to analyze how they shaped policy and events. In effect it is an attempt to ascertain just how the perceptions of the men on the spot, when heeded, helped determine the course of Anglo-Egyptian affairs.

One of the striking aspects of all the diplomatic and consular correspondence is how well aware and sensitive the British diplomatic staffers worldwide were to any events that could affect the Empire. They were fully cognizant of the global nature of British interests and the consulates in various countries would often route unsolicited but possibly relevant information through the Foreign or Colonial Office to each other. In

this manner they were able to keep track of the subject peoples over whom they presided no matter where they traveled. In addition they were extremely sensitive to the international impact of events in the Empire and monitored those closely through the press and local informants. This certainly held true in Egypt's case, which due to the multiple foreign interests involved, would receive careful and considerable attention. The Foreign Office records reflect this attention and concern.

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF JAMAL AL-DIN AL-AFGHANI

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had had past dealings with the British in India, but in the Egypt occupation era he first came to their attention on the 18 July, 1883. A letter from the Indian Foreign Secretary was forwarded to His Majesty's Secretary of Sate for Foreign Affairs in August, 1883 and gave "an account of one Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din who is at present conducting an anti-British periodical at Paris."[235] Sheikh Jamal-ud-Din, whose proper full name was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, had attracted some attention at the Residency in Hyderabad, when his periodical first came to its notice. The original letter was written by Syed Husein Bilgrami to Mr Cordery the Resident in Hyderabad, and forwarded to C. Grant (the Indian Foreign Secretary) contained the following:

> I think it is possible that the enclosed account of an ill affected individual, who is now carrying on his work in Paris, is worth forwarding to you, as it may be desirable at some point or other to be acquainted with his antecedents.[236]

Although the author of the letter misidentified the name of the periodical he remarked that "its circulation might do harm in parts of India, e.g. Delhi." In a postscript he also indicated that "the knowledge of who this man is might be useful to Major Baring as it is to Egypt that he is now going."[237]

Mr Cordery Hyderabad Residency to C. Grant Foreign Office, June 25 1883, FO 147/172
[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid

Presented here are portions of that letter containing al-Afghani's supposed antecedents and the Resident's recommendations, as well as analysis and commentary:

> About 3 years ago a man came here [Hyderabad] from Egypt alleged that he had been turned out of the country by the orders of H.H. the new Khedive Tewfik Pasha, for preaching doctrines distasteful to the authorities.[238]

On this account the letter writer was indeed correct. Prime Minister Mustafa Riaz Pasha ejected al-Afghani from Egypt in 1879, at the behest of the Khedive Tawfiq. Mustafa Riaz had been the person originally to invite al-Afghani from Istanbul to Cairo in 1871, as he was attracted to his reform message. Al-Afghani's preaching's against despotism however, raised the ire of Tawfiq and led to his banishment.

> I gathered from his conversation that he was a free thinker of the French type, and a socialist, and that he had been got rid of by the authorities in Egypt for preaching the doctrine of "liberte, fraternite, egalite, to the students and masses of the country.

Al-Afghani and his followers would have understood what the writer referred to as socialism, as simply a reflection of the social mores of Islam. This was also the case when discussing equality and fraternity that the reformers argued were inherent to Islam and its origins in Arab tribal society.

> I found him to be a well informed man for a Herati (he is a Herati by birth) though rather shallow in his acquirements. He could "hold forth" in Persian and Arabic with great easiness (sic) and purity of idiom. He talked a little French and he used to say that it was his purpose to go and make Paris his headquarters for some time in order to get justice out of the Khedive from the French.

In addition to the listed languages it is reasonable to assume that he also had some knowledge of Urdu having spent a considerable time in India. He might also have had

[238] Enclosed in: Mr Cordery Hyderabad Residency to C. Grant Foreign Office, June 25 1883, FO 147/172

some knowledge of Turkish having resided in Istanbul. Yet Arabic was the closest to a lingua franca in the Muslim world and therefore became his main medium of mass communication. Al-Afghani's command of several various languages, however, made him able to extend the reach of his message to many areas of the Muslim world where the British had a presence. This made him even more troublesome to the British.

> I also understand from Colonel Clark that he was the author of a violently anti-English article in the periodical "habla" that used to be published in London. H.E. the late minister gave him a couple of thousand rupees to enable him to leave the country; but I know that he did not leave the country but continued there a rather retired life in the city spending his time in teaching and philosophical discussions.

It is quite plausible that these funds were provided not simply as a courtesy or out of friendship, but as a means to speed al-Afghani out of the country. His presence in any location seemed perpetually to make local officials uncomfortable and eager to aid him on his way by whatever means they could.

> When however the ___(unintelligible word) in Egypt made a stir in the papers, the Sheikh Jamal –ud- Din (for such was his name) suddenly disappeared from Hyderabad and I was given the impression that he was gone to Burmah. I felt quite sure however that he was gone to no such place and that either Cairo or Paris was his destination.

Why Burma was advertised as a possible destination seems unclear except as an attempt at misdirection by al-Afghani. This attempt at obfuscation would not be overly surprising, as he trusted the British very little.

> Some months ago I was startled by having an Arabic periodical sent me from Paris, and on opening found that it was no other than the ____ (unintelligible word) philosopher of Hyderabad. Since then I have continued to be forwarded with copies, as have also many others in Hyderabad.

It appears that *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* managed rapidly to achieve some international circulation, sufficient at least to attract British attention in Paris and India.

> It is printed on a double sheet of paper, and within the limits of the four pages it contains nothing that is not anti-English. The paper in my opinion is not to be allowed into India, although fortunately there are not many in the country who can read Arabic. It is certainly even less desirable in Egypt where even the lower orders will be able to read it, of this however the authorities is Egypt are the best judges.

The reputed freedom of press established by the British whether in Egypt or India seemed to have finite limits.

> I may add that to my knowledge the man is penniless, and must therefore have some kind of support in Paris. Whether he is or is not countenanced by the French government it is not for me to say, perhaps the relations between France and England may account for his existence in Paris.

Possible French collusion with and support for al-Afghani were quite worrisome to the British authorities. They feared that the French were actively engaged in rousing Indian and certainly Egyptian sentiment against the British presence.

After translating selections from the periodical, the report concluded with the following menacing assertion: "Other numbers of the paper contain many words written in cipher, which it is difficult for me to understand. Perhaps they have no difficulty for the initiated in Egypt." Given the very rich and allegorical nature of the Arabic language, especially in its local variations, this could certainly have been the case. Unfortunately we cannot ascertain the validity of this claim, given that such communications depended in many cases on the shared knowledge and experience of individuals and not on cipher books or formulas that can be decoded.

Monitoring of al-Afghani continued on the part of the British Consulate in Paris. The next communication dated September 11, 1883 contained details regarding his associates and analysis of their background and actions. One Mr. James Sauna described as a "small Egyptian Jew" was mentioned as being involved with al-Afghani in the anti-

English campaign. Mr. Sauna according to the letter writer "is intelligent and writes well, but it is seldom that his affairs are prosperous and he frequently borrows money from my informant..." Despite this insider connection the British were left to speculate on the sources for the periodical's funding and in this regard they were quite fanciful:

> I have not been able to discern where comes the money which supports the paper. Is it not probable that as one of the principle benefits of which English influence will bring to Egypt is to free the peasant from the money lender, and to reduce the present usurious rate charged to the unfortunate fellah, the Jew money lender interest should be hostile to Great Britain.[239]

Not sufficiently satisfied with this initial scenario the letter writer elaborates farther on possible sources of funding:

> As the small money lenders draw their resources from the larger ones, and they again from certain Bankers in Paris and elsewhere, the inference is not unnatural that Mr. Sauna [and the periodical] is supported by what may be termed the unavowable financial interests of certain Egyptian Jews

Having singled out both the French bankers and the Jewish financial interests as possible sources of funding for the anti-British periodical, the author felt content to conclude his letter. This sort of speculation is illustrative of a relatively high degree of concern engendered by the British occupation of Egypt.

Another correspondence from Paris even went so far as to claim that the periodical was in fact a creation of these Jewish anti-British interests and that the "reason why Jamal al-Din has been taken into the affair is that through his friends he is expected to distribute the paper in India, and those who are working this press consider that the easiest way to increase the desire of England to leave Egypt is to stir up trouble in her Indian Provinces."[240] This letter is of particular importance for two reasons. First, in that it denied al-Afghani the initiative in founding the periodical, and second in that it correctly ascertained at least part of al-Afghani's hopes. He, indeed, had hoped to place

[239] Paris (sender signature illegible) to Earl of Granville, September 11, 1883, FO 141/72/601
[240] Memorandum by Mr F. Plunchett September 14, 1883, FO 141/72/601

enough pressure on the British in India, in order to force them to withdraw from Egypt. Al-Afghani recognized the ability of the English to utilize the great divisions in India to divide and rule. This made the task of ousting them from India extremely difficult. Egypt on the other hand had a relatively homogeneous population, the vast majority of whom were Sunni Muslims. This in al-Afghani's view made the task of ejecting the British more attainable, but also more desirable and pressing. Egypt unlike India was in his view a Muslim country, and moreover it was close to the very heart of Islam, and the gateway to the Hajj for millions of Muslims.

Ultimately *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* was banned in both India and in Egypt, and although it failed in its attempt to expel the British from Egypt, it certainly attracted their attention and caused them concern. It also inspired an entirely new generation of Muslims with its message of Islamic reform and empowerment, most notably Rashid Rida on whom this periodical had great impact. The British were able to suppress the distribution of the periodical but not before it had broadcast some of its ideology. One puzzling fact, however, requires mention. Muhammad Abduh had joined al-Afghani in Paris and worked as the editor of *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa.* Yet, no mention of him was made in the British correspondence from that period. That part of Abduh's past seemed to have been unknown, forgotten or simply ignored by the British who would later embrace him.

BRITISH PERCEPTION OF MUHAMMAD ABDUH

The British acceptance of Abduh was made clear in 1899 when he was appointed Grand Mufti of Egypt. Cromer, who had clashed with the former holder of this position over desired changes to the religious court system, welcomed Abduh's appointment:

> I have the honour to report that the proposed changes to Cadi's Court of Cairo…excited so much opposition among the Moslem population that it has been thought desirable not to insist on its immediate execution.[241]

[241] Cromer to the Marquis of Salisbury, Cairo, June 6th 1899, FO 78/5023

Cromer obviously had no intention to allow this challenge to his authority to go uncontested for long, despite the temporary setback. His plans were to wait only until passions were quieted and his opponents were weakened.

> A commission will be appointed in the course of the next winter to consider the subject. At the same time the Mufti, who is the authoritative exponent of Mohamedan religious law, and who has been the principle opponent of the proposed change has been removed from his place.

The Mufti's clash with Cromer apparently had negative consequences on his career. His successor, Muhammad Abduh, was introduced and described by Cromer as a person who "is believed to be animated with liberal sentiments, and it is hoped that he will aid in the cause of liberal reform."

Cromer returned to this issue in his annual report for 1899 and elaborated further on the incident:

> A commission has therefore been appointed under the presidency of the Minister of Justice, to consider the whole question of the reform of the Mehkemehs. At the same time, the Mufti whose tendencies are retrograde and who had introduced an unnecessary degree of violence into the discussions on this subject was removed from his place.[242]

Although Cromer admitted that this "matter was wholly for the Egyptians to decide for themselves," and that "no European or general interest was involved," a commission containing one Englishmen, a Mr Corbet, the Procureur-General was appointed. Despite his seemingly detached approach, there was in reality nothing during Cromer's Agency that was "wholly for the Egyptians to decide." In fact one would be very hard pressed to find anything in the public domain that Cromer did not seek to control directly or indirectly.

As for Muhammad Abduh, the new Mufti, Cromer praised him in his report as a man of "education and enlightenment." Abduh for his part became a crucial proponent of

[242] Cromer to Marquis of Salisbury, 20th February 1900, FO 78/5086

many of the reforms that Cromer desired. That is not to say that Abduh subordinated his will to Cromer, but that for the period preceding his death, his desires ran parallel to Cromer's in most cases. Both men were also equally animated by a dislike of the khedive Abbas Hilmy II and the hope of reducing his influence wherever possible. For Abduh this was from a desire to end despotic rule in his country. As for Cromer, it could be justifiably argued that he believed Egypt needed but one despot, himself.

The advantages to the British of having a collaborative reformer in the position of Mufti in Egypt, cannot be underestimated. This is doubly true in the case of Muhammad Abduh who had also been Sheikh al-Azhar. Al-Azhar the ancient university mosque in Cairo was the preeminent religious institution for the Sunni Moslem world. Students were attracted to it from all over the world, including British India, the majority of whose Muslims were Sunni. Fatwas, or religious rulings, on various subjects issued by Sheikh al-Azhar and the Mufti of Egypt would be taken quite seriously even as far as India. The implications of that influence were well recognized by the British and a series of correspondence between Simla and Cairo in 1912 over a fatwa issued by Abduh years previously demonstrate this.

In its efforts to encourage deposits in the Egyptian Post Office Savings Bank the Anglo-Egyptian government was stymied by the Islamic law that forbade usury. Interest yielding accounts were believed to be usurious and hence un-Islamic. The government then "prevailed upon Muhmmad Abduh to issue a fetwa approving of the Savings Bank scheme in every respect."[243] The Anglo-Indian government, likely facing similar problems with the Muslim population of India, was made aware of this fetwa in 1912 as a result of an article in the Pioneer newspaper. Realizing the importance of such a fetwa, and the respect with which the Grand Mufti of Egypt and sheikh al-Azhar was held throughout the Muslim world, a request was made from the Government of India, Department of Revenue and Agriculture, that "the necessary action may be taken to supply the government of India with a copy of the fetiva (fatwa) said therein to have been

[243] Extract from the Cairo correspondent of the Pioneer newspaper of the 6th of June 1912, FO 371/1363

issued by the Grand Mufti Sheikh Mohamed Abdou (Muhammad Abduh) conveying his approval of the Egyptian Post Office Savings Bank Scheme."[244]

The issuing of this fetwa was not an insignificant matter and did not simply involve a proclamation by the Grand Mufti. As in the case of any legal decision it required a full explanation and justification with reference to law and precedent. These, however, were exactly the sorts of challenges to Islamic society that the reformers such as al-Afghani and Abduh wanted to tackle. Not by any means a repudiation of *Shari'ah* or Sunna (law and proper tradition), but rather a proper reinterpretation of the law based on reason and logic. This was in essence the reopening of the gate of *ijtihad* (the practice of interpreting Islamic jurisprudence), and the denial of the claim that modern society was incapable and less than competent to interpret *Shari'ah*. The needs of the Anglo-Egyptian government and the goals of the Islamic reformers, in this instance and in many others, dovetailed perfectly. With this cooperation British interests were served not only in Egypt but in India and other parts of the empire where Sunni Muslims were prevalent. It is hardly surprising then that Abduh as noted earlier earned the praise of Cromer and was perceived as a man "of education and enlightenment," who "is believed to be animated with liberal sentiments."

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF ABDALLAH AL-NADIM:

Abdallah al-Nadim's return to Egypt, and his resumption of his former activities as a publicist, did not pass without remark by the British. A letter sent to *The Times* and published on March 31, 1893, by a supposed 20 year resident of Egypt, noted al-Nadim's resumption of activity as a publisher with great alarm. Given Cromer's ties to *The Times* and his constant manipulation of the news flowing from Egypt, it makes a great deal of sense to suggest that this article likely reflected his opinion on the situation. The article titled "Egypt 1881-1893, A PARALLEL" perceived much that was alarming in the state

[244] From Department of Revenue and Agriculture to His Majesty's Undersecretary of State for India, 20th of June, 1912, FO 371/1363

of Egyptian affairs and pointed to some "striking similarities" between the state of affairs in 1881 and 1893:

> In the early months of 1881 there was in Egypt a young and inexperienced Khedive under the dual control of England and France. His Prime Minister Riaz Pasha, infatuated with his own conceit, was subsidizing the native Press in order to keep them faithful to his autocratic policy…One Nedim was preaching an anti-European crusade.[245]

The author of the article was drawing attention to the prominent role Abdallah al-Nadim had played as the publicist of the 1882 Urabi revolution. Particularly interesting, if seriously flawed, was his use of the word "crusade" to describe al-Nadim's activities. The article continues by claiming:

> To-day—almost exactly 12 years later—we have again a young inexperienced Khedive. We have as premier the same autocratic Riaz disgusting the country with his cruelty and his nepotism, still subsidizing the native Press against English control…[and] we have again the same Nedim preaching the same crusade.

Clearly, al-Nadim's articles in *al-Ustadh* had been judged anti-British and of concern. The author of this article was also quite explicit in pointing to the Khedive Abbas and his chosen Prime Minister Riaz Pasha, as the sources of *al-Ustadh's* funding.

This did not prove the last time that *The Times* mentioned Abdallah al-Nadim and lamented his ability to publish. In the May 28 issue of that same year a brief piece from *The Times* Cairo correspondent contained the following information on the "Egyptian Native Press:"

> The fact that the rabid utterances of the native Press continue unchecked is causing anxiety, and surprise is felt that England, who is responsible for the maintenance of order in the country has not authoritatively intervened to stop this source of danger. The worst offender is the *Ustaz* a paper started by Abdallah Nedim shortly after his pardon and return from

[245] *The Times*, March 31st, 1893

> banishment, to which he was sentenced as one of the most violent of incendiary orators during Arabi's revolt.[246]

According to *The Times'* Egypt correspondent al-Nadim's behavior was as fully reprehensible in 1893 as it had been in 1882 and was bound to cause damage to the British position in Egypt:

> He has been for months past fully as violent as formerly in preaching sedition, and the impunity which he enjoys naturally leads the natives to believe that he has the approval of the Khedive or his Highness's Ministers in his gross attack upon Europeans and especially the British.

This article all but explicitly accused the Khedive and his government of being behind *al-Ustadh's* attacks on the British occupation.

These concerns, as expressed by *The Times,* appear to have been communicated quite clearly to the Khedive and the Egyptian government, for on the very next day, May 29, *The Times* quoted a Reuters report on a warning delivered to *al-Ustadh*:

> A warning is given tonight by the *Official Journal* to the native newspaper Ustaz, which has of late frequently made violent attacks on the policy of the British Government in Egypt. The *Official Journal* remarks that the *Ustaz* is a scientific and literary review, but that it has since a certain time been in the habit of publishing political articles, a course which is foreign to the principles on which the it was started; and the Ministry of interior therefore invites the proprietor to refrain from publishing further articles on political questions.[247]

This mild mannered admonishment in the Official Journal hardly suited the British and *The Times* correspondent in Egypt wrote a scathing response to what he regarded as a wholly inadequate action:

> Riaz pasha has given the mildest of warnings to the *Ustaz* for its incendiary publications. The occasion was a good one for the Government

[246] *The Times*, May 28th, 1893
[247] *The Times*, May 30th, 1893

> to show strong disapproval of attempts to incite Moslem feelings against Christians, yet, although the editor of the *Ustaz* is the same man who in 1882 did his utmost to help the Alexandria Massacre, the official warning merely says that the programme of his paper being literary and scientific, he is invited to abstain from politics.[248]

This British indignation was not without effect, and on June 13, *al-Ustadh* published its last edition. Whatever support al-Nadim might have enjoyed from the Khedive was not sufficient, it seems, to shield him from the effects of British displeasure. A June 21 article in *The Times* made the following assessment of the situation:

> The Government have granted Abdullah Nedim the editor of the seditious newspaper *Ustaz*, who was recently ordered to leave the country, 400 [pds] compensation and 25 [pds] monthly whilst he remains abroad…As he has not now been formally sentenced to exile, the award seems to be in the nature of a bribe to procure his silence.[249]

Whether *The Times* correspondent claimed that the Khedive had bribed al-Nadim to remain quiet concerning the palace's possible support of *al-Ustadh*, or simply to no longer publish, is not perfectly clear in this instance. Previous inferences though, by *The Times'* correspondent, appear to indicate that he believed that al-Nadim was bribed in order to stop him from revealing the Khedive's ties to an anti-British publication such as *al-Ustadh*. Whatever the reasons behind this compensation, al-Nadim left Egypt never to return and would no longer trouble the British and their allies in Egypt.

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF MUHAMMAD RASHID RIDA

One of the ways that Muhammad Abduh spread his message of reform and modernism was through a periodical, *al-Manar*, published by his disciple Muhammad Rashid Rida. This journal was launched in 1899 and was immediately brought to the attention of the British Administration by Sir Nicholas O'Conor, the British ambassador to the Sublime Port. The Ottomans had lodged a complaint with the Ambassador

[248] *The Times*, May 31st, 1893
[249] *The Times*, June 21st, 1893

claiming that al-*Manar* had insulted the Sultan; and Sir Nicholas had communicated with the Foreign Office, and with Cromer directly, to ask them to ascertain the truth of the matter. Cromer immediately launched an enquiry and communicated his finding to the Foreign Office and Sir Nicholas:

> "Al-Manar" which is published in Arabic and in the form of a pamphlet, does not deal with political questions. It confines itself to the discussion of religious and educational matters, and notably urges the desirability of improving the education of the Sheikh class. So far as I can gather it does not attack the Sultan. Common report does not in any way associate the Khedive's name with this newspaper.

As long as Abduh remained alive, *al-Manar* focused primarily on issues of reform and maintained a mostly pro-British tome. Even after Abduh's death, Rida chose to maintain an accommodating tone when speaking of the British, despite his suspicions regarding their good intentions towards Muslims.[250] This allowed the British to ignore *al-Manar* and Rida himself, as they were not yet regarded as troublesome.

This all changed after the outbreak of the First World War. Rida recognized that the demise of the Ottoman Empire was likely and hence looked towards an Arab Caliphate as a possible successor. He wished to preserve the bonds of Islamic universalism and thought a Caliphate necessary to that end. Rida, though, distrusted British absolutely by this point, and there were certainly those among the British that reciprocated those feelings of distrust:

> Rashid Rida is not sitting on the fence he has been an activist anti-British anti-Christian force and never lets and opportunity slip to do us some harm. I cannot understand Sir R.W.'s attitude towards this ruffian.[251]

A note was scribbled by Robert Cecil the Assistant Foreign Secretary on the bottom of this damning letter that "opinions vary about Rashid Rida" and the necessity of obtaining further information. Wingate's tolerance sprang from his desire to utilize Rida and *al-*

[250] Refer to Chapters 1 and 2 for a complete discussion of the reasoning behind Rida's attitude.
[251] Sir M. Seykes (location and exact date not specified) to Sir R. Graham, September! 1917, FO 371/2928

Manar to widen support for the Arab Revolt sponsored by the British Government. The material published in al-Manar during the war was for the most part neutral in tone, which was very likely because of the high degree of press censorship practiced by the British authorities. After the relaxing of press censorship, *al-Manar* featured several articles dealing with the history of the war from Rida's perspective. They demonstrate a clear clash between British views regarding the post-war Middle East and Rida's. It can be confidently stated that as of the publication of the Sykes-Picot agreement dividing the Middle East between the Britain and France, Rida had become unabashedly anti-British, and in general anti-European.

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF MUSTAFA KAMIL

Outside of Muhammad Abduh's circle a completely different sort of individual was rising to the fore in Egyptian public life. This new sort of assertive Egyptian, exemplified by the nationalist Mustafa Kamil, was never kindly perceived by Cromer and the British government. In May 1902 after a meeting held at Alexandria on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Muhammad Ali's arrival in Egypt, Kamil, one of the key speakers was thus described: "Mustapha Bey Kamil is the ordinary type of semi-Europeanized demagogue. He is a man of the worst character, and on his own merits would exercise but little influence." [252]In a couple of sentences Cromer had assessed, and dismissed, one of Egypt's most prominent nationalists and political orators. He chose to attribute Kamil's entire success solely to the backing the Khedive Abbas:

> He derives his importance wholly from the fact that he is encouraged by the Khedive…and that his newspaper 'The Lewa" which is violently pan-Islamic and Anglophobe is notoriously supported by the funds that the Khedive provides.

[252] Memorandum from the Lord Cromer on the present Situation in Egypt. Circulated to the Cabinet on Dec 9, 1906. FO/371/67 p.2

This dismissive assessment was made despite the fact that *The Lewa* was one of the most widely circulated newspapers of the period, and despite Kamil's demonstrable ability and his popularity among the younger generation of Egyptians. Later, as British concerns over pan-Islamism grew, Kamil's importance as its most able proponent in Egypt also increased in their perception. This is directly attributed to their understanding of the meaning of Pan-Islamism. According to Cromer:

> It is generally held to mean a combination of the Moslems throughout the world to defy and resist the Christian Powers. There can be no doubt that this is the fundamental notion which the Egyptian Pan-Islamists have in their mind.

Cromer believed that the rising tide of Pan-Islamism was dangerous and of concern to all Europeans because it could "not improbably lead to sporadic outbreaks of Moslem fanaticism in different parts of the world." Of its overall success though, Cromer was relatively skeptical, for he greatly doubted "the possibility of Moslem cooperation and cohesion, when once it becomes a question of passing from words to deeds."[253]

It is important to note that even early on, alternate assessments of Kamil were also available to London. A letter in French sent from the British embassy in Vienna in July 1902 to London presented a more complimentary picture of Kamil, while still noting his anti-English proclivities:

> Mustafa Kmail Bey, [is the] owner and editor of the daily Arabic journal al-Liwa published in Cairo. [He is] 28 to 33 yrs of age, very intelligent and active, and speaks excellent French. He publishes articles in French in a number of European journals (papers), in addition to brochures, against the English domination of Egypt. [254]

This characterization was obviously quite different form the one provided by Cromer and drew a picture of man who is "very intelligent and active" as well as a "fluent French speaker." Even more importantly the letter went on to refute Cromer's assertion that

[253] Ibid, p.3
[254] Memorandum from British Embassy Vienna (author described as a well-informed source), Forwarded by Sir F. Plunkett to the Marquis of Lansdowne. July 12, 14, 1902. FO 407/159.

Kamil was personally without any influence: "Moustafa Kamel jouit dans le monde Musulman de beaucoup de credit et de consideration." Kamil according to this letter writer is a man "who enjoys in the Muslim World a great deal of credit (prestige) and consideration."

Mustafa Kamil relied heavily prior to 1904 on the hope that the French could be encouraged to pressure the British in Egypt and cause their withdrawal. The entente cordial obviously destroyed these early hopes. But the ever-resourceful Kamil now turned for support to the Germans, the Ottoman Empire's new allies. By 1905 his movements and actions were being monitored more closely than ever by the British. Mr Findlay, Councilor of the British Embassy in Egypt, dispatched in September 1905 a memorandum written a month earlier (August 18), to London, copies of which were then forwarded to the British consulates in Constantinople and Berlin, and the India Office, informing them of Kamil's movements and activities. In this memorandum he indicated a break from the past for Kamil and a new and worrisome collaboration: "Mustapha Kamel first had relations with the French through Daloncle, by whom he was apparently paid for anti-British articles - but these relations have ceased.[255]This cessation of relations was certainly a direct result of the entente cordial as were Mustafa Kamil's subsequent actions:

> He now has relations with the German Consulate which I can't make out, and perhaps is known only to himself. Baron Oppenheim visited him at his house several times, and Mustafa Kamel paid him also several visits during the last winter.[256]

It was quite clear that these were much more than simply social visits. This fact was underscored by Kamil's trip to Germany:

[255] Memorandum from Mr. Findlay in Cairo Agency to Foreign Office, September 15,1905. FO 78/5431
[256] Enclosed in Memorandum from Mr. Findlay in Cairo Agency to Foreign Office, September 15,1905. FO 78/5431

> Mustafa Kamel is now in Europe and the last letters received from him were from Germany. He had gone there with the hopes of interviewing the German Emperor.

To that end he supposedly was armed with a letter of introduction from the German Consulate and the Turkish Commiserate in Egypt. The network of informants set up by the British in Egypt seems to have been spectacular, at least in 1905, if it allowed them to determine all this information with any degree of accuracy. This kind of network must have been an invaluable tool in monitoring all political activity in Egypt. As for Kamil's old sponsor Abbas Hilmy:

> Mustafa Kamel is not at present a favourite of the Khedive with whom he quarreled…He is however the favorite of the Turkish government who look up to him as a preserver of the Sultan's influence among the Mahomedans in Egypt.

By the time this memorandum was forwarded, Mr Findlay felt better able to comment on the German relationship with Mustafa Kamil since he reported:

> El Alem El Islami (The Muslim World: a Pan-Islamic publication) is edited by Mustapha Kamel and probably inspired by Baron Oppenheim of the German Agency.[257]

On this note someone, probably in London, appended the following comment: "This was an appreciable indicator of German methods." This comment in itself is an even more appreciable indicator of rising British concern with German policy.

Kamil's actions continued to attract British concern. In December 1905 when the European powers pressured the Ottoman Sultan to allow the Macedonian reforms "to pass unnoticed" Cromer reported to the Marquis of Lansdowne that the leaders of the pan Islamic movement were quick to take advantage of the situation. The pan Islamic journals according to Cromer had publicized the possibility of the Sultan calling on all his subjects to come to his aid. "By far the most important of these papers is the "Lewa"

[257] From Mr. Findlay to Foreign Office September 18, 1905. FO 78/5431

which is edited by Mustapha Kamel Pasha, [who] as a consistent, and unscrupulous opponent of the British policy in this country, is well known to your lordship." In what could only be described as an expression of very wishful thinking Cromer added: "The influence possessed by this man had been for some years steadily on the wane," and then more realistically "but he has the reputation – more especially among the ignorant classes – of being an uncompromising supporter of the rights of the Caliphate, and this reputation has given considerable weight to his writings on the present occasion."[258]

It was another event, known as the *Danshawi* incident, that undeniably demonstrated Mustafa Kamil's true standing among the populace, and especially the students. An altercation between a British shooting party and some Egyptian peasants led to the accidental death of a British officer. The Egyptians involved in the altercation were subjected to brutal and excessive punishments that enraged the Egyptian public. It can be confidentially said that Kamil and his newspaper truly expressed the sentiment of Egypt and the Egyptians on that occasion. The British, however, thought otherwise and the reports dispatched to London sought to lay the blame for the general Egyptian indignation primarily on Mustafa Kamil's *al-Liwa* and other nationalist and pan-Islamic publications:

> The first violence of the press campaign is over. It was lead by the "Lewa" (Mustapha Kamel)…It is my firm conviction there would have been no agitation to speak of over the Denshawi case if the leaders of the pan-Islamic movement had not hoped to gain the support of a party in the House of Commons.[259]

That Mustafa Kamil and the nationalists sought the support of the Labour Party in the House of Commons cannot have surprised anyone. But that Mr Findlay the author of this report could have assumed that the *Danshawi* incident would have otherwise passed without significant outcry shows that the Agency was clearly getting out of touch with

[258] Cromer to the Marquis of Lansdowne. December 9th 1905. FO 78/5431
[259] Findlay to Sir Edward Grey, July 30, 1906. FO 371/67

Egyptian sentiment. The British seemed unwilling to admit just how popular Mustfa Kamil was among a significant portion of the Egyptian population.

The British were absolutely correct, though, in claiming that Kamil took every possible advantage of the *Danshawi* incident, even traveling to London to face the lion in his den. Whatever they wrote of him by this point, the British kept very close watch over him. While on his way back to Egypt after publicizing the *Danshawi* incident in Europe, his return was anticipated by the following communication on the September 15, 1906 from Mr. Findlay to London:

> I am told that Mustapha Kamel who is due to arrive here in about a week's time, and is contemplating holding an open air meeting in Alexandria, and perhaps, also in Cairo. If he were permitted to do this, there would be serious risk of a disturbance.[260]

The fear was that he would stoke the passions of the crowds, which might in turn threaten European lives or property. Mustafa Kamil never called for or preached violence, but his oration was passionate and the British would say intentionally inflammatory.

Kamil continued to grow as an irritant for the British, especially when he launched an Anglo-French newspaper to trumpet his views. From the very beginning of his tenure as Agent, Cromer had very skillfully manipulated the news coming out of Egypt, even going so far as to have several of his protégés anonymously placed on *The Times* payroll. An endeavor such as the proposed Anglo-French newspaper was a direct challenge to Cromer's control of the flow of information. Cromer speculated in a letter to Lord Grey:

> I understand that the English portion of the "Egyptian Standard" is to be managed by an Irish Nationalist of considerable journalistic experience and polemical skill, but I have not yet learnt the gentleman's name.[261]

[260] Findlay to Sir Edward Grey, September 15, 1906. FO 371/67
[261] Cromer to Sir Edward Grey, November 6, 1906. FO 371/67

One of the constant concerns expressed by the Colonial and Foreign offices was of an active and effective collaboration between Britain's resentful subject peoples. The connection of "The Standard" with an Irish nationalist could not have been too pleasing to Cromer. His concern, though, was not too great since he was convinced that Mustafa Kamil and his fellow nationalists were deluding themselves:

> The selection has been dictated by the idea which, however erroneous, has laid firm hold of the mind of the Nationalists, that they have succeeded in enlisting the sympathy and active support of a powerful sector of the English public opinion, and that an editor of this kind will best know how to consolidate and farther excite the sentiments in question.

The confidence Cromer exhibited of his nation's support of his policy in Egypt was overwhelming. This can be seen by his dismissal of the idea that the Egyptian nationalists had managed to gain any effective support in England. Based on this confidence he fully indulged in his designs for Egypt, regardless of Egyptian nationalist concerns. Tragically, for long-term Anglo-Egyptian relations it meant that their resentment of the British would fester and grow.

Mustafa Kamil remained an irritant for Cromer and his successor Eldon Gorst, speaking out against British policy in Egypt at every opportunity. His also founded one of the first Egyptian political parties since the British Occupation, *al-Hizb al-Watani*, (the Nationalist Party). He would not however live to see an independent Egypt, dying from an illness in February 1908, barely two months after the foundation of the Nationalist Party. Perhaps, for a nationalist who spent his entire short adult life in conflict with the British, no better praise could be delivered than the discourteous words of his enemies. Upon his death Ronald Storrs, at the time Gorst's assistant, wrote home the following words:

> …Mustafa Kamel Pasha—Caramel Pasha the French called him—died this week and was accorded a slap up funeral. Though he was a charlatan of the first order, discreditable in his private life and *bakshished* up to the

> eyes by all parties, it was evident that he had a great hold over the town effendis.[262]

Though insulting to him in life and discourteous in death, the British did not forget him. Kamil and his movement had made a powerful impact on the British psyche. Until Zaghlul rose to the position of nationalist leader, Kamil's name was always used when the Anglo-Egyptian administrators wished to draw attention to a troublesome nationalist.

BRITISH PERCEPTIONS OF SAAD ZAGHLUL

There were certain prominent Egyptians who, for various reasons, shared the British distaste for Mustafa Kamil, and prominent among those was Saad Zaghlul. Yet it can be convincingly argued that Zaghlul received his first ministry appointment, as minister of education, because of the outcry made by the nationalists, and especially Kamil, over the *Danshawi* incident. On the occasion of this appointment Cromer wrote to Lord Grey:

> As this appointment constitutes in some respects a new departure and as it has attracted much attention in Egypt, it may be desirable that I should place you in the possession of the main facts…[263]

This was certainly a new departure and one that only circumstances on the ground forced Cromer to put into practice:

> In proposing Zaghlul's name to the Khedive I was however influenced by another consideration of wider scope. The freedom of thought and speech enjoyed by this country under the present regime, combined with the undoubted intellectual awakening which is taking place, has had the natural results in creating in the minds of educated Egyptians the desire to see the higher offices in the Administration, filled as far as possible, by men of true Egyptian origins…

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[262] Ronald Storrs, *Orientations,* London, 1937. p. 85

[263] Memorandum by the Lord Cromer on the present Situation in Egypt. Circulated to the Cabinet December, 1906. p., 11. FO/371/67

This fact alone would hardly have moved Cromer to such a concession had it not been combined with Egyptian nationalist agitation and the bad publicity aroused after *Danshawi*:

> The reproach most frequently urged by the "patriotic" press is that we have maintained for so long existence of a system under which the ministers are little more than dummies…

Cromer actually did not contest this characterization, but in fact confirmed it with his next statement:

> I am fully aware of desirability, from all points of views, of rendering the Egyptian Ministers a real working factor in the Administration. But it is of the last important that the utmost care should be exercised in the selection…

If in fact the Egyptian Ministers had to be rendered a "real working factor," then they were obviously at that point non-entities, having been gradually reduced to that point by Cromer. As far as the British were concerned the only real function of the Egyptian Minister was to rubberstamp all British decisions. Now faced with the prospect of reversing that absolute British domination, even if a little, Cromer cast about for a specific type of Egyptian:

> For the moment, the number of those who could, with safety to the true public interest, be invited to occupy positions of this nature is very limited. It does not, in my opinion, extend far beyond the members of the particular school of thought called into existence by the late Moufti, Sheikh Mohamed Abdou.

Cromer went on to explain his reasoning:

> …[T]he object that which Sheikh Mohamed Abdou and his successors have in view is the moral and intellectual improvement of the Egyptian

> people, and to be accompanied[?,accomplished] gradually and without running to extremes in any direction.

This sort of reform program appealed tremendously to Cromer, as it posed no threat to his immediate control of Egyptian affairs. His close and fruitful collaboration with Abduh reinforced his good opinions of that particular school of thought. Of their program he wrote:

> Their object is to reform the Moslem institutions by the introduction of Western ideas without shaking the main pillars upon which the fundamental pillar of Islam rests.

Of their chances of success, though, Cromer was more pessimistic. He followed the above description with this dampening statement: "I must candidly admit that is very questionable whether a policy of this description is ever likely to meet with any degree of success."

It is important to understand that Cromer and his successors intended this reform program to take a very long time even under the best of circumstances, which would in reality allow British control to continue indefinitely. Abduh's successors, though, had no such notion, and the problems between them and the British came to a head when the British themselves were seen as obstacles to true reform. At that time though, Cromer looked toward Abduh's successors for collaboration:

> Of this school Saad Zaghloul is one of the leading representatives. It is to be hoped that the wise and moderate doctrines which it professes will be found to stand satisfactorily the practical test of time.

In the end one could argue that "the practical test of time" proved neither the British nor the Egyptians particularly wise or moderate. However, at the time this letter was written Cromer had this to say about Zaghlul:

> Both as a barrister and on the Bench Zaghloul Bey, has earned the confidence and respect of all who have been brought into contact with him. His marked talents, unquestioned integrity, and high character in private life have secured him a distinguished place in the opinion of both his countrymen and of foreign residents in Egypt.[264]

Zaghlul's antecedents were well known to Cromer for several reasons. Zaghlul was a former government employee, a disciple of Muhammad Abduh, and the son-in-law of Fahmy Pasha. Fahmy Pasha had held the position of Egyptian Prime Minister for a significant portion of Cromer's tenure in Egypt, and was seen as reliably pro-British. Fahmy also enjoyed good relations with Cromer personally and his son-in-law must have been known to the Agent. Irrespective of this, Zaghlul's appointment had an immediate salutary effect on Anglo-Egyptian relations:

> The appointment of Zaghloul Bey has been received been received with great pleasure and approval by all classes of Egyptian society. Even the most uncompromisingly hostile among the native papers have been constrained by the popular feelings to express their approbation of the measure.[265]

This was certainly true, as even Mustafa Kamil published an article in *al-Liwa,* expressing his cautious approval for this new appointment. Although this approval did not long endure it was definitely a significant mark of success for Cromer's policy. Cromer appeared even further vindicated in his decision when a letter written to one his subordinates by "a leading member of the legislative council, a man of some talent and capacity," spoke of the appointment "as having obliterated in the minds of the Egyptians recollection of the *Danshawi* incident."[266]Cromer in agreeing with this assessment was at best naive and at worst self-deceptive. The *Danshawi* incident was to a great extent ingrained into the minds of the Egyptian populace as an instance of British brutality and injustice. That fact that he was likely correct in his assumption that it only became a

[264] Cromer to Sir Edward Grey, November 2nd, 1906. FO 371/67
[265] Ibid.
[266] Ibid.

national issue due to the outcry created by the nationalist press was immaterial. *Danshawi* was no more likely to be forgotten by the Egyptian population than the Alamo was to be forgotten by the people of Texas.

For his part Zaghlul looked up to Cromer and regarded him as a mentor and a man worthy of emulation. He attended Cromer's farewell gathering in 1908 and delivered a valedictory address praising Cromer's accomplishments, despite the political risk implicit in praising the Khedive Abbass Hilmy's bitter enemy. Indeed, accusations were made that the Khedive had frightened away many of the possible native participants with threats.[267] Cromer repaid Zaghlul's compliments with very high praise:

> Unless I am much mistaken, a career of great public usefulness lies before the present Minister of Education, Saad Zaghloul Pasha. He possesses all the qualities necessary to serve his country. He is honest; he is capable; he has the courage of his convictions; he has been abused by many of the less worthy of his own countrymen. These are high qualifications. He should go far.[268]

In a sense this was a foreshadowing of things to come, although hardly in the way that Cromer expected. These very same traits of honesty, ability, and conviction made Zaghlul incapable of compromising with Kitchener, the Consul-General in 1912, over what he saw as a matter of principle. The consequences of that confrontation with Kitchener sent Zaghlul down a very different path from the one likely imagined for him by Cromer in 1907, but he undoubtedly went quite "far."

Cromer's immediate successor, Eldon Gorst, had no cause to regret Cromer's decision to appoint Saad Zaghlul to the Ministry of Education. Whatever difficulties he might have created in his new post were apparently compensated for his committed support of Gorst's program for Egypt. This was made clear by his stance with respect to Gorst's proposal to approve an extension to the Suez Canal Company's lease agreement. Although Gorst's proposal failed in the Egyptian General Assembly, Zaghlul supported

[267] Ronald Storrs, *Orientations,* (London, 1937), p. 54
[268] Ibid.

Premier Butros Ghali's efforts to persuade the Assembly to accept it "with convinced and unquestioning loyalty."[269]

When Butrus Ghali, the first ever Egyptian Copt premier, was assassinated in 1909 Zaghlul, was transferred from the ministry of education to the ministry of justice. Given the turbulent aftermath of Butrus' assassination, Gorst's placement of Zaghlul at the head of the Ministry of Justice was certainly a pointed show of confidence in him. Zaghlul was extremely active and assertive in administering of his post. While both Cromer and Gorst had worked well enough with him despite this, Kitchener, Gorst's successor was a completely different matter. Less than a year after Kitchener had taken over as Consul-General he and Zaghlul clashed irrevocably over the appointment of *Husayn Muharam*, a palace favorite, to the Ministry of War. Zaghlul objected on principle to Muharam, believing him to be dishonest, and would not retreat from his stance despite the desires of both Kitchener and the Khedive. This led to his resignation form the government on bad terms. The relationship between Zaghlul and Kitchener was poisoned form that point onwards.

Both Cromer and Gorst managed to work with, and even appreciate, Zaghlul's determination to exert himself in his office. Both found ways to reach accommodations with him without forcing him to compromise on his convictions. Kitchener was unable, and maybe even incapable of replicating his predecessor's accomplishments. All three men came from relatively similar social backgrounds, had relatively similar educational experiences, and all had chosen to join the British Army. All were strongwilled, determined men who possessed conviction in the inherent rightness of their views. All these similarities make Kitchener's inability to reproduce their success in that arena even more puzzling. Kitchener, it must be remarked, differed in one major aspect. He had from early in his career often acted with a brash disregard to the consequences of his actions. His insubordination on the eve of the British invasion of Egypt, as discussed in the previous chapter, is an excellent indication of this. This disregard for the

[269] Storrs, p. 84

consequences also seemed to typify his behavior with regards the Saad Zaghlul and the Khedive Abbas Hilmy II.

Ronald Storrs, Kitchener's personal secretary, wrote of his former boss: "Kitchener was free of the uglier blemishes, grave or comic: he had no rancor, and no snobbishness, but he could be petulant."[270] Appropriately enough this remark was made in the context of Kitchener's treatment of Zaghlul after his resignation. Mustafa Pasha Fehmy the ex-Premier sent Kitchener a note "requesting for his son-in-law Zaghlul Pasha the position…of Controller of Egyptian students in France."[271] Storrs commented that after he gave his opinion to Kitchener that Zaghlul was indeed appropriate for the job, the latter remarked: "He [Zaghloul] is more trouble than he is worth."[272]

Zaghlul did not actually remain in private life long but ran for, and won, a seat in the newly constituted Legislative Assembly. He immediately assumed a position of some prominence in the Assembly. "A president and Vice President of the Chamber had been appointed by the government. The initial business of the house was to choose an elected Vice President to officiate with his nominated colleagues."[273] Zaghlul was elected Vice President by 65 out of 79 recorded votes. The author of the report alleged a "powerful press campaign – had been in progress in favour of Saad Pasha Zaghloul and of the odium attached to anyone opposing him." It must also be said that Zaghlul enjoyed a great deal of popular support and was a force in his own right. Much to the discomfort of Kitchener and the Egyptian Government he was certainly not kindly disposed to them:

> On February the 2nd Saad Pasha Zaghlul took an opportunity, afforded by a debate on the competence of the Assembly, to make a statement of policy in which he disclaimed all desire to place himself in systematic opposition to the Government. As, however, he was at the time holding daily meetings in his house to organize that Opposition and he was in

[270] Storrs, p.26
[271] Ibid., p.126
[272] Ibid.
[273] Report on the First (and only) Session of the Egyptian Legislative Assembly January 22-June 17, 1914. Report by R. Graham was completed 26th of June 1914. FO 371/1969

> constant communication with the Palace as to the best means of upsetting the Ministry, his statement was received with some skepticism.[274]

In his diaries Zaghlul denied being in any way controlled by the Palace but, as noted previously, he found it preferable to work with the Khedive than with Kitchener. Kitchener in his opinion was the much more dangerous of the two, and he chose to oppose him and his chosen government with all the means at his disposal. The report concluded with this shrewd assessment of Zaghlul's abilities:

> Saad Zaghlul was the dominating personality throughout the session and he has all the makings of a successful demagogue. Able and eloquent he was able to sway the house by his speeches…His weak points are intense egotism, an ungovernable temper, and a domineering manner, which militate against sustained popularity…[275]

As far as it went, this was characterization of Zaghlul was not very far off the mark. He did indeed find it difficult because of his "domineering manner" to sustain his popularity among fellow politicos. It failed, however, in one respect. It did not account for his ability to maintain popular support and affection.

The contest in the Assembly was not merely between the Egyptian Government on one side and the Khedive Abbas and the opposition on the other. It swiftly became a contest between the British authorities and the opposition, a contest essentially between Kitchener and the brief Zaghlul-Khedive alliance:

> They [the British authorities] have to incur the odium of scraping together a reluctant majority to support unpopular Ministers and forcing measures down the throat of the Chamber, where a defeat for the government becomes a defeat for them.[276]

Combine this with the fact that Kitchener had the sensitivity of a battering ram when it came to dealing with any opposition, and disaster seemed inevitable. The situation was

[274] Ibid., p. 2
[275] Ibid., p. 14
[276] Ibid., p.15

finally artificially and temporarily resolved by the outbreak of the First World War and the suspension of the legislative assembly in September 1914.

When Egypt was designated a British Protectorate and placed under martial law at the outbreak of the war, internal political activity was temporarily suspended. The departure of Kitchener also improved the possibilities for some sort of reconciliation between the British authorities and Saad Zaghlul. McMahon, Kitchener's replacement, now styled High Commissioner, had no previous personal history with Zaghlul and hence bore him no enmity. Their relationship, however, was extremely limited, as were McMahon's relations with Egyptians in general. The necessities of the war, his unfamiliarity with Egypt, and the convenience of military rule, meant that McMahon was mostly isolated from the native population. Hence he did not contribute much to the British perceptions of the Egyptian political scene. As stressed in Chapter Three, though, he left behind an administration in relative disarray from which multiple voices clamored for London's attention.

Sir Reginald Wingate his successor, on the other hand, was a veteran of Egyptian politics. He wished to engage the Egyptians who were progressively more restive but lacked guidance from his government. By December 1917 the Egyptian government of Rushdi Pasha wished to change its makeup, by replacing two of Kitchener's appointees. Rushdi, possibly at the behest of the new Sultan *Fuad*, proposed that Saad Zaghlul and Abdul Aziz Fahmy replace Hilmy Pasha and Fathy Pasha respectively. This was in the context of a larger proposal for the devolution of power from the British to the Egyptian Government. Wingate communicated Rushdi's proposal to London and requested to be informed of Britain's future policy in Egypt:

> In the circumstances I feel difficulty in making recommendations on proposed ministerial changes without some indication from you as to our future policy in Egypt of a more definite nature than I have yet received…

Two things are particularly striking about this communiqué. First is the hesitant and uncertain approach adopted by Wingate, in sharp contrast with Cromer for instance

whose communiqués were more likely to contain an account of his action rather than a request for advice. The other striking aspect is the fact that even as late as December 1917 the British government had still not developed a concrete policy with regard to post-war Egypt!

As to the proposed appointment of Saad Zaghlul to a ministerial post Wingate had this to say:

> Saad Zaghlul is well known. He left the Cabinet of Mahomet Said after quarrelling with his chief and subsequently in 1914 as Vice President of the Legislative Assembly led a bitter attack against the British Agency and his former colleagues. He is now getting old and probably desires income while Rushdi might prefer to place [the] most effective speaker in the Assembly under obligation to himself.[277]

Wingate reduced Zaghlul's resignation, which was due to a disagreement with the Khedive Abbass Hilmy and Kitchener over a matter of principle, to simply a quarrel with his chief. This is either excessive coyness on the part of Wingate or a perfect example of lack of proper historical background information. In either case it was a horrendous oversimplification of a crucial assessment. The comment regarding Zaghlul's advanced age and desire for an income, purely speculative as it might have been, was quite accurate if only a part of a much bigger picture. On the basis of the information at his disposal and on his perceptions of Zaghlul, Wingate wrote that he "should not be strongly opposed to either of these nominations of themselves…"[278] R. Graham appended further commentary and analysis to Wingate's report. In his assessment of Saad Zaghlul, Graham closely echoed Wingate and added the astute observation that "there is no doubt that the inclusion of Zaghlul and Fahmy in the Ministry will strengthen its position in the country."[279]It seems quite apparent that at least from the perspective of the most knowledgeable authorities on the subject, Zaghlul was not yet deemed incorrigible in December 1917. The Egyptian nationalists, however, were not content to wait upon the

[277] Sir Reginald Wingate to Mr. Balfour December 9th, 1917. FO 371/2928
[278] Ibid.
[279] R Graham December 13, 1917. Enclosed in Sir Reginald Wingate to Mr. Balfour December 9th, 1917. FO 371/2928

pleasure of the British government for answers on the future of their country, and the British insistence that they patiently wait for the end of the war was not well received.

Barely eleven months after Premier Rushdi's proposals were presented to Wingate a delegation headed by Saad Zaghlul visited Wingate at the Agency in order to present their own program for the future of their country. Wingate described the incident and the delegation thus:

> I have received a visit from three Egyptians, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, Abdel Aziz Bey Fahmy, and Ali Pasha Saharwi, all of whom will be known to you as politicians of advanced views. They came to advocate a program of complete autonomy for Egypt…they disowned the methods of Mustafa Kamil and Mohammad Farid though agreeing with their principles. They profess gratitude and friendship with us and stated their desire to go to London in order to put forward their demands.

It is striking just how much Kamil's memory still bothered the British even ten years after his death. Despite their disavowal of all anti-British sentiment Wingate could apparently only repeat the refrain from before: "I…warned them repeatedly that they must exercise patience having regard to [the] many important preoccupations of His Majesty's Government." Wingate was fully aware of the inadequacy of this response, for it had already proven highly ineffective, but without a clear indication of the British Government's intent, his ability to deal properly with Egyptian demands was limited. To that end he repeated previous requests to London for directions: "I should be glad to have any instructions His Majesty's Government consider it desirable to give me."[280]

Wingate received his response from London and although it contained a set of instructions it had little indication of the British Government's plans for Egypt:

> No useful purpose will be served by allowing Nationalist leaders to come to London and advance immoderate demands that cannot be entertained…His Majesty's Government would always be ready to listen with sympathy to any reasonable proposals on the part of the

[280] Sir R. Wingate and circulated to the King and War Cabinet, November 17th, 1918. FO 371/1918.

> Ministers…But the proposed visit of the two ministers would not be opportune at the moment.[281]

London seemed incapable of grasping that the more moderate Ministers were growing impatient. In reality they could not afford to wait any longer upon London's convenience. Egyptian public opinion was aroused in favor of Saad Zaghlul and his fellow nationalists. Of this the British Government seemed completely oblivious, neither well inform nor prepared for the situation.[282] Imperious instructions from London that the Egyptian Ministers should be patient were totally inadequate.

Arthur James Balfour, the Foreign Secretary at the time, appears to have placed his trust in Lord Robert Cecil, the Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, than the man on the ground, High Commissioner Wingate. Another delegation, this time comprised of 14 prominent Egyptians and led by Zaghlul, visited Wingate Cecil informed Balfour:

> The only men among them that have ability are Zaghul, Adly and Sidki who have already been described and Mahomed Mahmoud, the ex-governor of Bahria, and Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid formerly editor of the "Garida" and a powerful speaker and writer.

Despite admitting the abilities of these Egyptians, Cecil then made the assertion that those were all "disappointed and disgraced men."[283]It becomes crucial then to ask, in whose eyes exactly were they disgraced? That they were disgraced men in the eyes of Cecil and many of the British meant nothing in Egypt, where they had a powerful hold on their countrymen's minds and hearts.

Wingate's report to London on Egyptian public opinion, written on November 20, contained a considerably more level-headed and realistic analysis of the situation in Egypt:

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[281] Arthur James Balfour to Sir R. Wingate, November 25, 1918. FO 371/1918
[282] George A.L. Lloyd, *Egypt Since Cromer*, New York, 1970, 2 vol. vol 1. p. 294
[283] Robert Cecil to Arthur James Balfour, November 24, 1918. FO 371/1918

> You are well aware of the Egyptian politician as a class and with the vagueness and inconsistency of their programmes. At the same time it should be recognized that they are voicing the sentimental aspiration of the small native educated class, aspiration which…appeal to the susceptibilities of a considerable section of the Moslem population.[284]

This report indicated that the British government was definitely made aware that at least its High Commissioner believed in the relevance and importance of Zaghlul's Egyptian delegation. Yet Cecil's letter from the 24th paid scant heed to Wingate's warning. Indeed, handwritten at the end of the printed document was the following comment: "Sir R Wingate seems deplorably weak at a moment when such weakness is calculated to create serious embarrassment for us at the Peace."[285]

Of equal importance to Wingate's accurate assessment of the Egyptian support for the Nationalists was his opinion of their intentions:

> …it should be noted that their views have been expressed with remarkable frankness, and there has been no apparent disposition to engage in secret agitation or revolutionary propaganda. There are so far no signs whatever of a militant spirit, nor of attempts to excite religious fanaticism or anti-European feelings.

Wingate also suspected that the Egyptian nationalists were for the most part posturing for the home crowd and that they in reality sought more of a "change of form than of system in the present Government of Egypt." He believed that what they desired most, or would eventually settle for, were concessions that gave them "the appearance of increased political responsibility without eliminating the British element in the Administration."[286]In November 1918 this could possibly have been true of at least a portion of the nationalist camp. Although, given Zaghlul's history of wanting to wield effective power, that assessment was doubtful in his case. Regardless, the subsequent British actions assured the end of any real chance for compromise.

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[284] Report of Egyptian Public Opinion from Sir R Wingate to Mr. Balfour, 20th of November, 1918 p. 8. FO 371/1918
[285] Robert Cecil to Arthur James Balfour, November 24, 1918. FO 371/1918
[286] Sir R Wingate to Mr. Balfour, 20th of November, 1918 p. 9. FO 371/1918

To understand the increasingly counterproductive decisions coming from the British government, it is important to recognize just how much inaccurate material was making its way to the Foreign Office. An unattributed and unsigned personality report on Saad Zaghlul from the Foreign Office files for 1918 is a prime example:

> He [Zaghlul] joined the ranks of the Nationalists and was one of the chief adherents of Moustafa Pasha Kamil, the leader of the Nationalist Party in the time of Lord Cromer in Egypt…Lord Cromer determined to try the experiment of giving Zaglul a post in the government…The experiment was not a success. From the outset Zaglul maintained his connection with the Nationalist Part and showed marked hostility to the British officials with whom he had to work…Finally his attitude became so unsatisfactory that Lord Kitchener removed him from office.[287]

Lord Cromer's dispatches from that period did not in any way imply any such connection; rather to the contrary, they contrasted Zaghlul's nationalism favorably with that of Kamil and his group. Cromer was also frank in his admiration and praise for Zaghlul, as attested by his farewell speech. Eldon Gorst, Cromer's successor, also worked very congenially with him. Zaghlul's own diaries also very clearly contradicted these statements and demonstrated a lively hostility had developed between him and Mustafa Kamil, upon the latter's appointment by Cromer to the Ministry of Education. Yet despite this accumulated evidence to the contrary, a report of this nature made its way into the Foreign Office files. That was not the only report of this nature, but one of several such pieces. It can be said with some degree of certainty that by 1918 Foreign Office intelligence collection on Egypt was far from intelligent.

By March 1913 several major developments had taken place. Lord George Curzon, had been appointed Foreign Secretary in January of that year, and General Allenby, then the Military Governor of Palestine, was quietly chosen to supersede Wingate in Egypt. Wingate, while still retaining the title of High Commissioner, was recalled to London and kept there. Meanwhile the acting High Commissioner in Wingate's absence, Milne Cheetham, ordered the arrest and deportation of Zaghlul and

[287] Unsigned and Un-attributed, December 1918. FO 371/1918

his nationalist colleagues on March 8. Shortly thereafter, on March 21, Allenby was dispatched to Cairo as Special High Commissioner and Supreme Militray Commander. These changes being effected, Curzon was willing to receive the Egyptian ministers in London but still refused to entertain the idea of allowing the nationalist delegation the same courtesy.

By March 31, with most of the violence now under control, and after consultation with the ex-ministers Rushdi and Adly Pasha, Allenby telegraphed Lord Balfour the following surprising statement:

> I propose with your concurrence to issue passports to any respectable Egyptian who may wish to visit Europe, without reference to colour of their politics, as is done in Palestine and Syria…I have shown that I can repress agitation and action which I prepare to take shall have good effect. Please express approval.[288]

This was shortly followed on April 6, by another course-altering decision on Allenby's part:

> Outward quiet prevails but extremist feeling is increasingly violent and dangerous.
> I have today seen the Sultan who is making a proclamation counseling quiet and obedience to the law.
> I shall issue tomorrow a proclamation to the following effect.
> Now that order has been in a great measure restored, I declare in agreement with his highness the Sultan that there are no restrictions on travel and that Egyptian who wish to leave the country are free to do so.
> Further I have decided that SAAD Pasha Zaghlul, ISMAIL Pasha SIDKY; MOHAMMED Pasha MAHMOUD, HAMAD Pasha EL BASEL shall be released from imprisonment and given similar freedom of movement.[289]

Allenby also requested that the notables be granted a hearing both by the Prime Minister and by Balfour, as well as other delegates who could confirm the international acceptance

[288] General Allenby to Mr. Balfour, March, 31, 1919. FO 608/213
[289] General Allenby to Mr. Balfour, April, 6, 1919. FO 608/213

of the British Protectorate over Egypt.[290] Allenby wrote candidly to Balfour: "Nevertheless, I think Zaghlul now represents [the] opinion of [the] majority of [the] Egyptian intellectuals."[291]

Placed in a delicate position, the British government was ultimately forced to accede to Allenby's wishes. Zaghlul was released from Malta, along with his colleagues and headed for Paris and the Peace Conference. Their trip to Europe proved absolutely fruitless as the British had effectively curtailed all criticism of their position and received the support of both France and the United States. The ideals of self-determination espoused by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, and the hopes that they had raised, were dashed. A disappointed Saad Zaghlul eventually returned home empty-handed and disenchanted. His failure to secure Egypt's independence aside, Zaghlul effectively remained until his death in 1927 the master of Egyptian popular opinion. His relationship with the British was never righted and from them he earned the labels of "radical" and "obstructionist" but never again would the British ignore or trivialize him.

CONCLUSION

Perceptions are products of the moment. The period covered by this study, from 1882 through 1919, features many moments and hence many different perceptions, even for the same individual. The intent of this chapter was to track these changes and demonstrate how alterations in perception occurred over time; and how they actually helped determine the course of events. In addition this chapter has attempted to demonstrate the great extent to which the dilution of the Agent's authoritativeness, at least after Kitchener, created a situation where the ultimate decision makers in London were considerably and progressively more ill-informed. This loss of authoritativeness came despite an enhancement in authority, with the move from Agent's to High Commissioners, and in the case of Allenby Special High Commissioner and Supreme Military Commander. Yet none of those possessed the authoritativeness and esteem of

[290] General Allenby to Mr. Balfour, April, 18, 1919. FO 608/213
[291] General Allenby to Mr. Balfour, April, 20, 1919. FO/608/213

Cromer, or even Gorst and Kitchener. Gradually the voices claiming to speak with authority on Egypt increased, while in reality true understanding decreased. This was very clearly a contributing factor to the collapse in Anglo-Egyptian relations in 1919 and beyond.

Conclusion

Much of the literature written regarding the 1919 revolution persistantly questions how the deterioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations could have been averted. In reality, an Anglo-Egyptian clash over the future of Egypt was inevitable, for Egypt and the Egyptians had changed while the British requirements of Egypt remained the same. That is not to say that a wiser and more perceptive understanding of Egyptian aspirations could not have averted a great deal of violence, bloodshed and bitterness at least in 1919. In retrospect, it is difficult to ascertain whether Britain and Egypt could have arrived at a compromise, despite Lord Milner's optimism. This is where tracking the changes of perception from both sides proves tremendously informative.

Two critical developments significantly worsened relations between Egypt's elite and its British occupiers. These relationships were severely damaged during Kitchener's tenure as Agent. Much of the damage was caused by Kitchener's personality and his seeming indifference to alienating able and generally cooperative Egyptian individuals such as Saad Zaghlul. This is not to imply that Zaghlul's enmity with Kitchener caused the violence in 1919, for there were more substantial issues that occurred wartime developments that contributed to general Egyptian dissatisfaction. However, it was Zaghlul who gave the opposition a much-needed focus and a very powerful voice. To complicate matters further, the British occupation administration gradually lost its cohesiveness, just as it appeared to have lost touch with Egyptian sentiment.

The consequences of Kitchener's disregard for elite Egyptian sentiment were compounded by the factionalism of the British administration during McMahon's tenure. From this time onward the Agents, no longer commanded the authoritativeness with the British government that they had previously enjoyed. This is made patently clear during Wingate's tenure as High Commissioner, when his rather prescient analyses of the state of Egyptian nationalist feelings were routinely ignored in favor of far less insightful, if more congenial assessments. The British government occupied with the conclusion of the war in Europe, thus missed the gravity of the situation in Egypt.

There also appears to have been some validity to the statements made by al-Afghani, al-Nadim, and Kamil against the British, that they never quite accepted the Egyptians as "equals." For at least a certain faction of the British government, Egyptian demands for independence were not regarded as being heartfelt or genuine, but were portrayed as gambits by the ruling elite to improve their positions. This was obviously not a true reflection upon the Egyptians they attempted to portray, but rather their own inability to acknowledge that Egypt and its people had changed.

British strategic anxiety over the control of the Suez was also another persistent theme in British thinking. Indeed even after the loss of the Indian Empire, and the apparent dissolution of the pretext of safeguarding the Empire's lines of communication, Britain could not let Egypt go. It took the absolute political defeat of the 1956 Suez war to convince Britain that its claims to Suez were no longer viable. Even then, there was little acknowledgment that Egypt itself had changed, rather an acceptance that the world had changed. Prior to 1956 Britain was still operating under the assumption, espoused by the Milner Mission, that the two nations could arrive at an agreement suitable to the interests of both. The problem with this assumption was that even at the time that it was formulated Anglo-Egyptian relations had been severely damaged.

On the Egyptian side of the equation there existed two broad schools of thought, which coalesced to a certain degree over the issue of independence. The first was represented by al-Afghani, al-Nadim and Kamil. That school of thought rejected all and any benefits of the British occupation. To them the continuation of the British occupation was not a gradual path to sovereignty and independence but rather a continuous slide into enslavement. To Kamil, the trailblazer for 20th century nationalists, Egypt did not need to look to Britain but rather to Muhammad Ali, the founder of the khedival dynasty to retake a position of prominence in the world. To that end he exaggerated the accomplishments of Muhammad Ali's reign and ignored the grave social ills that it brought with it. Independence from Great Britain whatever the cost, could best characterize his political program. But Kamil's political program was limited, and his need to muster a large and powerful opposition to the British occupation made him

appear unprincipled. The Khedive, the French, the Ottomans, and the Germans were all seen as potential allies, and the price that they might exact should the struggle for independence succeed was not an issue on which Kamil chose to dwell. The program of the Nationalist Party he founded was limited to promoting independence and some form of constitutional government, but in reality it had no experience in management or government. The British were indeed correct in stating that the Egyptians were not ready to govern, but then Kamil was correct in assuming that the British would never judge them ready to govern.

The second Egyptian school of thought was infused by the more conciliatory spirit of Muhammad Abduh, who acknowledged the necessity of reform prior to independence. The period of British tutelage though was hardly supposed to be indefinite, and the very limited inclusion of Egyptians in high administrative posts was soon seen as a sign of British opposition to proper reform. By 1917, Saad Zaghlul became the driving force behind this new group of nationalists that later coalesced in the *Wafd* Party. They adopted Kamil's earlier calls for Egyptian independence while acknowledging the benefits of prior British rule. Experienced in administration and in governance the *Wafd* Prty's ability to carry out a constitutional political program was vastly superior to that of Kamil's ill-fated Nationalist Party. After the revolution of 1919, however, they placed themselves in a position where compromise with Britain became increasingly difficult. British accusations that the *wafd* had unleashed a destructive and intolerant spirit in Egypt may have been well deserved, but without such an unleashing the British might never have acknowledged the extent to which the situation in Egypt had changed.

By the end of the First World War Western notions of liberty and self-determination had undermined the concept of imperialism. Egypt had imbibed sufficiently from those principles to render a continued occupation intolerable to many of its people. Compromise over the nature of British presence in Egypt also became increasingly difficult to achieve as the bitterness and distrust each side harbored toward the other was magnified by imprisonments, deaths, and perceived humiliations. The

Anglo-Egyptian relationship that Cromer and Gorst had so carefully nursed into existence could not survive the imprudent treatment of Kitchener or the negligent disregard of the British government.

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